Between Presumption and Despair "city's life is inevitably a social one"(1998a.19.17: ascending order.suggesting that each participates in cf.19.5) the larger whole (1998a,19.13).He makes this part- Augustine's emphasis on sociality in the common- whole structure explicit in 19.16,where he describes wealth is even more evident in his original Latin.His how "domestic peace has reference to civic peace": definition of a "people"-coetus multitudinis rationalis "A man's household,then,ought to be the beginning, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus-is or a little part,of the city;and every beginning has usually translated as "an assembled multitude of ra- reference to some end proper to itself,and every part tional creatures bound together by a common agree- has reference to the integrity of the whole of which ment as to the objects of their love,"which can sug- it is a part."Indeed,even the "peace of the unjust" gest a kind of rational consensus of citizens (1998a. ultimately participates in the peace of the heavenly 19.24).But as John von Hevking notes,Augustine's in city:"Even that which is perverse...must of necessity vocation of coming together (coetus)in concord (con- be in,or derived from,or associated with,and to that cordi)has social and affective connotations that are extent at peace with,some part of the order of things often downplayed in modern accounts of Augustine's political thought(2001,85-8;cf.2004,182-4).The dif. Ouheu mot at (9sa.92) ference is especially clear when contrasting Augustine's In the current age,Augustine holds that civic peace definition with Cicero's:in place of a people joined remains proximate and imperfect,but the properly by common agreement on justice and law (iuris con- ordered friendships that constitute the peace of the sensu)and the sharing of interests or benefits (utilitas just are genuine goods,friendships that participate communione sociatus).Augustine emphasizes agree in friendship with God.Indeed,given the part-whole ment and harmony (concordi communione sociatus) structure of human society,civic peace need not be a around common objects of love (rerum quas diligit) "lowly form of 'peace""(Markus 1970,174),but can While many interpreters assume that "common ob- constitute a more positive form of civic friendship that jects of love"refers to something closer to "common participates,even if imperfectly,in friendship with God. 4r元 interests"(e.g.,Klosko 2012,233,247),the modern If civic peace is a proper object of Augustinian hope, language of interests can also suggest"rational"or this hope,however,must also be rightly ordered to "economic"interests that do not necessarily map onto avoid the vices of presumption and despair.Peace,after the affective and social complexity of Augustine's ac- all,is a fragile and "uncertain good":"If...there is no count..“Values'”or“common goods'”are better analo- security even in the home from the common evils which gies since they capture the ways in which these objects befall the human race,what of the city?The larger the engage our affections along with our reason.Augus- city,the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and tine's conception of the commonwealth carves out a criminal trials.Even when the city is at peace and free political role for virtues and affections -such as love from actual sedition and civil war,it is never free from and hope-that are sometimes elided in contempo- the danger of such disturbance or,more often,blood- rary political theories that emphasize epistemic justifi- shed"(1998a,19.5;cf.15.4).Augustine's vivid account cation and abstract rationality (for discussion,see Gre of social and political evils chastens citizens from find- g0y2008,23,38,66-74,99-107,149-75,241-56.366-7: ing rest in an imperfect commonwealth,either making Hordern 2012). an idol of politics or presuming that earthly politics is That many critics downplay the associational and the supreme source of happiness(1998a,15.4,19.5-8). affective aspects of Augustine's thought may reflect This is one of the core insights of Augustine's politica their implicit metaphysical dualism and"futurist"es- thought:Augustine's diagnosis of political and social chatology,their view that heaven and earth are en- evils punctures any illusions that politics can escape tirely distinct and that the eschaton is deferred indefi- the effects of self-interest or the temptations toward nitely to some"absolute future"beyond temporal his- vice that exist on all sides.But Augustine's warnings tory(Billings2004:135-6;Arendt1996,18-9,2644) against presumption do not thereby license pessimism If one assumes a strict separation between the earthly or despair.As Kristen Deede Johnson argues,Augus- and heavenly or the temporal and eternal,the relative tine's political vision "lies somewhere in between the peace of the saeculum can seem detached from par two extremes of completely abandoning the earthly ticipation in the City of God.But if one recognizes city and looking to the earthly city to achieve utopian Augustine's participationist ontology,temporal or civic like harmony and peace"(Johnson 2007,169;cf.176-9). peace is no longer simply an absence of violence,but Luke Bretherton agrees:"For Augustine,politics in the a kind of participation in the peace of the Heavenly saeculum is about enabling a limited peace that is on City.23 the one hand shorn of messianic pretensions but on the Augustine suggests as much in City of God.When other not given over to demonic despair"(Bretherton, he identifies the various forms of peace-the peace of 2010.83:see also Mathewes 2007.214-60:Avramenko the body,irrational and rational souls,the household 2007,810). the city,and the heavenly city-he identifies them in 24 Citing this passage,Klosko recognizes that earthly peace "par- 23 While John Milbank rejects a futurist eschatology and affirms Au- takes to some extent of the heavenly peace,"but he does not draw gustine's participationist ontology (2006,394,429-34).in his most the same implications for his understanding of Augustine's com- rhetorically excessive moments,he tends to limit any "real"and"gen- monwealth.Instead,he follows Deane in seeing the purposes of the uine"peace to the church(2006,394-5). 'state”as primarily“negative”"(Klosko2012,246-9). 1045Between Presumption and Despair “city’s life is inevitably a social one” (1998a, 19.17; cf. 19.5). Augustine’s emphasis on sociality in the common￾wealth is even more evident in his original Latin. His definition of a “people”—coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus—is usually translated as “an assembled multitude of ra￾tional creatures bound together by a common agree￾ment as to the objects of their love,” which can sug￾gest a kind of rational consensus of citizens (1998a, 19.24). But as John von Heyking notes, Augustine’s in￾vocation of coming together (coetus) in concord (con￾cordi) has social and affective connotations that are often downplayed in modern accounts of Augustine’s political thought (2001, 85–8; cf. 2004, 182–4). The dif￾ference is especially clear when contrasting Augustine’s definition with Cicero’s: in place of a people joined by common agreement on justice and law (iuris con￾sensu) and the sharing of interests or benefits (utilitas communione sociatus), Augustine emphasizes agree￾ment and harmony (concordi communione sociatus) around common objects of love (rerum quas diligit). While many interpreters assume that “common ob￾jects of love” refers to something closer to “common interests” (e.g., Klosko 2012, 233, 247), the modern language of interests can also suggest “rational” or “economic” interests that do not necessarily map onto the affective and social complexity of Augustine’s ac￾count. “Values” or “common goods” are better analo￾gies since they capture the ways in which these objects engage our affections along with our reason. Augus￾tine’s conception of the commonwealth carves out a political role for virtues and affections—such as love and hope—that are sometimes elided in contempo￾rary political theories that emphasize epistemic justifi￾cation and abstract rationality (for discussion, see Gre￾gory 2008, 23, 38, 66–74, 99–107, 149–75, 241–56, 366–7; Hordern 2012). That many critics downplay the associational and affective aspects of Augustine’s thought may reflect their implicit metaphysical dualism and “futurist” es￾chatology, their view that heaven and earth are en￾tirely distinct and that the eschaton is deferred indefi￾nitely to some “absolute future” beyond temporal his￾tory (Billings 2004: 135–6; Arendt 1996, 18–9, 26–44). If one assumes a strict separation between the earthly and heavenly or the temporal and eternal, the relative peace of the saeculum can seem detached from par￾ticipation in the City of God. But if one recognizes Augustine’s participationist ontology, temporal or civic peace is no longer simply an absence of violence, but a kind of participation in the peace of the Heavenly City.23 Augustine suggests as much in City of God. When he identifies the various forms of peace—the peace of the body, irrational and rational souls, the household, the city, and the heavenly city—he identifies them in 23 While John Milbank rejects a futurist eschatology and affirms Au￾gustine’s participationist ontology (2006, 394, 429–34), in his most rhetorically excessive moments, he tends to limit any “real” and “gen￾uine” peace to the church (2006, 394–5). ascending order, suggesting that each participates in the larger whole (1998a, 19.13). He makes this part￾whole structure explicit in 19.16, where he describes how “domestic peace has reference to civic peace”: “A man’s household, then, ought to be the beginning, or a little part, of the city; and every beginning has reference to some end proper to itself, and every part has reference to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part.” Indeed, even the “peace of the unjust” ultimately participates in the peace of the heavenly city: “Even that which is perverse … must of necessity be in, or derived from, or associated with, and to that extent at peace with, some part of the order of things among which it has its being or of which it consists. Otherwise, it would not exist at all” (1998a, 19.12).24 In the current age, Augustine holds that civic peace remains proximate and imperfect, but the properly ordered friendships that constitute the peace of the just are genuine goods, friendships that participate in friendship with God. Indeed, given the part-whole structure of human society, civic peace need not be a “lowly form of ‘peace’” (Markus 1970, 174), but can constitute a more positive form of civic friendship that participates, even if imperfectly,in friendship with God. If civic peace is a proper object of Augustinian hope, this hope, however, must also be rightly ordered to avoid the vices of presumption and despair. Peace, after all, is a fragile and “uncertain good”: “If . . . there is no security even in the home from the common evils which befall the human race, what of the city? The larger the city, the more is its forum filled with civil law-suits and criminal trials. Even when the city is at peace and free from actual sedition and civil war, it is never free from the danger of such disturbance or, more often, blood￾shed” (1998a, 19.5; cf. 15.4). Augustine’s vivid account of social and political evils chastens citizens from find￾ing rest in an imperfect commonwealth, either making an idol of politics or presuming that earthly politics is the supreme source of happiness (1998a, 15.4, 19.5–8). This is one of the core insights of Augustine’s political thought: Augustine’s diagnosis of political and social evils punctures any illusions that politics can escape the effects of self-interest or the temptations toward vice that exist on all sides. But Augustine’s warnings against presumption do not thereby license pessimism or despair. As Kristen Deede Johnson argues, Augus￾tine’s political vision “lies somewhere in between the two extremes of completely abandoning the earthly city and looking to the earthly city to achieve utopian￾like harmony and peace” (Johnson 2007, 169; cf. 176–9). Luke Bretherton agrees: “For Augustine, politics in the saeculum is about enabling a limited peace that is on the one hand shorn of messianic pretensions but on the other not given over to demonic despair” (Bretherton, 2010, 83; see also Mathewes 2007, 214–60; Avramenko 2007, 810). 24 Citing this passage, Klosko recognizes that earthly peace “par￾takes to some extent of the heavenly peace,” but he does not draw the same implications for his understanding of Augustine’s com￾monwealth. Instead, he follows Deane in seeing the purposes of the “state” as primarily “negative” (Klosko 2012, 246–9). 1045 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345