190MaoednnDuring the Korean War Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia 191 aim in sending troops to Korea was to strike against US and South ormee t mediion,re Since Stalin attached such importance to the thirty-eighth paral- solve the Korean crisis peacefully. Chinagradually lel,the Chinese consulted the Soviets regarding the timing and terms dhmeahenlhcnaiomomtehatefedRedinisfavorAhe of accepting armistice negotiations.On December 4 Wang Jiaxiang. the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union,asked Andrei Gromyko. thehorin his cable to the Soviet deputy foreign minister."From a political perspeetive, S Novmercrin should the Chinese army cross the 38th parallel when it is on a vic- rtaenKore e revrdn No torious march forward?"Gromyko answered,"Since the situation in vemberMP Dun-chiel of the Chi Korea has become so unfavorable to the Americans...it is appro- opleCPVTheU nd Francecou priate to apply the Chinese proverb-'to strike while the iron is hot'" dyTheypesmism Iou (APRF 1950,1.35-37).On December 5.calling on Andrei Vishinsky. rr e nsof thousnd the Soviet representative to the UN.Wu Xiuquan,head of China's ofmthionoudn change special delegation to the UN,told him that when he met with Trygve YMZW197658672).Stalin's congratulatory telegramalso Lie,the UN Secretary-General,delegates from Sweden.England.and nmleofhe Soviet army'defet other countries"attempted to find out if the Chinese forces would ofhedurin World War I.Salinold Mao that the stop at the thirty-eighth parallel and if the Chinese army would re- Chnesecmcompletely modemized,well treat from Korea when all other foreign troops leave Korea"(Bian- equipped,and very powerful army"through this war. weihui 2009,264-265).After receiving Wu's cable inquiry.Zhou o Demt Chinese nd Norh Korean forces were Enlai sent his reply via cable in the early morning of December 7.de- hvecampaign.Mao and Zhou met claring that"the demarcation line at the thirty-eighth parallel no Kmhe North Korean leader.in Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian longer exists."As to the content of negotiations.Zhou stated,"We are y1997.102-103).When discussing the war situation,Mao considering and will cable you later"(JYZEW 2008,599-600). 如过 Meanwhile,Zhou,via Nikolai Roshchin,the Soviet ambassador to China,sent an urgent cable to Moscow,notifying Soviet leaders of The enemy might ask for a cease-fire.We think [the Americans continuous inquiries regarding China's conditions for cessation of mil- houdewithdraw from Korea.First of all,they should itary action in Korea.These had been received from Secretary-General ithrwsouth of the 38th parallel,and then we can ne. Lie and delegates from India,Britain,and Sweden.Zhou indicated that gotiateacfire The best outcome is that we not only take over China planned to present five conditions for a cease-fire at the UN via Pyongyang.but also occupy Seoul....If the United States con- withraw itstoothe UN might agree to a free election Wu Xiuquan and would like to hear from the Soviet Union before tak- of a govemmentnall of Korea under UN control with Chinese and ing any action.The conditions were:first,the withdrawal of all foreign Soviet participation.(JYMJW 2010,388) forces from Korea:second,the withdrawal of US troops from the Tai- wan Strait area and from Taiwan;third,the Korean issue should be re- Mao's talk was cabled to the front-line commanders of the CPV the solved by the Korean people themselves;fourth.the admission of the next day.Mao still believed that the war should be terminated mainly PRC to the UN and the dismissal of Taiwan's representative from the through peaceful negotiations,but that the US-UN forces had to vol- UN:fifth,the convening of a conference of foreign ministers of the niy withdraw or be driven back toareas south of the thirty-eighth parallel four major powers(the United States,the USSR,Britain,and China) to prepare for a peace treaty with Japan.Zhou expected to receive the Soviet reply the same day (APRF 1950.1.17-19)