考虑回收渠道竞争下闭环供应链的决策与协调 徐朗123,汪传旭1,程茜3,陈伟宏4 (1.上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306: 2.上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海20003 3.约克大学公共管理学院,多伦多M3JP3 4.华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640) 搞要:运用博弈理论在回收渠道竞争的情形下,构建了由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的闭环供应链 决策模型,研究了如何制定合理的价格和回收决策来实现自身利润最大化。通过比较集中决策和分散 决策的最优决策和供应链利润,在Nash谈判的框架下提出了改进的收益成本共享契约来实现闭环供 应链的协调,并确定合理的最优共享系数提高系统绩效水平。通过算例分析,讨论了相关参数对闭环 供应链决策和协调的影响。 关镳词:闭环供应链:回收渠道:协调机制;Nash谈判 中图分类号:F272 文献标识码:A Decision and coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering recycling Channel Competition XU Lang,2,3 WANG Chuan-xu'. CHENG XI'. CHEN Wei-hong (1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China; 2. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China 3. School of Administrative Studies, York University, Toronto M3J 1P3, Canada: 4. School of Business administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China) Abstract: Under the competitive condition of recycling channels, the decision-making models of closed-loop were established between the manufacturer and the retailer based on Stackelberg game. In addition, the optimal pricing and recycling rate were obtained to maximize respective profits. Through comparing the decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios, a contract through revenue and cost sharing is provided to achieve the supply chain coordination in the framework of Nash negotiation and the coefficient of sharing is obtained to improve the performance. Through numerical analysis, the impacts of some relevant parameters on the optimal decisions and coordination mechanism Key words: closed-loop supply chain; recycling channel; coordination mechanism; nash negotiation 1引言 收稿日期:2017-12-01:修回日期:2018-0402 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373157,71403120)中国博士后特等资助项目(2015T80172);江 苏省哲学社会科学重点资助项目(2015ZDXM039):上海海事大学优秀博士论文培育项目 (2016BXLP005):上海海事大学研究生创新项目(2016ycx074) 作者简介:徐朗(1990-),湖北荆州人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理等, E-mail考虑回收渠道竞争下闭环供应链的决策与协调 1 徐 朗 1,2,3，汪传旭 1 ，程 茜 1 ，陈伟宏 4 (1.上海海事大学 经济管理学院，上海 201306； 2.上海交通大学 安泰经济与管理学院，上海 200030； 3. 约克大学 公共管理学院，多伦多 M3J 1P3； 4. 华南理工大学 工商管理学院，广东 广州 510640) 摘要：运用博弈理论在回收渠道竞争的情形下，构建了由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的闭环供应链 决策模型，研究了如何制定合理的价格和回收决策来实现自身利润最大化。通过比较集中决策和分散 决策的最优决策和供应链利润，在 Nash 谈判的框架下提出了改进的收益成本共享契约来实现闭环供 应链的协调，并确定合理的最优共享系数提高系统绩效水平。通过算例分析，讨论了相关参数对闭环 供应链决策和协调的影响。 关键词：闭环供应链；回收渠道；协调机制；Nash 谈判 中图分类号：F 272 文献标识码：A Decision and Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Recycling Channel Competition XU Lang1,2,3, WANG Chuan-xu 1 , CHENG Xi1 , CHEN Wei-hong4 (1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China; 2. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China; 3. School of Administrative Studies, York University, Toronto M3J 1P3, Canada; 4. School of Business administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China) Abstract: Under the competitive condition of recycling channels, the decision-making models of closed-loop supply chain were established between the manufacturer and the retailer based on Stackelberg game. In addition, the optimal pricing and recycling rate were obtained to maximize respective profits. Through comparing the decisions and profits in the centralized and decentralized scenarios, a contract through revenue and cost sharing is provided to achieve the supply chain coordination in the framework of Nash negotiation and the coefficient of sharing is obtained to improve the performance. Through numerical analysis, the impacts of some relevant parameters on the optimal decisions and coordination mechanism were analyzed. Key words: closed-loop supply chain; recycling channel; coordination mechanism; nash negotiation 1 引言 收稿日期：2017-12-01； 修回日期：2018-04-02 基金项目：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373157, 71403120)；中国博士后特等资助项目(2015T80172)；江 苏省哲学社会科学重点资助项目(2015ZDIXM039)；上海海事大学优秀博士论文培育项目 (2016BXLP005)；上海海事大学研究生创新项目(2016ycx074) 作者简介：徐朗(1990-)，湖北荆州人，讲师, 博士，主要研究方向为物流与供应链管理等，E-mail: jerry_langxu@yeah.net