188 Mo edong Erroneous Dedsion rn Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia 189 the time of China's entry into the war in October 1950 and the cre. ation of the United Narions (UN)cease-fire resolution in early Janu- On October 1.when US and UN forces were approaching the ry 1951 (Chen 2001.8s-96:Qi and Liu 1998:Shen 2000:Shen 宽hteelyn on Chin thirty-eighth parallel,in his cable to Mao,Stalin asked the Chinese RnatSaaeaerNaoenmwpue forces to"immediately march toward the thirty-eighth parallel so that rand Chneivthr the Korean comrades could organize reserve forces under your cover" (JYMZW 1987.556.558-561).Mao responded to Stalin's cable.In kkemg、vemndpsoWteNeoloio a draft reply on October 2.Mao stated that the aim of China's entry orhao me an erroneous into the war was"to annihilate and drive the US and other invaders e the N anuary out of Korea."China was preparing for a US declaration of war.At teChmost itsnageon this early stage of the war,Chinese forces"would only engage in de- theKndi tenforce Chin fensive warfare in North Korea."In the early moring of October 3. vlliplomtically,and miltarily Zhou Enlai.China's premier and foreign minister,wamed the US gov- ernment through Sardar K.M.Panikkar,the Indian ambassador to China.that foreign forces,especially meaning US troops,must not Mao's Decision Not to Negotiate Before cross the thirty-eighth parallel to the north.Otherwise,the Chinese Chinese Soldiers Crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel would enter the war.Regarding the war in Korea,Zhou proposed, "All countries concerned must seek a peaceful resolution through the UN"(Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives [CFMA].1950,no.105- Chinas War Aims 00009-01.13-16:ZEJW 1997.67-68).At this point,Zhou highlighted MaoZedonthe thirty-eighth parallel served the political importance of the thirty-eighth parallel and clearly pointed eindndofor China's entryinto out that peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict should be through theKre War.When he first discussed the issue of China's sending the UN.It seems that Zhou and Stalin happened to hold the same view. rStin'sprerqe was"when the enemy crosses the On October 5,Stalin again cabled Mao to try to persuade him to hralle heedt(Archive of the President of the send Chinese forces.Stalin told Mao that if China entered the war us Feration [APRF]90.d.331.1.79).This statement is also and "engages the US in a serious contest,"the United States"will dbyChinese soures On July 9 1950.when relaying the Chi- have to accept the terms for cease-fire in Korea.It would be favorable neseCommunist Party (CCP)center's instruction at an expanded meet- to North Korea and the enemy could not turn Korea into a colony" ing of the East China Bureau.Liu Xiao,second secretary of the (Shen 2004,909-912).At meetings of the CCP Politburo on October Shanghai Municipal Committee of the CCP.reported that when the 4-5,the Chinese leaders made the decision to send troops to Korea, United Sates counrked and crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,the hoping the Soviet air force would provide cover (JYMZW 1987.556. Chinese amy would assist the Korean people"to drive the U.S.impe- 558-561).After learning that the Soviet air force could not enter the rialists out of Korea]"(Liu 2001).When the war stalemated along the war for a while,Mao on October 14 modified China's battle plan Nakdong River,Mao.on several occasions,indicated his willingness to slightly:avoid US forces,only fight South Korean forces,and vigor- send Chinese troops.He planned to have the Chinese soldiers wear the ously defend areas south of Tokchon and Nyongwon while waiting for (North)Korean People's Ammy (KPA)uniforms and fight together with Soviet aid (JYMZW 1987,556.558-561).After China entered the itssoldiers But Stalin tumed Mao down on the grounds that the tim- war,Zhou told the Chinese public that the aim was"to localize the ing was not ripe (Shen 2010.Bajanov 1995/1996.88-89) war"and"to force U.S.imperialists to beat a retreat in the face of dif- ficulties"(ZEJW 1997,92.102-109).In short,China's initial strategic