Michael Lamb Among the most important is "temporal peace,in pro- citizens in the commonwealth (cf.Johnson 2007.166- portion to the short span of a mortal life,consisting in 70). bodily health and soundness,and the society of one's Critics,however.may wonder whether this civic own kind:and all things necessary for the preserva- peace counts as an object of hope at all.After all. tion and recovery of this peace"(1998a,19.13).These most Augustinian realists interpret temporal "peace" goods are similar to the health,friendship,and "tem- in a negative,minimalist way,identifying peace sim- poral well-being"that Augustine identifies in Letter ply as the mere absence of violence.For example, 130 to Proba.In both texts.Augustine considers these Robert Markus argues that,for Augustine,the pur- goods proper as long as citizens observe right"order" pose of politics consists solely in protecting "a lowly and“use”(1998a.19.13:2003.130.6.12-130.714). form of 'peace':the public order and security which For Augustine,the supreme good is not temporal human sin has made unstable in society"(1970.174) peace but eternal peace,which consists in "a perfectly “The greater goods,”Markus argues,are“beyond the ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the en- scope of politics"(1970,174).Herbert Deane shares joyment of God,and of one another in God"(1998a this tragic vision of politics as a modus vivendi whose 19.13;cf.19.11,19.20).Although eternal peace is "our remedial function is negative rather than positive:"the Final Good,"temporal peace remains a genuine good: state,for Augustine,is an external order;the peace that "For peace is so great a good that,even in the sphere it maintains is external peace-the absence,or at least of earthly and mortal affairs,we hear no word more the diminution.of overt violence....It does not seek thankfully,and nothing is desired with greater long- to make men truly good or virtuous.Rather,it is in- ing:in short,it is not possible to find anything bet- terested in their outward actions,and it attempts,with ter"(1998a,19.11).Augustine's emphasis on tempo- some success,to restrain its citizens from performing ral peace reflects his view of human beings as inher- certain kinds of harmful and criminal acts"(1963.117: ently social beings who desire peace with their fellows: cf.133-4.138-43).For these Augustinian realists,the "just as there is no one who does not wish to be joyful, primary purpose of politics is not to promote good so there is no one who does not wish to have peace but to prevent evil,not to foster internal virtue but to (1998a,19.12)."Civic peace"(concordiam ciuium)- restrain external violence.Since this view has autho- the peace of the city or commonwealth-constitutes rized influential accounts of Augustinian pessimism,it one species of this temporal peace (1998a,19.16).It is worth considering whether the mere absence of vio- consists in "peaceful association"among fellows,"an lence provides an object of hope sufficient to motivate ordered concord,with respect to command and obedi- positive political action. ence,of the citizens"(1998a,19.12-13). Augustine certainly believes that civic peace re- Crucially,although Augustine distinguishes the quires remedies and restraints.Indeed,when he ex- heavenly'”and“earthly'”cities by their loves and plains what constitutes the "well-ordered concord"of hopes (1998a,14.28,15.21,19.1),he describes civic 'peace among men,"he identifies a duty not to harm peace as a common good that citizens of both cities as the first principle (1998a,19.14).Yet,following Ci- can share,even if they "use"it as a proximate object cero (1991,1.31),2 he also specifies more positive re- for different ultimate ends: sponsibilities of justice and civic friendship alongside these negative duties:"the order of this concord is,first. both kinds of men and both kinds of household make com- that a man should harm no one,and,second,that he mon use of those things which are necessary to this mortal should do good to all,so far as he can"(1998a.19.14) life;but each has its own very different end in using them This second,more positive form of concord challenges So also,the earthly city,which does not live by faith,desires those who cast politics simply as a negative remedy for an earthly peace,and it establishes an ordered concord of constraining the effects of sin.Augustine's common- civic obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co- wealth,like Cicero's,is not simply a set of minimal gov- operation of men's wills for the sake of attaining the things ernment structures,coercive laws,or political institu- which belong to this mortal life.But the Heavenly City-or tions,but also a set of ordered relationships,a kind of rather,that part of it which is a pilgrim in this condition of concord or civic friendship among those who belong to mortality,and which lives by faith-must of necessity make use of this peace also,until this mortal state,for which such the populus (see 1998a,19.3,19.13-14;Elshtain 1998. peace is necessary,shall have passed away.Thus,it lives like 38-9 von Heyking2001,77-89:2004,182-4).Indeed, a captive and a pilgrim,even though it has already received Augustine suggests that the pursuit of common goods the promise of redemption,and the gift of the Spirit as a requires "peaceful association among citizens:the kind of pledge of it.But,for as long as it does so,it does "society of one's own kind"remains a necessary not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city,whereby precondition for temporal peace(1998a,19.12-13).The the things necessary for the support of this mortal life are administered (1998a,19.17). 22 In On Duties,Cicero identifies two fundamental duties of justice: "first that one should harm no one:and secondly that one serve the Thus,Augustine concludes,"since this mortal condition common advantage"(1991,1.31:cf.1.20).In particular,he suggests is common to both cities,a harmony concordia is pre that citizens have a duty "to contribute to the common stock the served between them with respect to the things which things that benefit everyone together,and,by the exchange of dutiful belong to this condition"(1998a,19.17).Here,Augus- services,by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means,to 士 bind fast the fellowship of men with each other"(1991,1.22:cf.1.28) tine identifies a distinctly political good-civic peace In appropriating a twofold formula similar to Cicero's,Augustine ad- or concord-as a common object of hope for diverse vocates a more positive form of concord. 1044Michael Lamb Among the most important is “temporal peace, in pro￾portion to the short span of a mortal life, consisting in bodily health and soundness, and the society of one’s own kind; and all things necessary for the preserva￾tion and recovery of this peace” (1998a, 19.13). These goods are similar to the health, friendship, and “tem￾poral well-being” that Augustine identifies in Letter 130 to Proba. In both texts, Augustine considers these goods proper as long as citizens observe right “order” and “use” (1998a, 19.13; 2003, 130.6.12–130.7.14). For Augustine, the supreme good is not temporal peace but eternal peace, which consists in “a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the en￾joyment of God, and of one another in God” (1998a, 19.13; cf. 19.11, 19.20). Although eternal peace is “our Final Good,” temporal peace remains a genuine good: “For peace is so great a good that, even in the sphere of earthly and mortal affairs, we hear no word more thankfully, and nothing is desired with greater long￾ing: in short, it is not possible to find anything bet￾ter” (1998a, 19.11). Augustine’s emphasis on tempo￾ral peace reflects his view of human beings as inher￾ently social beings who desire peace with their fellows: “just as there is no one who does not wish to be joyful, so there is no one who does not wish to have peace” (1998a, 19.12). “Civic peace” (concordiam ciuium)— the peace of the city or commonwealth—constitutes one species of this temporal peace (1998a, 19.16). It consists in “peaceful association” among fellows, “an ordered concord, with respect to command and obedi￾ence, of the citizens” (1998a, 19.12–13). Crucially, although Augustine distinguishes the “heavenly” and “earthly” cities by their loves and hopes (1998a, 14.28, 15.21, 19.1), he describes civic peace as a common good that citizens of both cities can share, even if they “use” it as a proximate object for different ultimate ends: both kinds of men and both kinds of household make com￾mon use of those things which are necessary to this mortal life; but each has its own very different end in using them. So also, the earthly city, which does not live by faith, desires an earthly peace, and it establishes an ordered concord of civic obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co￾operation of men’s wills for the sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal life.But the Heavenly City – or, rather, that part of it which is a pilgrim in this condition of mortality, and which lives by faith – must of necessity make use of this peace also, until this mortal state, for which such peace is necessary, shall have passed away.Thus,it lives like a captive and a pilgrim, even though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as a kind of pledge of it. But, for as long as it does so, it does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the support of this mortal life are administered (1998a, 19.17). Thus,Augustine concludes, “since this mortal condition is common to both cities, a harmony [concordia] is pre￾served between them with respect to the things which belong to this condition” (1998a, 19.17). Here, Augus￾tine identifies a distinctly political good—civic peace or concord—as a common object of hope for diverse citizens in the commonwealth (cf. Johnson 2007, 166– 70). Critics, however, may wonder whether this civic peace counts as an object of hope at all. After all, most Augustinian realists interpret temporal “peace” in a negative, minimalist way, identifying peace sim￾ply as the mere absence of violence. For example, Robert Markus argues that, for Augustine, the pur￾pose of politics consists solely in protecting “a lowly form of ‘peace’: the public order and security which human sin has made unstable in society” (1970, 174). “The greater goods,” Markus argues, are “beyond the scope of politics” (1970, 174). Herbert Deane shares this tragic vision of politics as a modus vivendi whose remedial function is negative rather than positive: “the state, for Augustine, is an external order; the peace that it maintains is external peace—the absence, or at least the diminution, of overt violence…. It does not seek to make men truly good or virtuous. Rather, it is in￾terested in their outward actions, and it attempts, with some success, to restrain its citizens from performing certain kinds of harmful and criminal acts” (1963, 117; cf. 133–4, 138–43). For these Augustinian realists, the primary purpose of politics is not to promote good but to prevent evil, not to foster internal virtue but to restrain external violence. Since this view has autho￾rized influential accounts of Augustinian pessimism, it is worth considering whether the mere absence of vio￾lence provides an object of hope sufficient to motivate positive political action. Augustine certainly believes that civic peace re￾quires remedies and restraints. Indeed, when he ex￾plains what constitutes the “well-ordered concord” of “peace among men,” he identifies a duty not to harm as the first principle (1998a, 19.14). Yet, following Ci￾cero (1991, 1.31),22 he also specifies more positive re￾sponsibilities of justice and civic friendship alongside these negative duties: “the order of this concord is, first, that a man should harm no one, and, second, that he should do good to all, so far as he can” (1998a, 19.14). This second, more positive form of concord challenges those who cast politics simply as a negative remedy for constraining the effects of sin. Augustine’s common￾wealth, like Cicero’s, is not simply a set of minimal gov￾ernment structures, coercive laws, or political institu￾tions, but also a set of ordered relationships, a kind of concord or civic friendship among those who belong to the populus (see 1998a, 19.3, 19.13–14; Elshtain 1998, 38–9; von Heyking 2001, 77–89; 2004, 182–4). Indeed, Augustine suggests that the pursuit of common goods requires “peaceful association” among citizens: the “society of one’s own kind” remains a necessary precondition for temporal peace (1998a, 19.12–13).The 22 In On Duties, Cicero identifies two fundamental duties of justice: “first that one should harm no one; and secondly that one serve the common advantage” (1991, 1.31; cf. 1.20). In particular, he suggests that citizens have a duty “to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together, and, by the exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving expertise and effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other” (1991, 1.22; cf. 1.28). In appropriating a twofold formula similar to Cicero’s, Augustine ad￾vocates a more positive form of concord. 1044 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345