Chapter 1 Included in this deduction is the concept of revolution, which plays a pivotal The Philosophy of praxis methodologicalrole in their philosophies In interpreting Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis, I have been obliged to choose positions in some of the Marx and Lukacs umerous debates over this early work. It will be useful at the outset to make kacsian perspective, as a background to the exposition of LukiG.a Lu. these positions explicit by situating this interpretation with respect to some In this chapter, I discuss the philosophy of the early Marx from others. I will not review the enormous literature on the Manuscripts only parallel attempt to resolve the problems first posed by Marx. There are, of two facets of it are relevant here, the debates over the ontological and the ourse, considerable differences between these thinkers, and there is always normative character of social categories in the Manuscripts. Ar Is more the risk that in comparing them in this manner the identity of one will be than a matter of textual exegesis. The larger question concerns whether the ubmerged in that of the other. I will do my best to avoid an artificial Manuscripts are a philosophy of praxis, as I am engaged in defining it, or, on identification of the two positions where they do actually differ; however, I the contrary, a far less ambitious ethical complement ill argue that in spite of real differences we are dealing here with a specific within the framework of a traditional concept of theory hilosophical doctrine, which might be called philosophy of praxis, and I show the former, that Marx founds a new concept of reason in revolu- hich is shared by a number of thinkers tion through an ontological treatment of social categories. This approach While writing his notebooks in prison, Gramsci used the phrase"phi brings to the fore all that links the project of the early Marx to that of Hegel. losophy of praxis"ambiguously to signify Marxism in general and his own In 1923 Lukacs was of course unaware of the existence of Marx's Manu- interpretation of Marxism. In essence Gramsci argues that all knowledge is scripts, which had not yet been published when he wrote History and cla situated in a cultural context, itself based on a class specific worldview. No Consciousness In fact, Capital is the primary basis of Lukacs'Marxism domain of knowledge and no corresponding domain of being is independen rather than Marx's early work. of society. That interpretation, which he called"absolute historicism Now, Capita/ is self-consciously unphilosophical, in spite of Marx's resembles in broad outline the Hegelian Marxism of Lukacs, Korsch, prefatory acknowledgment of Hegel's influence. In it Marx is careful to Marcuse and the early work of Marx himself.' It seems appropriate therefore minimize the use of philosophical terminology and to avoid the exploration to call this whole trend "philosophy of praxis, "not as a euphemism for of philosophical problems. Yet we now know on the basis of extensive Marxism but rather to distinguish a particular radical philosophical version textual evidence just how complex were the philosophical considerations f Marxism from other interpretation behind Capital The link between the Manuscripts and the published The early method of Marx and Lukacs is very different from the"scien- writings of Marx's maturity is supplied by his own draft of Capital but the tific socialism"erected later on the basis of historical obseryation and eco- blication of this text, the Grundrisse, was delayed until the beginning of nomic theory. In 1843 and 1844 Marx developed a philosophy of revolution the Second World War. These textual absences, combined with the image which he seems to have intended as a foundation for economic studies Marx wished to project of his work in Capital seemed to authorize a scien- From 1918 to 1923 Lukacs elaborated a philosophy of revolution supple- tistic interpretation of Marx's later doctrine Lukacs first challenged from a menting Marxist economics. For both the early Marx and Lukacs, such dialectical perspective. central Marxist concepts as the proletariat and socialism were not first Lukacs made the connection between Marxism and philosophy (that is developed through empirical research. Instead, as philosophers they set out between Marx and Hegel), primarily through a reflection on Marx's meth- a critical discussion of the philosophical tradition in the course of odology in his economic writings, and only secondarily on the basis of those they deduced the characteristic historical concepts of Marxism f Marx's comments on philosophical1 Chapter 1 2 Chapter 1 The Philosophy of Praxis Marx and Lukács In this chapter, I discuss the philosophy of the early Marx from a Lu￾kácsian perspective, as a background to the exposition of Lukács’ own parallel attempt to resolve the problems first posed by Marx. There are, of course, considerable differences between these thinkers, and there is always the risk that in comparing them in this manner the identity of one will be submerged in that of the other. I will do my best to avoid an artificial identification of the two positions where they do actually differ; however, I will argue that in spite of real differences we are dealing here with a specific philosophical doctrine, which might be called "philosophy of praxis," and which is shared by a number of thinkers. While writing his notebooks in prison, Gramsci used the phrase “phi￾losophy of praxis” ambiguously to signify Marxism in general and his own interpretation of Marxism. In essence Gramsci argues that all knowledge is situated in a cultural context, itself based on a class specific worldview. No domain of knowledge and no corresponding domain of being is independent of society. That interpretation, which he called “absolute historicism,” resembles in broad outline the Hegelian Marxism of Lukács, Korsch, Marcuse and the early work of Marx himself.1 It seems appropriate therefore to call this whole trend “philosophy of praxis,” not as a euphemism for Marxism but rather to distinguish a particular radical philosophical version of Marxism from other interpretations. The early method of Marx and Lukács is very different from the "scien￾tific socialism" erected later on the basis of historical observation and eco￾nomic theory. In 1843 and 1844 Marx developed a philosophy of revolution which he seems to have intended as a foundation for economic studies. From 1918 to 1923 Lukács elaborated a philosophy of revolution supple￾menting Marxist economics. For both the early Marx and Lukács, such central Marxist concepts as the proletariat and socialism were not first developed through empirical research. Instead, as philosophers they set out from a critical discussion of the philosophical tradition in the course of which they deduced the characteristic historical concepts of Marxism. Included in this deduction is the concept of revolution, which plays a pivotal methodological role in their philosophies. In interpreting Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts as a philosophy of praxis, I have been obliged to choose positions in some of the numerous debates over this early work. It will be useful at the outset to make these positions explicit by situating this interpretation with respect to some others. I will not review the enormous literature on the Manuscripts; only two facets of it are relevant here, the debates over the ontological and the normative character of social categories in the Manuscripts. 2 At issue is more than a matter of textual exegesis. The larger question concerns whether the Manuscripts are a philosophy of praxis, as I am engaged in defining it, or, on the contrary, a far less ambitious ethical complement to economic research within the framework of a traditional concept of theory. I show the former, that Marx founds a new concept of reason in revolu￾tion through an ontological treatment of social categories. This approach brings to the fore all that links the project of the early Marx to that of Hegel. In 1923 Lukács was of course unaware of the existence of Marx's Manu￾scripts, which had not yet been published when he wrote History and Class Consciousness. In fact, Capital is the primary basis of Lukács’ Marxism rather than Marx’s early work. Now, Capital is self-consciously unphilosophical, in spite of Marx's prefatory acknowledgment of Hegel's influence. In it Marx is careful to minimize the use of philosophical terminology and to avoid the exploration of philosophical problems. Yet we now know on the basis of extensive textual evidence just how complex were the philosophical considerations behind Capital. The link between the Manuscripts and the published writings of Marx's maturity is supplied by his own draft of Capital; but the publication of this text, the Grundrisse, was delayed until the beginning of the Second World War.3 These textual absences, combined with the image Marx wished to project of his work in Capital, seemed to authorize a scien￾tistic interpretation of Marx's later doctrine Lukács first challenged from a dialectical perspective. Lukács made the connection between Marxism and philosophy (that is, between Marx and Hegel), primarily through a reflection on Marx's meth￾odology in his economic writings, and only secondarily on the basis of those of Marx's comments on philosophical matters with which he was ac-