Michael Lamb The order of hope that I have brought into be preferable to naive optimism,it can also license a view supplies the conceptual framework needed to kind of apathy or fatalism in the face of uncertainty identify the proper relation between temporal and encouraging citizens to withdraw from politics rather eternal hopes and the moral vocabulary needed to de- than stretch toward difficult goods.When such despair scribe an Augustinian posture toward politics.Augus- becomes a habit-a vice-it can further entrench the tine commends a virtue of hope that enables citizens social and political problems that prompted pessimism to resist temptations toward political despair without in the first place.To avoid temptations on both sides, thereby licensing the presumption that breeds idolatry, citizens need a way to resist despair without thereby complacency,or cruelty.By discouraging citizens from licensing presumption or false hope.Augustine's con- having too much,or too little,hope for earthly politics, ception of hope as a virtue between these two vices pro- Augustine encourages a hope for the commonwealth vides the conceptual and political vocabulary needed that avoids both presumption and despair. to identify this posture.By recognizing temptations to- ward presumption and despair that accompany hope CONCLUSION in various contexts,Augustine supplies critical leverage for distinguishing cases when hope is appropriate from This article has sought to make three contributions to cases when it is excessive or deficient.And by identi- the study of Augustine within political theory.First,it fying a virtue that guides the affection.he highlights a has attempted to synthesize and integrate recent re- disposition that can provide a more nuanced alterna- search in religious studies to challenge common as- tive to the binary rhetoric of optimism and pessimism sumptions about Augustine's otherworldly order of that often pervades contemporary discourse.?6 love and the political pessimism it seems to underwrite. Second.Augustine's vision of the commonwealth Second,it has drawn on understudied sermons,trea shifts the focus of politics away from entrenched dis- tises,and letters to highlight structural similarities be- putes over ultimate ends toward the need to share tween Augustine's explicit order of love and his implicit common objects of hope,even if those hopes are or- order of hope.These similarities,in turn,show how Au- dered to different ultimate ends.And Augustine does gustine acknowledges the permissibility of hoping for this in a way that requires neither strict neutrality nor temporal goods and identifies a virtue that resists vices totalizing exclusion.Contrary to what Robert Markus of both perversion and privation.Finally,this article has suggests (1970,69-71,151,174),Augustine's common- recast Augustine's account of civic peace as a form of wealth is not "autonomous"and"neutral"with respect civic friendship in order to identify a distinctly polit- to the good.Augustine clearly believes that civic peace ical object of hope that diverse citizens can share in participates in eternal peace and that some objects of the commonwealth.Contrary to what many critics as- hope are better than others (1998a.19.13,19.24).He sume,Augustine's hope is not exclusively otherworldly also explicitly encourages citizens to bring their reli- or anti-political.Although he recognizes that politics is gious values and moral virtues into the public sphere fraught with dangers,toils,and snares,he also acknowl- (see 2001.Letters 138.155.189).While Markus con- edges that civic peace is a genuine good and can even cedes this in his later work(2006.1-6,44-8.50-1.63-4) be a way to participate in the city of God. he still occasionally slips into the language of"auton- If this reading challenges common interpretations of omy"and "neutrality"and even compares Augustine's S5.501g Augustine,it also seeks to highlight resources for con- position to Rawls's liberal conception of"overlapping temporary political theory and practice,even for schol- consensus,"in which citizens with diverse "comprehen- ars and citizens who do not share Augustine's religious sive doctrines"arrive at a shared political consensus commitments or endorse the ultimate objects of his based on "public reasons"(Markus 2006,5-7 40,44, hope.While Augustine's concerns are different from 63,66-9,citing Rawls1996,134,11-5,190-5,and Rawls our own and a comprehensive analysis is beyond the 1985,247-8).A better contemporary analogue for Au- scope of this article,I conclude by briefly identifying gustine's view is Cass Sunstein's idea of"incompletely three potential contributions. theorized agreement,"a practical and provisional con- First,Augustine's triad of presumption,hope,and vergence around common goods that seeks to promote despair provides a useful conceptual vocabulary for coordination and stability in the face of disagreement analyzing hope in contemporary politics.Although a without requiring strict neutrality or comprehensive rhetoric of hope has recently pervaded public dis- agreement on ultimate ends (Sunstein 1998).In rec- course,this rhetoric has often equated "hope"with ognizing how diverse citizens make common use of “optimism”or“positive thinking,.”setting it in strict civic peace,Augustine endorses a similar kind of in- opposition to"pessimism."25 While this binary may be completely theorized agreement in the face of diver- appropriate in some contexts,it can be confining in sity and disagreement,encouraging citizens from di- others,causing defenders to ignore how the attitude verse traditions to converge around the common good of hope can swell into presumption and leaving critics of civic peace,regardless of"any differences in the cus- with no other option but to embrace "pessimism"or toms,laws,and institutions by which earthly peace is L even "despair."While thoroughgoing pessimism may 26 For similar arguments in the context of Aquinas,see Lamb(2016a. 2016b).For other accounts of hope as a virtue in a democratic con- 25 See,for example,Ehrenreich(2007):Scruton(2010,2013):Baner- text,see,e.g.,Mittleman (2009);Stout (2010,xv-xix,254-9.278-86): jee and Duflo (2011,202);Runciman(2013,xi-xix,41,52-3,234,304). and Snow (2018). 1046Michael Lamb The order of hope that I have brought into view supplies the conceptual framework needed to identify the proper relation between temporal and eternal hopes and the moral vocabulary needed to de￾scribe an Augustinian posture toward politics. Augus￾tine commends a virtue of hope that enables citizens to resist temptations toward political despair without thereby licensing the presumption that breeds idolatry, complacency, or cruelty. By discouraging citizens from having too much, or too little, hope for earthly politics, Augustine encourages a hope for the commonwealth that avoids both presumption and despair. CONCLUSION This article has sought to make three contributions to the study of Augustine within political theory. First, it has attempted to synthesize and integrate recent re￾search in religious studies to challenge common as￾sumptions about Augustine’s otherworldly order of love and the political pessimism it seems to underwrite. Second, it has drawn on understudied sermons, trea￾tises, and letters to highlight structural similarities be￾tween Augustine’s explicit order of love and his implicit order of hope. These similarities, in turn, show how Au￾gustine acknowledges the permissibility of hoping for temporal goods and identifies a virtue that resists vices of both perversion and privation.Finally, this article has recast Augustine’s account of civic peace as a form of civic friendship in order to identify a distinctly polit￾ical object of hope that diverse citizens can share in the commonwealth. Contrary to what many critics as￾sume, Augustine’s hope is not exclusively otherworldly or anti-political. Although he recognizes that politics is fraught with dangers, toils, and snares, he also acknowl￾edges that civic peace is a genuine good and can even be a way to participate in the city of God. If this reading challenges common interpretations of Augustine, it also seeks to highlight resources for con￾temporary political theory and practice, even for schol￾ars and citizens who do not share Augustine’s religious commitments or endorse the ultimate objects of his hope. While Augustine’s concerns are different from our own and a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this article, I conclude by briefly identifying three potential contributions. First, Augustine’s triad of presumption, hope, and despair provides a useful conceptual vocabulary for analyzing hope in contemporary politics. Although a rhetoric of hope has recently pervaded public dis￾course, this rhetoric has often equated “hope” with “optimism” or “positive thinking,” setting it in strict opposition to “pessimism.”25 While this binary may be appropriate in some contexts, it can be confining in others, causing defenders to ignore how the attitude of hope can swell into presumption and leaving critics with no other option but to embrace “pessimism” or even “despair.” While thoroughgoing pessimism may 25 See, for example, Ehrenreich (2007); Scruton (2010, 2013); Baner￾jee and Duflo (2011, 202); Runciman (2013, xi–xix, 41, 52–3, 234, 304). be preferable to naive optimism, it can also license a kind of apathy or fatalism in the face of uncertainty, encouraging citizens to withdraw from politics rather than stretch toward difficult goods. When such despair becomes a habit—a vice—it can further entrench the social and political problems that prompted pessimism in the first place. To avoid temptations on both sides, citizens need a way to resist despair without thereby licensing presumption or false hope. Augustine’s con￾ception of hope as a virtue between these two vices pro￾vides the conceptual and political vocabulary needed to identify this posture. By recognizing temptations to￾ward presumption and despair that accompany hope in various contexts,Augustine supplies critical leverage for distinguishing cases when hope is appropriate from cases when it is excessive or deficient. And by identi￾fying a virtue that guides the affection, he highlights a disposition that can provide a more nuanced alterna￾tive to the binary rhetoric of optimism and pessimism that often pervades contemporary discourse.26 Second, Augustine’s vision of the commonwealth shifts the focus of politics away from entrenched dis￾putes over ultimate ends toward the need to share common objects of hope, even if those hopes are or￾dered to different ultimate ends. And Augustine does this in a way that requires neither strict neutrality nor totalizing exclusion. Contrary to what Robert Markus suggests (1970, 69–71, 151, 174), Augustine’s common￾wealth is not “autonomous” and “neutral” with respect to the good. Augustine clearly believes that civic peace participates in eternal peace and that some objects of hope are better than others (1998a, 19.13, 19.24). He also explicitly encourages citizens to bring their reli￾gious values and moral virtues into the public sphere (see 2001, Letters 138, 155, 189). While Markus con￾cedes this in his later work (2006, 1–6, 44–8, 50–1, 63–4), he still occasionally slips into the language of “auton￾omy” and “neutrality” and even compares Augustine’s position to Rawls’s liberal conception of “overlapping consensus,”in which citizens with diverse “comprehen￾sive doctrines” arrive at a shared political consensus based on “public reasons” (Markus 2006, 5–7, 40, 44, 63, 66–9, citing Rawls 1996, 134, 11–5, 190–5, and Rawls 1985, 247–8). A better contemporary analogue for Au￾gustine’s view is Cass Sunstein’s idea of “incompletely theorized agreement,” a practical and provisional con￾vergence around common goods that seeks to promote coordination and stability in the face of disagreement without requiring strict neutrality or comprehensive agreement on ultimate ends (Sunstein 1998). In rec￾ognizing how diverse citizens make common use of civic peace, Augustine endorses a similar kind of in￾completely theorized agreement in the face of diver￾sity and disagreement, encouraging citizens from di￾verse traditions to converge around the common good of civic peace, regardless of “any differences in the cus￾toms, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is 26 For similar arguments in the context of Aquinas, see Lamb (2016a, 2016b). For other accounts of hope as a virtue in a democratic con￾text, see, e.g., Mittleman (2009); Stout (2010, xv–xix, 254–9, 278–86); and Snow (2018). 1046 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345