Changing Exposure to Trade traditional rule.In its main aspect,this The Depression of the 1930s seems to me only a restatement of a cen- tral tendency that has long been Here the fit between theory and reality remarked,namely that class conflict in seems quite strong.Not only the United the nineteenth century came at an earlier States but Canada,Australia,and New phase of industrialization,and more bit- Zealand were by this time advanced, terly,to southern and central than to land-rich economies.Labor,their only northwestern Europe (e.g.,Lipset 1970, scarce factor,gained from the collapse of 28-30;Macridis 1978,485-87;cf.Thom- international trade:workers became more son 1962,375-78);and it seems to me a militant,policy shifted to the left.Most more credible account of these regions' Latin American societies remained land- extremism than Duverger's (1959,238) rich but backward;and for them this was famous invocation of an allegedly more quite generally the period of "Populist" mercurial "Latin"temperament. coalitions of the two scarce factors,labor The United States,finally,represents and capital.In developed northern the land-rich,but labor-and capital-poor Europe,owners and exploiters of the "frontier societies"of this period gener- locally scarce factor of land grew more ally:most of both Americas,Australia, assertive,and generally more powerful, New Zealand,even those parts of central wherever previous developments had not and southern Africa that would soon be caused them to disappear;capitalists and opened to commercial agriculture.Here, workers lost ground.Finally,throughout expanding trade benefits and strengthens the backward regions of the world econ- landowners and farmers against protec- omy,where labor was abundant and land tionist capitalists and workers(although, was scarce-not only in Asia but in as in the United States,the protectionist southern and eastern Europe-labor lost forces may still prevail);rural-urban con- to a renascent coalition of the locally flict ensues,precipitated by demands scarce factors of land and capital:in from the rural sector. Spain,Italy,Rumania,Hungary,and Again,this does not at first glance Poland,to name only the most prominent appear wide of the mark.In many of the cases (Carsten 1967,Chaps.2,5 and pp. Latin American societies,this period 194-204). cemented landed rule (Skidmore and Smith 1984,50;Sunkel and Paz 1973, After World War II 306-21);in the United States and Canada, it was characterized by conflicts between Under U.S.hegemony,and with new the industrial East and the agricultural economies in transportation and com- West (Easterbrook and Aitken 1958, munication,the West since World War II 503-4);in almost wholly agricultural has experienced one of history's more Australia,trade precipitated a cleavage dramatic expansions of international between free-trading landowners and trade (Organization for Economic Coop- increasingly protectionist rural and urban eration and Development [OECD]1982, wage labor (Gollan 1955,esp.162-69; 62-63).Again,the theory would lead us Greenwood 1955,216-20). to expect different regional consequences. In all of these cases,as I have empha- In the developed,labor-rich and land- sized before,other factors were surely at poor economies-including now not only work and important aspects are neglected most of Europe but Japan-the model by the present analysis;but it is essential would predict an "end of ideology,"at also not to ignore the benefits and costs of least as regards issues of class:labor and expanding trade to the various sectors. capital,both beneficiaries of expanding 1129Changing Exposure to Trade traditional rule. In its main aspect, this seems to me only a restatement of a cen￾tral tendency that has long been remarked, namely that class conflict in the nineteenth century came at an earlier phase of industrialization, and more bit￾terly, to southern and central than to northwestern Europe (e.g., Lipset 1970, 28-30; Macridis 1978, 485-87; cf. Thom￾son 1962, 375-78); and it seems to me a more credible account of these regions' extremism than Duverger's (1959, 238) famous invocation of an allegedly more mercurial "Latin" temperament. The United States, finally, represents the land-rich, but labor- and capital-poor "frontier societies" of this period gener￾ally: most of both Americas, Australia, New Zealand, even those parts of central and southern Africa that would soon be opened to commercial agriculture. Here, expanding trade benefits and strengthens landowners and farmers against protec￾tionist capitalists and workers (although, as in the United States, the protectionist forces may still prevail); rural-urban con￾flict ensues, precipitated by demands from the rural sector. Again, this does not at first glance appear wide of the mark. In many of the Latin American societies, this period cemented landed rule (Skidmore and Smith 1984, 50; Sunkel and Paz 1973, 306-21); in the United States and Canada, it was characterized by conflicts between the industrial East and the agricultural West (Easterbrook and Aitken 1958, 503-4); in almost wholly agricultural Australia, trade precipitated a cleavage between free-trading landowners and increasingly protectionist rural and urban wage labor (Gollan 1955, esp. 162-69; Greenwood 1955, 216-20). In all of these cases, as I have empha￾sized before, other factors were surely at work and important aspects are neglected by the present analysis; but it is essential also not to ignore the benefits and costs of expanding trade to the various sectors. The Depression of the 1930s Here the fit between theory and reality seems quite strong. Not only the United States but Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were by this time advanced, land-rich economies. Labor, their only scarce factor, gained from the collapse of international trade: workers became more militant, policy shifted to the left. Most Latin American societies remained land￾rich but backward; and for them this was quite generally the period of "Populist" coalitions of the two scarce factors, labor and capital. In developed northern Europe, owners and exploiters of the locally scarce factor of land grew more assertive, and generally more powerful, wherever previous developments had not caused them to disappear; capitalists and workers lost ground. Finally, throughout the backward regions of the world econ￾omy, where labor was abundant and land was scarce-not only in Asia but in southern and eastern Europe-labor lost to a renascent coalition of the locally scarce factors of land and capital: in Spain, Italy, Ridmania, Hungary, and Poland, to name only the most prominent cases (Carsten 1967, Chaps. 2, 5 and pp. 194-204). After World War I1 Under U.S. hegemony, and with new economies in transportation and com￾munication, the West since World War I1 has experienced one of history's more dramatic expansions of international trade (Organization for Economic Coop￾eration and Development [OECD] 1982, 62-63). Again, the theory would lead us to expect different regional consequences. In the developed, labor-rich and land￾poor economies-including now not only most of Europe but Japan-the model would predict an "end of ideology," at least as regards issues of class: labor and capital, both beneficiaries of expanding