quainted. This is possible because, as Ernest Mandel remarks, "the concept conception of being that would take into account both its subjective and of alienation.. is part of the mature Marx's instrumentarium Lukacs was objective dimensions. in fact the first to show this, to notice and explain not merely the influence For Hegel the resolution of the antinomies is a theoretical task. How- of Hegel on Marx's early political ral marxian"world er, he believes that this task can only be carried out under specific histori- but on the concepts and method of Capital He reevaluated Marx conditions which happened to be those of his own time and place. famous"coquetting" with Hegel, and concluded that in that work, "a whole Philosophy of praxis begins with a critique of the conservative implications series of categories of central importance and in constant use stem directhy of this resolution of the antinomies and a radicalization of its historical from Hegel's Logic.” aspect. Both Marx and Lukacs argued that because Hegel could not conceive Lukacs reconstructed a philosophy of praxis from the methodologic of really radical changes in modern culture, he treated temporary historical traces of Marx's philosophical position visible in his economic wri conditions such as monarchy and wage labor as though they were eternal result of this effort is not identical with the position of either the Manu- necessities. They claimed that the antinomies would be transcended by social scripts or the Grundrisse; nevertheless, it is impressive to what extent Lukacs support in these unpublished ones. Most important, Lukacs'philosophy of ang Had Marx confined himself to arguing this position in relation to the somewhat speculative extrapolations from Marx's published work can find praxis has remarkable structural similarities to that of Marx, notably insofar phy of value based on the demand for revolutionary social change. This new as lukacs develops an original critique of philosophy paralleling Marx's o philosophy would have been compatible with a traditional ontology and This convergence has a biographical background. Like Marx, Lukacs was might have been formulated as a"left" variant of Hegel' s philosophy. Marx's deeply schooled in Hegelian dialectics and so when he sought to develop a startling innovation was to include all the antinomies in his theory of revolu- Marxist philosophy, he returned to the Hegelian doctrine from which Marx tion, those relating to epistemology and ontology as well as the moral and set out. It is this link, mediated by the supposedly"scientific"work Capital political ones. He thus arrived at the astounding proposition that social hich bespeaks an affinity of Marxism for philosophy of praxis. Yet this change could not only accomplish such goals as reconciling individual and biographical coincidence does not quite explain the similarity of the trans- society, moral responsibility and self-interest, but that it could also unite formation undergone by Hegel's dialectic at their hands subject and object, thought and being, man and nature. This proposition has a number of paradoxical corollaries from which The antinomies must not shrink in interpreting the early Marx. As we will see, Lukacs to The defining trait of philosophy of praxis is the claim that the"antino. shares a similar approach. When philosophy of praxis contends that human mies"of philosophy can only be resolved in history. The concept of"antin- action is philosophically relevant not just in ethics or politics but in all omy"employed here is derived from Hegel, for whom it signifies the ever domains, it is asserting a wholly original ontological position. For this idening gap between subject and object in modern culture. Ever since philosophy, human action touches being as such, and not simply those Descartes distinguished the two substances, philosophy and life had become special domains we usually conceive as affected by our activities. In some- more and more sharply sundered. Rich and complex theories of the subjec what different terms, essentially this same requirement can be formulated tive dimension of being explain the meaning of freedom, value, political the transcendence of the antinomy of value and fact, "ought" and"is. For, ideals, while equally powerful and encompassing theories of the objective if human action affects being, then values do not confront a normless and dimension of being explain the laws of necessity in nature and history. From humanly indifferent reality, but rather represent its highest potentialities his earliest to his last works, Hegel saw his task as cataloguing the resulting This position is coherent only where being is interpreted through a spe- ontradictions in modern culture and transcending them in a dialectical cial sphere in which human being is actually able to transform the objects or 3 Chapter3 Chapter 1 4 quainted. This is possible because, as Ernest Mandel remarks, “the concept of alienation . . . is part of the mature Marx's instrumentarium.”4 Lukács was in fact the first to show this, to notice and explain not merely the influence of Hegel on Marx's early political essays, or on the general Marxian "world￾view," but on the concepts and method of Capital. He reevaluated Marx's famous "coquetting" with Hegel, and concluded that in that work, “a whole series of categories of central importance and in constant use stem directly from Hegel's Logic.”5 Lukács reconstructed a philosophy of praxis from the methodological traces of Marx's philosophical position visible in his economic writings. The result of this effort is not identical with the position of either the Manu￾scripts or the Grundrisse; nevertheless, it is impressive to what extent Lukács’ somewhat speculative extrapolations from Marx's published work can find support in these unpublished ones. Most important, Lukács’ philosophy of praxis has remarkable structural similarities to that of Marx, notably insofar as Lukács develops an original critique of philosophy paralleling Marx's own. This convergence has a biographical background. Like Marx, Lukács was deeply schooled in Hegelian dialectics and so when he sought to develop a Marxist philosophy, he returned to the Hegelian doctrine from which Marx set out. It is this link, mediated by the supposedly “scientific” work Capital, which bespeaks an affinity of Marxism for philosophy of praxis. Yet this biographical coincidence does not quite explain the similarity of the trans￾formation undergone by Hegel's dialectic at their hands. The Antinomies The defining trait of philosophy of praxis is the claim that the “antino￾mies” of philosophy can only be resolved in history. The concept of “antin￾omy” employed here is derived from Hegel, for whom it signifies the ever widening gap between subject and object in modern culture. Ever since Descartes distinguished the two substances, philosophy and life had become more and more sharply sundered. Rich and complex theories of the subjec￾tive dimension of being explain the meaning of freedom, value, political ideals, while equally powerful and encompassing theories of the objective dimension of being explain the laws of necessity in nature and history. From his earliest to his last works, Hegel saw his task as cataloguing the resulting contradictions in modern culture and transcending them in a dialectical conception of being that would take into account both its subjective and objective dimensions. For Hegel the resolution of the antinomies is a theoretical task. How￾ever, he believes that this task can only be carried out under specific histori￾cal conditions which happened to be those of his own time and place. Philosophy of praxis begins with a critique of the conservative implications of this resolution of the antinomies and a radicalization of its historical aspect. Both Marx and Lukács argued that because Hegel could not conceive of really radical changes in modern culture, he treated temporary historical conditions such as monarchy and wage labor as though they were eternal necessities. They claimed that the antinomies would be transcended by social revolution and not by philosophical speculation. Had Marx confined himself to arguing this position in relation to the antinomies of moral and political life, he would have created a new philoso￾phy of value based on the demand for revolutionary social change. This new philosophy would have been compatible with a traditional ontology and might have been formulated as a “left” variant of Hegel's philosophy. Marx's startling innovation was to include all the antinomies in his theory of revolu￾tion, those relating to epistemology and ontology as well as the moral and political ones. He thus arrived at the astounding proposition that social change could not only accomplish such goals as reconciling individual and society, moral responsibility and self-interest, but that it could also unite subject and object, thought and being, man and nature. This proposition has a number of paradoxical corollaries from which we must not shrink in interpreting the early Marx. As we will see, Lukács too shares a similar approach. When philosophy of praxis contends that human action is philosophically relevant not just in ethics or politics but in all domains, it is asserting a wholly original ontological position. For this philosophy, human action touches being as such, and not simply those special domains we usually conceive as affected by our activities. In some￾what different terms, essentially this same requirement can be formulated as the transcendence of the antinomy of value and fact, “ought” and “is.” For, if human action affects being, then values do not confront a normless and humanly indifferent reality, but rather represent its highest potentialities. This position is coherent only where being is interpreted through a spe￾cial sphere in which human being is actually able to transform the objects on