American Political Science Review Vol.81 The "Long"Sixteenth Century landowners and capitalists in many of these regions.12 It has long been recognized that im- provements in navigation and shipbuild- The Nineteenth Century ing permitted,from about 1450 on,a pre- viously unimagined expansion of trade, We can again proceed regionally,gen- which eventuated in the European "dis- eralizing on the sketch of Britain, Ger- covery"and colonization of the Americas many,and the United States developed (Cipolla 1965).Among social scientists, earlier for this period.For the period just Immanuel Wallerstein (1974)has studied before the great cheapening of transpor- this period most intensively;and it is tation-roughly at the middle of the nine- worth emphasizing that the present analy- teenth century13-Britain can stand as the sis conforms with essential aspects,and, surrogate for the advanced and labor-rich indeed,permits some clarification,of his. economies of northwest Europe generally, Within the context of the age,what including Belgium,the Netherlands,and Wallerstein calls the core economies of the northern France(Hobsbawm 1962,Chap. new world system-those,essentially,of 9;Landes 1969,Chap.3).For this whole northwestern Europe-were defined by region,as for Britain,the model predicts their abundance in capital and labor,and that expanding trade would engender by their relative scarcity of land.The rural-urban conflict:capitalists and periphery can be described as the exact workers,united in support of free trade inverse:rich in land,poor in both capital and greater urban influence,oppose a and-often leading to the adoption of more traditional and protectionist landed slavery or serfdom-labor.Under ex- sector.It does not seem to me farfetched panding trade,the regimes of the core to see the powerful liberalism and radical- come to be dominated by a "bourgeois" ism of this whole region in the later nine- coalition of capital and skilled labor(the teenth century (Carstairs 1980,50,62; Dutch Republic,the Tudors),and of the Cobban 1965,21-28,58-67;Daalder manufactures that use both intensively; 1966,196-98;Lorwin1966,152-55)-or, the older,landed elites lose ground.Con- for that matter,much of the conflict versely,in the periphery,land-in the between secularism and clericalism-in persons of plantation owners and this light. Gutsherren-suppresses both capital and Almost all of the rest of Europe at the labor and,indeed,almost all urban life. dawn of this period can be compared with So far the equation seems apt.Can we, Germany:poor in capital and in land, however,not go on to define that Waller- rich in labor.1 (The land-labor ratio steinian chimera,the semiperiphery seems as a rule to have declined as one (Wallerstein 1974,102-7),as comprising moved from north to south within the economies that fall into the lower right- economically backward regions of Europe hand cell of Figure 1,economies poor in [see figures for 1846 in Bowden,Karpo- capital and land,rich in labor?That vich,and Usher 1937,3].)As it does for would,I suspect,accurately describe most Germany,the model predicts for these of the southern European economies in other countries,particularly in southern this period;and it would correctly predict Europe,class conflict as a consequence of (see again Figure 2)the intense class con- increasing exposure to trade:workers flict(including the German Peasants War (including agricultural wage laborers) [Moore 1967,463-67])and the wholly press for more open markets and greater retrograde and protectionist policies influence;capitalists and landowners adopted by a peculiarly united class of unite in support of protection and more 1128American Political Science Review Vol. 81 The "Long" Sixteenth Century It has long been recognized that im￾provements in navigation and shipbuild￾ing permitted, from about 1450 on, a pre￾viously unimagined expansion of trade, which eventuated in the European "dis￾covery" and colonization of the Americas (Cipolla 1965). Among social scientists, Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) has studied this period most intensively; and it is worth emphasizing that the present analy￾sis conforms with essential aspects, and, indeed, permits some clarification, of his. Within the context of the age, what Wallerstein calls the core economies of the new world system-those, essentially, of northwestern Europe-were defined by their abundance in capital and labor, and by their relative scarcity of land. The periphery can be described as the exact inverse: rich in land, poor in both capital and-often leading to the adoption of slavery or serfdom-labor. Under ex￾panding trade, the regimes of the core come to be dominated by a "bourgeois" coalition of capital and skilled labor (the Dutch Republic, the Tudors), and of the manufactures that use both intensively; the older, landed elites lose ground. Con￾versely, in the periphery, land-in the persons of plantation owners and Gutsherren-suppresses both capital and labor and, indeed, almost all urban life. So far the equation seems apt. Can we, however, not go on to define that Waller￾steinian chimera, the semiperiphery (Wallerstein 1974, 102-7), as comprising economies that fall into the lower right￾hand cell of Figure 1, economies poor in capital and land, rich in labor? That would, I suspect, accurately describe most of the southern European economies in this period; and it would correctly predict (see again Figure 2) the intense class con￾flict (including the German Peasants War [Moore 1967, 463-671) and the wholly retrograde and protectionist policies adopted by a peculiarly united class of landowners and capitalists in many of these regions.12 The Nineteenth Century We can again proceed regionally, gen￾eralizing on the sketch of Britain, Ger￾many, and the United States developed earlier for this period. For the period just before the great cheapening of transpor￾tation-roughly at the middle of the nine￾teenth century13-Britain can stand as the surrogate for the advanced and labor-rich economies of northwest Europe generally, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and northern France (Hobsbawm 1962, Chap. 9; Landes 1969, Chap. 3). For this whole region, as for Britain, the model predicts that expanding trade would engender rural-urban conflict: capitalists and workers, united in support of free trade and greater urban influence, oppose a more traditional and protectionist landed sector. It does not seem to me farfetched to see the powerful liberalism and radical￾ism of this whole region in the later nine￾teenth century (Carstairs 1980, 50, 62; Cobban 1965, 21-28, 58-67; Daalder 1966, 196-98; Lorwin 1966,152-55)-or, for that matter, much of the conflict between secularism and clericalism-in this light. Almost all of the rest of Europe at the dawn of this period can be compared with Germany: poor in capital and in land, rich in labor.14 (The land-labor ratio seems as a rule to have declined as one moved from north to south within the economically backward regions of Europe [see figures for 1846 in Bowden, Karpo￾vich, and Usher 1937, 31.) As it does for Germany, the model predicts for these other countries, particularly in southern Europe, class conflict as a consequence of increasing exposure to trade: workers (including agricultural wage laborers) press for more open markets and greater influence; capitalists and landowners unite in support of protection and more