248 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from separation is likely to be leveled by separation income is split across two new mechanisms that have gained strength in re- households,the loss of economies of scale cent decades.Shifts in the labor market have means that the joint economic status of the reduced married and cohabiting men's share separated partners is lower than it would be of household income,and thereby raised the if they shared the costs of maintaining a cost of exit.Men's potential gains are often single household.We expect that the loss of further reduced by tax and social welfare partner's market income is the primary policies,by compulsory child support and mechanism for reducing men's economic alimony payments,and by informal support status following union dissolution. to members of the former family. WELFARE STATE MECHANISMS GENDER-ROLE SPECIALIZATION Welfare state tax and transfer policy takes AND MARKET MECHANISMS marital status and household composition The presumption that men reap financial re- into account,ostensibly providing preferen- wards in the aftermath of shedding their tial treatment to families.In fact,the well- families is partly rooted in the "specializa- publicized "marriage penalty"imposed on tion and trading model"(Becker 1981; many dual-earner couples obscures the fact Oppenheimer 1997),which arguably is the that,at least through the mid-1990s,the ma- most prominent contemporary model for jority of married couples paid lower federal marriage.This model conceptualizes the income taxes than they would have if they married couple as a production and bargain- were single (U.S.Congressional Budget Of- ing unit in which,for biological reasons,the fice 1997).As another example,low-income female partner has a comparative advantage men who separate from their families stand in household production,while the male part- to lose benefits (e.g.,food stamps)that are ner has a comparative advantage in paid la- contingent on both household income and bor.According to this model,the partners household size.We expect state policy to specialize in gender-specific tasks and then buffer income lost to men with low pre-sepa- trade the product of their labor to maximize ration shares of household income,and to their joint well-being.It seems obvious that level the incomes of men with the highest a male breadwinner who kept his job while pre-separation income shares. separating from his homemaker partner would be materially better off,though at the JUDICIAL MECHANISMS TO cost of doing more housework(Gupta 1999). PROTECT DEPENDENTS Because of the specialization-induced finan- cial risk,the wife demands a marriage con- Post-separation household income can also tract to protect herself from possible malfea- be reduced by court-ordered family-support sance by her partner. payments.Noncustodial parents are subject As Oppenheimer (1997)points out,com- to compulsory child-support payments,and plete gender-role specialization is a high-risk in rare instances the financially weaker part- strategy for both partners and is not typical ner may also win redress in the form of a of contemporary American households.In- spousal support award.Noncustodial parents stead,American men and women generally are overwhelmingly male,and alimony pay- share in the market provision for the house- ments flow almost exclusively from men to hold.Men typically earn more than their fe- women.We expect compulsory transfers to male partners,and the partner with greater reduce men's incomes,more so for men who economic strength is likely to have a com- provided the bulk of the couple's pre-disrup- parative financial advantage following any tion income. separation.But relative market advantages are imprecise tools for assessing the abso- INFORMAL NORMS OF OBLIGATION lute financial impact of an event as costly as AND RECIPROCITY separation,which can easily produce a de- cline in the living standards of both former Separation and divorce do not invariably partners (Sgrensen 1994).When the pre- sever informal financial ties between men This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions248 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from separation is likely to be leveled by mechanisms that have gained strength in re￾cent decades. Shifts in the labor market have reduced married and cohabiting men's share of household income, and thereby raised the cost of exit. Men's potential gains are often further reduced by tax and social welfare policies, by compulsory child support and alimony payments, and by informal support to members of the former family. GENDER-ROLE SPECIALIZATION AND MARKET MECHANISMS The presumption that men reap financial re￾wards in the aftermath of shedding their families is partly rooted in the "specializa￾tion and trading model" (Becker 1981; Oppenheimer 1997), which arguably is the most prominent contemporary model for marriage. This model conceptualizes the married couple as a production and bargain￾ing unit in which, for biological reasons, the female partner has a comparative advantage in household production, while the male part￾ner has a comparative advantage in paid la￾bor. According to this model, the partners specialize in gender-specific tasks and then trade the product of their labor to maximize their joint well-being. It seems obvious that a male breadwinner who kept his job while separating from his homemaker partner would be materially better off, though at the cost of doing more housework (Gupta 1999). Because of the specialization-induced finan￾cial risk, the wife demands a marriage con￾tract to protect herself from possible malfea￾sance by her partner. As Oppenheimer (1997) points out, com￾plete gender-role specialization is a high-risk strategy for both partners and is not typical of contemporary American households. In￾stead, American men and women generally share in the market provision for the house￾hold. Men typically earn more than their fe￾male partners, and the partner with greater economic strength is likely to have a com￾parative financial advantage following any separation. But relative market advantages are imprecise tools for assessing the abso￾lute financial impact of an event as costly as separation, which can easily produce a de￾cline in the living standards of both former partners (Sorensen 1994). When the pre￾separation income is split across two new households, the loss of economies of scale means that the joint economic status of the separated partners is lower than it would be if they shared the costs of maintaining a single household. We expect that the loss of partner's market income is the primary mechanism for reducing men's economic status following union dissolution. WELFARE STATE MECHANISMS Welfare state tax and transfer policy takes marital status and household composition into account, ostensibly providing preferen￾tial treatment to families. In fact, the well￾publicized "marriage penalty" imposed on many dual-earner couples obscures the fact that, at least through the mid-1990s, the ma￾jority of married couples paid lower federal income taxes than they would have if they were single (U.S. Congressional Budget Of￾fice 1997). As another example, low-income men who separate from their families stand to lose benefits (e.g., food stamps) that are contingent on both household income and household size. We expect state policy to buffer income lost to men with low pre-sepa￾ration shares of household income, and to level the incomes of men with the highest pre-separation income shares. JUDICIAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT DEPENDENTS Post-separation household income can also be reduced by court-ordered family-support payments. Noncustodial parents are subject to compulsory child-support payments, and in rare instances the financially weaker part￾ner may also win redress in the form of a spousal support award. Noncustodial parents are overwhelmingly male, and alimony pay￾ments flow almost exclusively from men to women. We expect compulsory transfers to reduce men's incomes, more so for men who provided the bulk of the couple's pre-disrup￾tion income. INFORMAL NORMS OF OBLIGATION AND RECIPROCITY Separation and divorce do not invariably sever informal financial ties between men This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions