P THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT INTRODUCTION 9 practically to the whole of the country.With the possible exception of From the very beginning the retreat was based on a strategy of the United States,all were interested in a particular part of the country considered expediency laid down on broad and general lines which where they enjoyed a special position and framed their policies on that were to be pursued with flexibility and suited to the ever-changing basis.Japan,for example,had one policy for Manchuria and quite phases of the Chinese revolution.It was in essence a course of gradual another for China proper.?6 Britain had no policy for north China and adaptation of the pre-war status of British subjects and interests in Manchuria,but had one for the south concentrating on the Yangzi region. China to post-war conditions,a policy of what John Gittings calls What happened to Manchuria and the north was not a matter of great 'ameliorative imperialism'27 This policy was an enlightened one to be importance to England as long as British interests in the south were sure.But it was dictated by self-interest,tangible and material objectives, not in jeopardy.When Whitehall officials described their China policy not altruistic or moralistic considerations.Britain's policy-makers ap- in terms of the security of British life and property,the maintenance proached the problem of China in a shrewd,hard-headed manner,with of the 'open door'and equal opportunity for all,and a desire to see the same pragmatism as they tackled other problems in the East where a united,well-ordered,and prosperous China,they were talking in British interests were at stake.Their emphasis was on long-term economic generalities.Specifically,their concern had always been for Britain's and commercial advantages that would accrue from a friendly relationship interests in the Yangzi region,and their policy was,to all intents and with the Chinese.Moreover,the conciliation of Chinese nationalism, purposes,formulated with south China in mind,a position which re- while significant in itself,was part of Britain's global retreat from mained unchanged during the inter-war period.In this sense the Yangzi power since the First World War.In numerous issues,especially in region,as distinct from the whole of China,was part of Britain's.informal empire.Thus this study will focus on south China (using the Yangzi Europe,the British found themselves virtually impotent in this century river as the convenient dividing line between north and south),where of their supposed dominance.Slowly but surely Britain was on the decline as a great power because of her inability or unwillingness to C the British faced a major crisis in their relations with the Chinese in match her resources to the risks involved.28 the mid-1920s,and will confine itself to describing Britain's south China Apart from economic and commercial considerations,there were policy as one of imperial retreat during the period under review. compelling political reasons why Britain wished to come to terms with The retreat,designed by the Foreign Office with cabinet approval, Chinese nationalism.To try to capture the Nationalist movement by was aimed at meeting Chinese nationalism,at least half way,so that sympathizing with it and endeavouring to get it on the 'right line'could a more peaceful and friendly atmosphere conducive to the expansion of British trade in China could be restored.This did not mean the assist in the formation of a Chinese government that would look upon the West as a friend rather than an enemy.Ultimately this would prove appeasement of the Chinese,as Britain did not sacrifice her own to be the most cost-effective way of dealing with the Bolshevik influ- principles in acceding to their demands.What it meant was that certain ence in China which many Britons regarded as the fundamental cause relatively unimportant rights and privileges could be relinquished by negotiation and agreement with the Chinese authorities in order to protect of their troubles in Asia.If and when the Russians lost ground in China their menace to India and Afghanistan would also diminish.Conversely, the most important interests at stake.It would entail a modification of continued confrontation with Chinese nationalism would drive the KMT the unequal treaties and thereby undermine the very foundation on which further into the communist camp and intensify the anti-British and anti- the imperialism of informal empire had been based.Ultimately it would imperialist feelings around the country. change the character of British expansion in China.If and when the British,along with other foreign nationals,were stripped of their special As Wellesley theorized,it was a test of generalship to conduct an orderly retreat,but how to prevent it from being turned into a rout rights and privileges,they would have to carry out their trade on terms would be a test of statesmanship.2 "The great point about a retreat,' to be negotiated with the Chinese on a basis of mutual benefit and he opined,'is to avoid defeat so that one may come out of the scuffle reciprocity.Only then could they really divest themselves of charges of imperialism.In the short term the retreat would give Britons in China with one's prestige and striking power unimpaired.'The idea was that little cause for comfort,but eventually it would redound to their long- Britain must not be forced into a situation where it would be stampeded term economic and commercial interests. into action-that is,into giving things away more than necessary- and that Britain,not China,should be the judge of the extent and pace