Soviet Union collapsed shortly afterwards. There was no space race to engage in. Third, as a result of the Reagan/Bush era of tax cuts and increased defense spending, there was a huge deficit and the Congress was in the mood for budget cuts not increases. The Presidents announcement was seen as just another space speech without a clear rationale for undertaking such a large undertaking. What also helped sink it was that when NASa did do a cost estimate with it's "90 day" study, the number out of JSC was approximately $500 billion for the mission By any measure, this is a lot of money (even spread over 30 years)and requires a national commitment to such an undertaking(by contrast at it's peak the dod budget was over $400 billion a year but there was a national consensus that we needed to oppose the Soviets). The Congress objected to the idea of such a large undertaking especially while existing programs like Space Station were ongoing. The Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee zeroed out the funding for Moon-Man in 1991 with the statement"This is the camel's nose under the tent All those space wackos they want to get started. This revealing comment suggested that the NASA camels nose under the tent was recognized for what it was(once burned, twice shy)and that the space community was seen as a special interest group without wide popular support. The Bush White House was unwilling or unable to fight for it and the whole program collapsed. In a sense, it was a remake of apollo but the underlying mood and drives in the country had changed so now instead of being right program at the right time, it was the wrong program at the wrong time The Clinton Administration came in, in early 1993. This administration had it's focus on the domestic economy. NASa was so far down their list of priorities that they did not even change the NASA administrator. In February 1993 looking for ways to cut the federal budget the administration suggested that the Space Station would face the budget axe. This was after $9 billion had been spent and almost nothing was actually built. In a masterful tour de force, NASA Administrator Dan Goddin persuaded the Clinton Administration to keep supporting Space Station as a means of keeping Russian scientists occupied and as a means of saving money The argument was that if Station was restructured to involve the Russians then it would keep Russian scientists from going off to do things we wouldnt like(like work on Iranian missiles) and by taking account of all the Russian expertise and hardware, NASa would save over a billio dollars on Station. Thus Space Station went from being a stepping stone to Mars(the next logica place) to being a scientific lab(microgravity and life sciences)to being explicitly a foreign olicy mechanism for international engagement. This was accepted by the administration and Station was again rephased, descoped and restructured. The size and power was reduced, the name was changed from Space Station Freedom to International Space Station, the orbit was changed to accommodate the russians and most critical(in hindsight), the russians were put in the critical path for the construction of the ISS. They would build the first two modules. The first under NASa funding and the second under their own funding. The lifetime was also reduced from 30 to 10 years partly because NASA now recognized how difficult it was to build something that would last thirty years in space. NASa also entered into agreements with the Russians to send US astronauts to Mir for extended times in order to learn how to live in space is led to some hair raising adventures. The Clinton administration also made nasa agree to a lifetime cap on funding for construction of approx. 19 billion and a cap of $2 billion a year in the NASA budget. This set of agreements(along with the personal work of Dan Goldin) proved enough to sell the program with the Congress. Congressional support for the Space Station soared and the votes for it were overwhelmingly favorable. This was due both to the fixed budgeSoviet Union collapsed shortly afterwards. There was no space race to engage in. Third, as a result of the Reagan/Bush era of tax cuts and increased defense spending, there was a huge deficit and the Congress was in the mood for budget cuts not increases. The President’s announcement was seen as “just another space speech” without a clear rationale for undertaking such a large undertaking. What also helped sink it was that when NASA did do a cost estimate with it’s “90 day” study, the number out of JSC was approximately $500 billion for the mission. By any measure, this is a lot of money (even spread over 30 years) and requires a national commitment to such an undertaking (by contrast at it’s peak the DoD budget was over $400 billion a year but there was a national consensus that we needed to oppose the Soviets). The Congress objected to the idea of such a large undertaking especially while existing programs like Space Station were ongoing. The Chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee zeroed out the funding for Moon-Man in 1991 with the statement “This is the camel’s nose under the tent. All those space wackos they want to get started.” This revealing comment suggested that the NASA camel’s nose under the tent was recognized for what it was (once burned, twice shy) and that the space community was seen as a special interest group without wide popular support. The Bush White House was unwilling or unable to fight for it and the whole program collapsed. In a sense, it was a remake of Apollo but the underlying mood and drives in the country had changed so now instead of being right program at the right time, it was the wrong program at the wrong time. The Clinton Administration came in, in early 1993. This administration had it’s focus on the domestic economy. NASA was so far down their list of priorities that they did not even change the NASA administrator. In February 1993 looking for ways to cut the federal budget the administration suggested that the Space Station would face the budget axe. This was after $9 billion had been spent and almost nothing was actually built. In a masterful tour de force, NASA Administrator Dan Goddin persuaded the Clinton Administration to keep supporting Space Station as a means of keeping Russian scientists occupied and as a means of saving money. The argument was that if Station was restructured to involve the Russians then it would keep Russian scientists from going off to do things we wouldn’t like (like work on Iranian missiles) and by taking account of all the Russian expertise and hardware, NASA would save over a billion dollars on Station. Thus Space Station went from being a stepping stone to Mars (the next logical place) to being a scientific lab (microgravity and life sciences) to being explicitly a foreign policy mechanism for international engagement. This was accepted by the administration and Station was again rephased, descoped and restructured. The size and power was reduced, the name was changed from Space Station Freedom to International Space Station, the orbit was changed to accommodate the Russians and most critical (in hindsight), the Russians were put in the critical path for the construction of the ISS. They would build the first two modules. The first under NASA funding and the second under their own funding. The lifetime was also reduced from 30 to 10 years partly because NASA now recognized how difficult it was to build something that would last thirty years in space. NASA also entered into agreements with the Russians to send US astronauts to MIR for extended times in order to learn how to live in space. This led to some hair raising adventures. The Clinton administration also made NASA agree to a lifetime cap on funding for construction of approx. 19 billion and a cap of $2 billion a year in the NASA budget. This set of agreements (along with the personal work of Dan Goldin) proved enough to sell the program with the Congress. Congressional support for the Space Station soared and the votes for it were overwhelmingly favorable. This was due both to the fixed budget