American Political Science Review Vol.81 trade,unite to advance it and to oppose of capitalists and landowners.To the any remaining pretensions to rule by the extent that labor wins this struggle,it will landowning groups.1s Conversely,in the require a strong state to administer the land-rich and still underdeveloped econo- economy;to the extent that capital and mies of Latin America,expanding trade land prevail,a state powerful enough to displaces the Depression-era "Populist" suppress labor is needed.Either route coalitions of labor and capital and brings leads to a stronger state. renewed influence to the landed sectors. Even this generalization,however, The areas of Asia and of southern Europe applies only to economies where labor is that are economically backward and abundant,and land scarce.Hence Hirsch- abundant only in labor experience labor man's observation that "latecomers"in militancy and,in not a few cases,revolu- Latin America do not behave as Gerschen- tionary workers'movements.Finally,and kron predicts should not surprise us. perhaps more as a statement about the Where land is abundant,and labor scarce future,the few economies rich in both -as has generally been true of the capital and land-principally those of Americas-"late"economic moderniza- North America,Australia,and New tion (i.e.,one that follows significant Zealand-should,as they become serious- exposure to trade)radicalizes owners of ly exposed to international trade,experi- land rather than owners of labor.In such ence class conflict and a considerable sup- "frontier"economies,labor and capital pression of labor.Capital and agriculture again find themselves in the same political will for the most part unite in support of camp,this time in support of protection. the free trade that benefits them;labor,as In the absence of class conflict,no power- the locally scarce factor,will favor pro- ful state is required. tection and imperialism. This last point,of course,sheds some light on Sombart's old question,Why is Further Implications there no socialism in the United States?If this model is right,the question is appro- To the extent that the model has gained priately broadened to,Why is there no any credibility from the foregoing brief socialism in land-rich economies?Simply survey,it may be useful to observe some put,socialism develops most readily of its other implications for disciplinary where labor is favored by rising exposure riddles and conjectures.Take first to trade and capital is not;labor is then Gerschenkron's (1962)observation,and progressive and capital is reactionary.But Hirschman's (1968)subsequent challenge labor is never favored by rising trade and amendment of it,that"latecomers"to where it is scarce.Powerful socialist economic development tend to assign a movements,the present model suggests, stronger role to the state.From the pres- are confined to backward and labor-rich ent perspective,what should matter economies under conditions of expanding more,at least among labor-rich econo- trade(the less-developed European socie- mies,is whether development precedes or ties in the later nineteenth century,Asia follows significant exposure to trade.In after World War II). an economy that has accumulated abun- A third riddle this approach may help dant capital before it is opened to trade, resolve is that of the coalitional basis and capital and labor will operate in relative aims of the North in the U.S.Civil War.16 harmony,and little state intervention will As Barrington Moore,Jr.posed the ques- be required.Where trade precedes devel- tion in a memorable chapter of Social opment,assertive labor faces-as it did in Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Imperial Germany-the united opposition (1967,Chap.3),What was the connection 1130American Political Science Review Vol. 81 trade, unite to advance it and to oppose any remaining pretensions to rule by the landowning groups.15 Conversely, in the land-rich and still underdeveloped econo￾mies of Latin America, expanding trade displaces the Depression-era "Populist" coalitions of labor and capital and brings renewed influence to the landed sectors. The areas of Asia and of southern Europe that are economically bcickward and abundant only in labor experience labor militan~y and, in not a few cases, revolu￾tionary workers' movements. Finally, and perhaps more as a statement about the future, the few economies rich in both capital and land-principally those of North America, Australia, and New Zealand-should, as they become serious- 1~ exposed to international trade, experi￾ence class conflict and a considerable SUP￾pression of labor. Capital and agriculture will for the most Part unite in support of the free trade that benefits them; labor, as the locally scarce factor, will favor pro- tection and imperialism. Further Implications To the extent that the model has gained any credibility from the foregoing brief survey, it may be useful to observe some of its other implications for disciplinary riddles and conjectures. Take first Gerschenkron's (1962) observation, and Hirschman's (1968) subsequent challenge and amendment of it, that "latecomers" to economic development tend to assign a stronger role to the state. From the pres￾ent perspective, what should matter more, at least among labor-rich econo￾mies, is whether development precedes or follows significant exposure to trade. In an economy that has accumulated abun￾dant capital before it is opened to trade, capital and labor will operate in relative harmony, and little state intervention will be required. Where trade precedes devel￾opment, assertive labor faces-as it did in Imperial Germany-the united opposition of capitalists and landowners. To the extent that labor wins this struggle, it will require a strong state to administer the economy; to the extent that capital and land prevail, a state powerful enough to suppress labor is needed. Either route leads to a stronger state. Even this generalization, however, applies only to economies where labor is abundant, and land scarce. Hence Hirsch￾observation that ulatecomersu in Latin America do not behave as Gerschen￾kron predicts should not surprise us. Where land is abundant, and labor scarce ,as has generally been tme of the ~~~~i~~~-"latev economic rnoderniza￾tion (i.e., one that follows significant exposure to trade) radicalizes owners of land rather than owners of labor. In such "frontieru economies, labor and capital again find themselves in the same political camp, this time in support of protection. 1, the absence of class conflict, no power￾ful state is required. This last point, of course, sheds some light on Sombart's old question, Why is there no socialism in the United States? If this model is right, the question is appro￾priately broadened to, Why is there no socialism in land-rich economies? Simply put, socialism develops most readily where labor is favored by rising exposure to trade and capital is not; labor is then progressive and capital is reactionary. But labor is never favored by rising trade where it is scarce. Powerful socialist movements, the present model suggests, are confined to backward and labor-rich economies under conditions of expanding trade (the less-developed European socie￾ties in the later nineteenth century, Asia after World War 11). A third riddle this approach may help resolve is that of the coalitional basis and aims of the North in the U.S. Civil War.16 As Barrington Moore, Jr. posed the ques￾tion in a memorable chapter of Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967, Chap. 3), What was the connection 1130