10 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 11 of concessions.Above all,the retreat must not be seen by the Chinese, and when the United Kingdom was facing a decline in its economic the British communities in the treaty ports,or any of the foreign powers and military power.It focuses on Britain's relations with the Nationalists as a sign of weakness,least of all a defeat for the British empire.In first as a regional regime in south China and then as a national gov- other words,no British_prestige should be lost,otherwise there would ernment having effective control over the largest part of the Yangzi be disastrous repercussions on British standing in the colonies,par- region but less than one-third of the country.The year 1924 has been ticularly India,where an independence movement was well under way. chosen as a starting point because it marked the reorganization of the The concern about prestige reflected the general feeling of the empire- KMT and the beginning of an anti-imperialist movement in the south conscious British establishment,London's top civil servants,the which soon forced the British government to undertake a reappraisal conservative press,and the business communities in China.It was often of its China policy.The year 1931 serves_as_a convenient finishing in the name of restoring or upholding British prestige that arguments point because it was the Manchurian crisis that prevented the Nationalist for forcible action in China were advanced. government from proceeding any further with the campaign for treaty The objective of British diplomacy in China after 1926 was therefore revision. to implement the new policy in an orderly manner.The new policy was, The period 1924-31 spanned three British administrations:the short- in the Foreign Office parlance,one of 'patient and liberal conciliation', lived Labour government of 1924 was followed by five years of Con- patient because the process of redressing the Chinese grievances was servative rule and,in 1929,by a second Labour government until late a gradual one-the surrender of special rights and privileges by ne- in 1931 when a coalition National government took over.It was the gotiation pari passu with the improvement in China's internal condi- Baldwin government which made the decision to beat a retreat.The tions-and liberal because for the first time since the days of the policy enjoyed the support of the Labour Party and was followed by Opium War the British government was prepared to make changes to the MacDonald administration,helped by the continuity in office of the the treaty system and to abandon a policy of gunboat diplomacy.Putting two influential Foreign Office officials in the China area,Sir Victor an end to gunboat diplomacy did not mean,however,that force no Wellesley and adviser Sir John Pratt.There were personnel changes in longer had a place in Britain's China policy.Given the continuing the Far Eastern Department,but these changes did not affect the general disorder,chaos,and political instability in the country which threatened thrust of its new China policy,the implementation of which in China foreign life and property,forcible action would still be necessary in was the responsibility of Sir Miles Lampson whose term as British some situations for defensive purposes against mob violence and/or minister in Peking expired in 1933.On the Nationalist side,the period attacks by any Chinese forces for whatever reason.Yet the application 1924-31 also spanned-three regimes:Canton,Wuhan,and Nanking. of force,however discriminate and justifiable from the British point of The short-lived Wuhan regime marked the last phase of the KMT-CCP view,was liable to be interpreted by the Chinese as imperialist ag- united front and the beginning of the end of Bolshevik influence in gression,thereby provoking more boycotts,strikes,and demonstrations. China,and the year 1928 saw a turning point in the KMT's attitude That was the dilemma facing London's policy-makers,to which there towards the British.During the Nanking period there was a significant was no easy solution.Nevertheless,they pursued the strategy of improvement in Anglo-Chinese relations,even though for non-political combining conciliation with firmness-commitment to the conciliation reasons the share of British trade in China continued to decline. of Chinese nationalism on the one hand and obligation to the protection This book addresses a number of specific issues relating,on the one of British life,property,and their most important interests in China on hand,to the policy-making process in London and the main factors, the other.These dual aspects of British policy were not necessarily both domestic and external,which influenced that process,and,on the incompatible or contradictory,for the important thing was to control other hand,to Chinese politics in so far as it affected China's external and limit the use of force so that it would serve,rather than undermine, behaviour.Was the Foreign Office in control of policy-making?Did the cause of conciliation.3 it have any differences of opinion with the Colonial Office over Hong This book is not designed to give equal treatment to both sides in Kong and with the British legation in Peking and His Majesty's Gov- the bilateral relationship.Rather,it is a study of British response to ernment's other representatives in China on policy matters?And on the Chinese nationalism at a time when China was in the throes of revolution Chinese side:was there any significant policy change after 1927?To