Changing Exposure to Trade between protection and Free Soil in the ing:if all factors were abundant relative platform of the Republican party or of the to the rest of the world,the society would North more generally,and Why did so unanimously embrace free trade;if all broad a coalition support both aims? were scarce,it would agree on protection. If,as seems apparent,labor was scarce Let us consider,then,the remaining two in the United States,then the nineteenth possibilities. century's increasing exposure to trade In an advanced economy where both should have depressed,or at least land and labor are scarce,expanding retarded the advance of,wages.By defini- trade will benefit only capital.Agriculture tion,slaves already received a lower wage and labor-green and red-will unite in than they would voluntarily accept(Else, support of protection and,if need be, why coerce them?);and increased trade imperialism;only capitalists will embrace could reasonably be seen as intensifying, free trade.When trade contracts in such or at least as retarding the demise of, an economy,the scarce factors of land slavery.Conversely,protection in a and labor gain,and capital loses,influ- labor-scarce economy might so raise the ence;farmers and peasants are likely to general wage level (while,paradoxically, seek expanded mass participation in poli- also increasing returns to scarce capital) tics and a radical curtailment of capitalist as to make manumission feasible.Hence power. to link protection and abolition might In a backward economy with abundant seem a wholly sensible strategy.More- land and labor (a possibility considered over,because protection in that period explicitly by Myint [1958,323]),change would benefit workers and capitalists in exposure to trade again mobilizes a generally,it could attract the support of a coalition of red and green,but with dia- very wide coalition.At least some of the metrically opposed positions.Expanding mystery seems dissolved. trade now benefits farmers and workers but harms capitalists;and the labor- landowner coalition pursues a wider fran- Relaxing the Reliance on chise,free trade,and disempowerment of Land-Labor Ratios capital.Contracting trade,however, benefits only the owners of capital and For the sake of logical completeness, injures both workers and farmers;again and to fill a nagging empirical gap,let us intense conflict between capital and the now relax the assumption that the land- other two factors is predicted,ending in labor ratio informs us completely about either a capitalist dictatorship or an anti- the relative abundance of these two fac- capitalist revolution. tors.We admit,in other words,that a It is tempting,if speculative in the country may be rich or poor in both land extreme,to see in the red-green coalitions and labor.Four new cases arise in theory of Scandinavia in the 1930s(Gourevitch if (as I suspect)rarely in practice (see 1986,131-35;Hancock1972,30-31;Rok- Figure 4):economies may be,as before, kan 1966,84)the natural response to advanced or backward (i.e.,capital rich trade contraction of(by then)capital-rich or capital poor);but they may now be but land-and labor-poor economies;and, rich in both land and labor or poorly conversely,to view modern Russian his- endowed in both factors. tory,at least until well after World War Two cases-that of the advanced econ- II,as that of a backward but land-and omy rich in both factors and of the back- labor-rich economy,which,in a time of ward one poor in both-are theoretically expanding trade,indeed forged an anti- improbable17 and politically uninterest- capitalist coalition of peasants and work- 1131Changing Exposure to Trade between protection and Free Soil in the platform of the Republican party or of the North more generally, and Why did so broad a coalition support both aims? If, as seems apparent, labor was scarce in the United States, then the nineteenth century's increasing exposure to trade should have depressed, or at least retarded the advance of, wages. By defini￾tion, slaves already received a lower wage than they would voluntarily accept (Else, why coerce them?); and increased trade could reasonably be seen as intensifying, or at least as retarding the demise of, slavery. Conversely, protection in a labor-scarce economy might so raise the general wage level (while, paradoxically, also increasing returns to scarce capital) as to make manumission feasible. Hence to link protection and abolition might seem a wholly sensible strategy. More￾over, because protection in that period would benefit workers and capitalists generally, it could attract the support of a very wide coalition. At least some of the mystery seems dissolved. Relaxing the Reliance on Land-Labor Ratios For the sake of logical completeness, and to fill a nagging empirical gap, let us now relax the assumption that the land￾labor ratio informs us completely about the relative abundance of these two fac￾tors. We admit, in other words, that a country may be rich or poor in both land and labor. Four new cases arise in theory if (as I suspect) rarely in practice (see Figure 4): economies may be, as before, advanced or backward (i.e., capital rich or capital poor); but they may now be rich in both land and labor or poorly endowed in both factors. Two cases-that of the advanced econ￾omy rich in both factors and of the back￾ward one poor in both-are theoretically improbable17 and politically uninterest￾ing: if all factors were abundant relative to the rest of the world, the society would unanimously embrace free trade; if all were scarce, it would agree on protection. Let us consider, then, the remaining two possibilities. In an advanced economy where both land and labor are scarce, expanding trade will benefit only capital. Agriculture and labor-green and red-will unite in support of protection and, if need be, imperialism; only capitalists will embrace free trade. When trade contracts in such an economy, the scarce factors of land and labor gain, and capital loses, influ￾ence; farmers and peasants are likely to seek expanded mass participation in poli￾tics and a radical curtailment of capitalist power. In a backward economy with abundant land and labor (a possibility considered explicitly by Myint [1958, 3231), change in exposure to trade again mobilizes a coalition of red and green, but with dia￾metrically opposed positions. Expanding trade now benefits farmers and workers but harms capitalists; and the labor￾landowner coalition pursues a wider fran￾chise, free trade, and disempowerment of capital. Contracting trade, however, benefits only the owners of capital and injures both workers and farmers; again intense conflict between capital and the other two factors is predicted, ending in either a capitalist dictatorship or an anti￾capitalist revolution. It is tempting, if speculative in the extreme, to see in the red-green coalitions of Scandinavia in the 1930s (Gourevitch 1986,131-35; Hancock 1972,30-31; Rok￾kan 1966, 84) the natural response to trade contraction of (by then) capital-rich but land- and labor-poor economies; and, conversely, to view modern Russian his￾tory, at least until well after World War 11, as that of a backward but land- and labor-rich economy,ls which, in a time of expanding trade, indeed forged an anti￾capitalist coalition of peasants and work-