《性别、亲密关系与社会》课程教学资源：LOSERS AND WINNERS：THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE FOR MEN

LOSERS AND WINNERS: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE FOR MEN PATRICIA A.MCMANUS THOMAS A.DIPRETE Indiana University Duke University Contrary to conventional thinking,the majority of partnered men in the United States lose economic status when their unions dissolve.Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,this analysis shows that for most men the primary source of economic decline after union dissolution is their inability to fully compensate for the loss of their partner's income.A secondary source of economic decline is an increase in compulsory and voluntary support payments.Welfare state tax and trans- fer mechanisms have a much smaller overall impact on changes in men's living standards following separation.Although most men experience a decline in living standards following union dissolution,men's outcomes are heterogeneous,and the minority of men who relied on their partners for less than one-fifth of pre-dissolu- tion income typically gain from separation and divorce.The data show a clear trend toward greater economic interdependence in American partnerships,and this trend appears to increase the proportion of men who suffer a reduced standard of living following separation. LARGE body of research has estab- and its implications for the well-being of lished that marital disruption has a children who experience a parental divorce substantial negative impact on women's (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997;McLana- standard of living,and that this impact is han and Sandefur 1994)contribute to the worse for women than for men (Bianchi, heated public debate on divorce reform. McArthur,and Hill 1989;Burkhauser et al. Feminist scholars and commentators who 1990,1991;Duncan and Hoffman 1985; defend no-fault divorce laws nonetheless Hoffman 1977;Smock 1993,1994;Smock, condemn this gender disparity as "uncon- Manning and Gupta 1999;for a review,see scionable for a legal system and a society Holden and Smock 1991).Gender inequal- committed to fairness,justice and equality" ity in the economic consequences of divorce (Weitzman 1996:538,emphasis in original; also see Bradford 1997;DiTullio 1997; Faludi 1991). Direct correspondence to Patricia McManus, Department of Sociology,Indiana University, Though Weitzman's (1985)well-publi- Ballantine Hall 744,1020 E.Kirkwood Avenue, cized claim that women lose three-quarters Bloomington,IN 47405-7103 (pmcmanus@ of their previous standard of living while indiana.edu).This research was supported in part men gain over 40 percent has been proven by National Science Foundation grant NSF-SBR- erroneous(Peterson 1996),the assertion that 96-31944.Karen Segar provided assistance with men gain from divorce is still part of the con- data preparation.We thank Frances Gold- ventional wisdom about marital dissolution scheider,participants in the Political and Eco- (e.g.DiTullio 1997;Morrison and Ritualo nomic Sociology Workshop at Indiana Univer- 2000;Smock et al.1999).Yet while there is sity,and the ASR Editors and anonymous review- ers for providing helpful comments on early overwhelming evidence supporting the view drafts.The data used in this study were made that women's standard of living declines- available to us by the Cross-National Equivalent often precipitously-following separation or File (CNEF)project at the College of Human divorce,the financial impact on men is less Ecology at Cornell University,Ithaca,NY. well understood.Studies relying primarily on 246 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW,2001.VoL.66(APRIL:246-268) This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LOSERS AND WINNERS: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE FOR MEN PATRICIA A. MCMANUS THOMAS A. DIPRETE Indiana University Duke University Contrary to conventional thinking, the majority of partnered men in the United States lose economic status when their unions dissolve. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this analysis shows that for most men the primary source of economic decline after union dissolution is their inability to fully compensate for the loss of their partner's income. A secondary source of economic decline is an increase in compulsory and voluntary support payments. Welfare state tax and trans￾fer mechanisms have a much smaller overall impact on changes in men's living standards following separation. Although most men experience a decline in living standards following union dissolution, men's outcomes are heterogeneous, and the minority of men who relied on their partners for less than one-fifth of pre-dissolu￾tion income typically gain from separation and divorce. The data show a clear trend toward greater economic interdependence in American partnerships, and this trend appears to increase the proportion of men who suffer a reduced standard of living following separation. A LARGE body of research has estab￾lished that marital disruption has a substantial negative impact on women's standard of living, and that this impact is worse for women than for men (Bianchi, McArthur, and Hill 1989; Burkhauser et al. 1990, 1991; Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Hoffman 1977; Smock 1993, 1994; Smock, Manning and Gupta 1999; for a review, see Holden and Smock 1991). Gender inequal￾ity in the economic consequences of divorce Direct correspondence to Patricia McManus, Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Ballantine Hall 744, 1020 E. Kirkwood Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405-7103 (pmcmanus@ indiana.edu). This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant NSF-SBR- 96-31944. Karen Segar provided assistance with data preparation. We thank Frances Gold￾scheider, participants in the Political and Eco￾nomic Sociology Workshop at Indiana Univer￾sity, and the ASR Editors and anonymous review￾ers for providing helpful comments on early drafts. The data used in this study were made available to us by the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) project at the College of Human Ecology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. and its implications for the well-being of children who experience a parental divorce (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997; McLana￾han and Sandefur 1994) contribute to the heated public debate on divorce reform. Feminist scholars and commentators who defend no-fault divorce laws nonetheless condemn this gender disparity as "uncon￾scionable for a legal system and a society committed to fairness, justice and equality" (Weitzman 1996:538, emphasis in original; also see Bradford 1997; DiTullio 1997; Faludi 1991). Though Weitzman's (1985) well-publi￾cized claim that women lose three-quarters of their previous standard of living while men gain over 40 percent has been proven erroneous (Peterson 1996), the assertion that men gain from divorce is still part of the con￾ventional wisdom about marital dissolution (e.g. DiTullio 1997; Morrison and Ritualo 2000; Smock et al. 1999). Yet while there is overwhelming evidence supporting the view that women's standard of living declines￾often precipitously-following separation or divorce, the financial impact on men is less well understood. Studies relving primarily on 246 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2001, VOL. 66 (APRIL:246-268) This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 247 data from the 1970s"decade of divorce"gen- An understanding of the financial after- erally found that men lost a small share of math of union dissolution for men requires their nominal income and enjoyed an in- knowledge of the mechanisms that contrib- crease in their standard of living following ute to change in economic status.Men's out- divorce or separation(Duncan and Hoffman comes depend not only on changes in house- 1985;Hoffman 1977;Sorensen 1992).But hold composition and the loss of partner's findings from more recent evidence are less income,but also on the extent to which state uniform.Two studies report post-disruption welfare policy-via tax and transfer pro- declines in men's living standards,or mixed grams-targets family formation and disso- results depending on the equivalence scale lution.Men's outcomes also depend on the used to calculate changes in standard of liv- characteristics of American family law (in- ing (Burkhauser et al.1990,1991).Another cluding enforcement practices)that affect study finds substantial gains in economic the size of mandatory support payments to well-being among separating men,but limits the ex-partner or to children.Finally,men's the scope of the study to noncustodial fathers outcomes are affected by“voluntary”cash (Bianchi,Subaiya and Kahn 1999).Two re- payments to their former partners (Edin and cent studies also find gains in per capita in- Lein 1997).Despite the potential importance come for separating men,but these studies of these mechanisms in determining men's limit the scope to men who were married to economic status following separation,only young women and do not report changes in a handful of studies address the impact of living standards using conventional equiva- the welfare state (Burkhauser et al.1990, lence scales (Smock 1993,1994). 1991),and a few more take compulsory fam- We believe it is time to reassess the finan- ily-support payments into account(Bianchi cial consequences of union dissolution for et al.1999;Burkhauser et al.1990,1991; men.The disparity between early research Duncan and Hoffman 1985;Smock 1994). and some recent research may indicate a These studies,however,are hampered either temporal shift in the financial consequences by inadequate coverage of the population of of union dissolution for men.More impor- separating men (e.g.,by restricting the study tant,recent research suggests a great deal of to noncustodial fathers),or by the use of in- heterogeneity in these consequences.Recent sufficiently broad measures of post-separa- demographic trends,including the decline in tion transfers. marital fertility,the rise in cohabitation,and The analyses presented here provide the the increase in stepfamily households,all first comprehensive and systematic assess- contribute to an increasing diversity of ment of the impact of market and nonmarket couple-headed households.The rise in mechanisms on men's financial outcomes women's labor force participation and the following union dissolution.They are de- decline in the gender gap in earnings signed to answer the following questions:(1) (Bernhardt,Morris,and Handcock 1995) Do men typically experience an increase or have increased women's economic contribu- a decrease in their standard of living follow- tions to the household,especially during the ing separation?(2)Is the economic impact 1980s (Hayghe 1993).More than ever be- of separation fairly uniform across men,or fore,men face the risk that separation will is there substantial heterogeneity in their impose a substantial financial burden in the outcomes?(3)How is the economic impact form of the loss of partner's income.At the of separation on men structured by market, same time,fathers may be assuming a larger welfare state,legal,and voluntaristic level- role in the post-disruption financial support ing mechanisms? of their children than was the case during the 1970s.National efforts to reform and en- LEVELING MECHANISMS force child-support decrees,along with a gradual increase in the rate of paternal and Men are often seen as economic winners in joint physical custody of children(Garfinkel a separation scenario in which material re- et al.1998),suggest that fathers may be less sources and financial obligations are un- likely to realize substantial material gains equally distributed between the two ex-part- from separation and divorce. ners.But any potential economic windfall This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 247 data from the 1970s "decade of divorce" gen￾erally found that men lost a small share of their nominal income and enjoyed an in￾crease in their standard of living following divorce or separation (Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Hoffman 1977; Sorensen 1992). But findings from more recent evidence are less uniform. Two studies report post-disruption declines in men's living standards, or mixed results depending on the equivalence scale used to calculate changes in standard of liv￾ing (Burkhauser et al. 1990, 1991). Another study finds substantial gains in economic well-being among separating men, but limits the scope of the study to noncustodial fathers (Bianchi, Subaiya and Kahn 1999). Two re￾cent studies also find gains in per capita in￾come for separating men, but these studies limit the scope to men who were married to young women and do not report changes in living standards using conventional equiva￾lence scales (Smock 1993, 1994). We believe it is time to reassess the finan￾cial consequences of union dissolution for men. The disparity between early research and some recent research may indicate a temporal shift in the financial consequences of union dissolution for men. More impor￾tant, recent research suggests a great deal of heterogeneity in these consequences. Recent demographic trends, including the decline in marital fertility, the rise in cohabitation, and the increase in stepfamily households, all contribute to an increasing diversity of couple-headed households. The rise in women's labor force participation and the decline in the gender gap in earnings (Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 1995) have increased women's economic contribu￾tions to the household, especially during the 1980s (Hayghe 1993). More than ever be￾fore, men face the risk that separation will impose a substantial financial burden in the form of the loss of partner's income. At the same time, fathers may be assuming a larger role in the post-disruption financial support of their children than was the case during the 1970s. National efforts to reform and en￾force child-support decrees, along with a gradual increase in the rate of paternal and joint physical custody of children (Garfinkel et al. 1998), suggest that fathers may be less likely to realize substantial material gains from separation and divorce. An understanding of the financial after￾math of union dissolution for men requires knowledge of the mechanisms that contrib￾ute to change in economic status. Men's out￾comes depend not only on changes in house￾hold composition and the loss of partner's income, but also on the extent to which state welfare policy-via tax and transfer pro￾grams-targets family formation and disso￾lution. Men's outcomes also depend on the characteristics of American family law (in￾cluding enforcement practices) that affect the size of mandatory support payments to the ex-partner or to children. Finally, men's outcomes are affected by "voluntary" cash payments to their former partners (Edin and Lein 1997). Despite the potential importance of these mechanisms in determining men's economic status following separation, only a handful of studies address the impact of the welfare state (Burkhauser et al. 1990, 1991), and a few more take compulsory fam￾ily-support payments into account (Bianchi et al. 1999; Burkhauser et al. 1990, 1991; Duncan and Hoffman 1985; Smock 1994). These studies, however, are hampered either by inadequate coverage of the population of separating men (e.g., by restricting the study to noncustodial fathers), or by the use of in￾sufficiently broad measures of post-separa￾tion transfers. The analyses presented here provide the first comprehensive and systematic assess￾ment of the impact of market and nonmarket mechanisms on men's financial outcomes following union dissolution. They are de￾signed to answer the following questions: (1) Do men typically experience an increase or a decrease in their standard of living follow￾ing separation? (2) Is the economic impact of separation fairly uniform across men, or is there substantial heterogeneity in their outcomes? (3) How is the economic impact of separation on men structured by market, welfare state, legal, and voluntaristic level￾ing mechanisms? LEVELING MECHANISMS Men are often seen as economic winners in a separation scenario in which material re￾sources and financial obligations are un￾equally distributed between the two ex-part￾ners. But any potential economic windfall This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

248 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from separation is likely to be leveled by separation income is split across two new mechanisms that have gained strength in re- households,the loss of economies of scale cent decades.Shifts in the labor market have means that the joint economic status of the reduced married and cohabiting men's share separated partners is lower than it would be of household income,and thereby raised the if they shared the costs of maintaining a cost of exit.Men's potential gains are often single household.We expect that the loss of further reduced by tax and social welfare partner's market income is the primary policies,by compulsory child support and mechanism for reducing men's economic alimony payments,and by informal support status following union dissolution. to members of the former family. WELFARE STATE MECHANISMS GENDER-ROLE SPECIALIZATION Welfare state tax and transfer policy takes AND MARKET MECHANISMS marital status and household composition The presumption that men reap financial re- into account,ostensibly providing preferen- wards in the aftermath of shedding their tial treatment to families.In fact,the well- families is partly rooted in the "specializa- publicized "marriage penalty"imposed on tion and trading model"(Becker 1981; many dual-earner couples obscures the fact Oppenheimer 1997),which arguably is the that,at least through the mid-1990s,the ma- most prominent contemporary model for jority of married couples paid lower federal marriage.This model conceptualizes the income taxes than they would have if they married couple as a production and bargain- were single (U.S.Congressional Budget Of- ing unit in which,for biological reasons,the fice 1997).As another example,low-income female partner has a comparative advantage men who separate from their families stand in household production,while the male part- to lose benefits (e.g.,food stamps)that are ner has a comparative advantage in paid la- contingent on both household income and bor.According to this model,the partners household size.We expect state policy to specialize in gender-specific tasks and then buffer income lost to men with low pre-sepa- trade the product of their labor to maximize ration shares of household income,and to their joint well-being.It seems obvious that level the incomes of men with the highest a male breadwinner who kept his job while pre-separation income shares. separating from his homemaker partner would be materially better off,though at the JUDICIAL MECHANISMS TO cost of doing more housework(Gupta 1999). PROTECT DEPENDENTS Because of the specialization-induced finan- cial risk,the wife demands a marriage con- Post-separation household income can also tract to protect herself from possible malfea- be reduced by court-ordered family-support sance by her partner. payments.Noncustodial parents are subject As Oppenheimer (1997)points out,com- to compulsory child-support payments,and plete gender-role specialization is a high-risk in rare instances the financially weaker part- strategy for both partners and is not typical ner may also win redress in the form of a of contemporary American households.In- spousal support award.Noncustodial parents stead,American men and women generally are overwhelmingly male,and alimony pay- share in the market provision for the house- ments flow almost exclusively from men to hold.Men typically earn more than their fe- women.We expect compulsory transfers to male partners,and the partner with greater reduce men's incomes,more so for men who economic strength is likely to have a com- provided the bulk of the couple's pre-disrup- parative financial advantage following any tion income. separation.But relative market advantages are imprecise tools for assessing the abso- INFORMAL NORMS OF OBLIGATION lute financial impact of an event as costly as AND RECIPROCITY separation,which can easily produce a de- cline in the living standards of both former Separation and divorce do not invariably partners (Sgrensen 1994).When the pre- sever informal financial ties between men This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

248 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW from separation is likely to be leveled by mechanisms that have gained strength in re￾cent decades. Shifts in the labor market have reduced married and cohabiting men's share of household income, and thereby raised the cost of exit. Men's potential gains are often further reduced by tax and social welfare policies, by compulsory child support and alimony payments, and by informal support to members of the former family. GENDER-ROLE SPECIALIZATION AND MARKET MECHANISMS The presumption that men reap financial re￾wards in the aftermath of shedding their families is partly rooted in the "specializa￾tion and trading model" (Becker 1981; Oppenheimer 1997), which arguably is the most prominent contemporary model for marriage. This model conceptualizes the married couple as a production and bargain￾ing unit in which, for biological reasons, the female partner has a comparative advantage in household production, while the male part￾ner has a comparative advantage in paid la￾bor. According to this model, the partners specialize in gender-specific tasks and then trade the product of their labor to maximize their joint well-being. It seems obvious that a male breadwinner who kept his job while separating from his homemaker partner would be materially better off, though at the cost of doing more housework (Gupta 1999). Because of the specialization-induced finan￾cial risk, the wife demands a marriage con￾tract to protect herself from possible malfea￾sance by her partner. As Oppenheimer (1997) points out, com￾plete gender-role specialization is a high-risk strategy for both partners and is not typical of contemporary American households. In￾stead, American men and women generally share in the market provision for the house￾hold. Men typically earn more than their fe￾male partners, and the partner with greater economic strength is likely to have a com￾parative financial advantage following any separation. But relative market advantages are imprecise tools for assessing the abso￾lute financial impact of an event as costly as separation, which can easily produce a de￾cline in the living standards of both former partners (Sorensen 1994). When the pre￾separation income is split across two new households, the loss of economies of scale means that the joint economic status of the separated partners is lower than it would be if they shared the costs of maintaining a single household. We expect that the loss of partner's market income is the primary mechanism for reducing men's economic status following union dissolution. WELFARE STATE MECHANISMS Welfare state tax and transfer policy takes marital status and household composition into account, ostensibly providing preferen￾tial treatment to families. In fact, the well￾publicized "marriage penalty" imposed on many dual-earner couples obscures the fact that, at least through the mid-1990s, the ma￾jority of married couples paid lower federal income taxes than they would have if they were single (U.S. Congressional Budget Of￾fice 1997). As another example, low-income men who separate from their families stand to lose benefits (e.g., food stamps) that are contingent on both household income and household size. We expect state policy to buffer income lost to men with low pre-sepa￾ration shares of household income, and to level the incomes of men with the highest pre-separation income shares. JUDICIAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT DEPENDENTS Post-separation household income can also be reduced by court-ordered family-support payments. Noncustodial parents are subject to compulsory child-support payments, and in rare instances the financially weaker part￾ner may also win redress in the form of a spousal support award. Noncustodial parents are overwhelmingly male, and alimony pay￾ments flow almost exclusively from men to women. We expect compulsory transfers to reduce men's incomes, more so for men who provided the bulk of the couple's pre-disrup￾tion income. INFORMAL NORMS OF OBLIGATION AND RECIPROCITY Separation and divorce do not invariably sever informal financial ties between men This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 249 and their children and former partners. hold consumption patterns give similar re- Sometimes informal transfers are an expres- sults for our question.Some of our tables re- sion of personal responsibility for kinship port results using alternative living standard obligations that are perceived to outlast the measures;other tables rely on a single mea- partnership.Such transfers can also be seen sure that produces relatively optimistic esti- as an indirect response to the specific char- mates of the economic consequences of acter of the American welfare state.High-in- separation for men. come fathers may supplement compulsory We assess the economic consequences of support payments or provide additional di- separation in several ways.We use regres- rect support to children who have moved out sion models and other statistical strategies to of the mother's household.Ethnographic estimate the actual economic impact of sepa- studies of low-income fathers suggest that ration.Next,we use the full sample of mar- many who are not paying compulsory sup- ried and cohabiting men to simulate the po- port may help out informally,perhaps as part tential economic impact of separation for of a tacit economic bargain (Edin and Lein men with different household arrangements. 1997;Sullivan 1989).Edin and Lein (1997) The median values from the simulations are found,for example,that AFDC mothers in then compared to the actual outcomes among their sample received more money from the men who separated in order to better under- fathers through informal (covert)support stand the typical pattern of men's behavioral payments than through the formal child-sup- responses to separation.We also assess the port system.Whatever their explanation, relative impact of market and nonmarket noncompulsory money transfers to former mechanisms by measuring economic change partners and children who no longer live in both before and after taking account of taxes, the household will reduce any financial public transfers,compulsory support pay- gains from divorce or separation. ments,and other private transfers. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY DATA AND METHODS Following previous research,we measure Data for this paper are from the 1980-1993 economic growth among men who at time t waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynam- were married or in a long-term cohabiting ics (PSID)and the income measures are union by comparing annual household in- from the Cross-National Equivalent File come or standard of living (income adjusted (Wagner,Burkhauser,and Behringer 1993).1 for household size)in the previous calendar The PSID collects data from sample mem- year (t-1)to annual household income two bers on an annual basis,typically in the years later (t+1).We define the short-term spring of the survey year.Respondents are economic impact of union dissolution as the asked about marital status and household difference at time t +1 between economic composition at the time of the survey as well change for men who separated from their as changes from the previous survey.Exten- partners and men who remained in intact sive information is collected on individual unions.While our primary focus is on the short-term consequences,we also present 1 The income measures on the Cross-National selected results for a four-year economic Equivalent File(CNEF)are constructed by aug- change-between one year before and three menting the detailed income components in the years after the last intact interview (i.e.,be- PSID data with two components not available in tween t-1 and t+3).We report results the source data,namely the imputed rental value separately for white men and African Ameri- of owner-occupied housing and imputed payroll can men. and income taxes,calculated using the National Our analysis includes results for change in Bureau of Economic Research's TAXSIM rou- men's nominal income,but our chief inter- tine.We use the CNEF pre-government and post- est is change in men's living standards. government income measures in our analyses, along with additional measures of post-support While no single measure of living standards income constructed by combining the CNEF has won universal acceptance,measures measures with information on support payments based on plausible assumptions about house- from the source data. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 249 and their children and former partners. Sometimes informal transfers are an expres￾sion of personal responsibility for kinship obligations that are perceived to outlast the partnership. Such transfers can also be seen as an indirect response to the specific char￾acter of the American welfare state. High-in￾come fathers may supplement compulsory support payments or provide additional di￾rect support to children who have moved out of the mother's household. Ethnographic studies of low-income fathers suggest that many who are not paying compulsory sup￾port may help out informally, perhaps as part of a tacit economic bargain (Edin and Lein 1997; Sullivan 1989). Edin and Lein (1997) found, for example, that AFDC mothers in their sample received more money from the fathers through informal (covert) support payments than through the formal child-sup￾port system. Whatever their explanation, noncompulsory money transfers to former partners and children who no longer live in the household will reduce any financial gains from divorce or separation. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY Following previous research, we measure economic growth among men who at time t were married or in a long-term cohabiting union by comparing annual household in￾come or standard of living (income adjusted for household size) in the previous calendar year (t - 1) to annual household income two years later (t + 1). We define the short-term economic impact of union dissolution as the difference at time t + 1 between economic change for men who separated from their partners and men who remained in intact unions. While our primary focus is on the short-term consequences, we also present selected results for a four-year economic change-between one year before and three years after the last intact interview (i.e., be￾tween t - 1 and t + 3). We report results separately for white men and African Ameri￾can men. Our analysis includes results for change in men's nominal income, but our chief inter￾est is change in men's living standards. While no single measure of living standards has won universal acceptance, measures based on plausible assumptions about house￾hold consumption patterns give similar re￾sults for our question. Some of our tables re￾port results using alternative living standard measures; other tables rely on a single mea￾sure that produces relatively optimistic esti￾mates of the economic consequences of separation for men. We assess the economic consequences of separation in several ways. We use regres￾sion models and other statistical strategies to estimate the actual economic impact of sepa￾ration. Next, we use the full sample of mar￾ried and cohabiting men to simulate the po￾tential economic impact of separation for men with different household arrangements. The median values from the simulations are then compared to the actual outcomes among men who separated in order to better under￾stand the typical pattern of men's behavioral responses to separation. We also assess the relative impact of market and nonmarket mechanisms by measuring economic change both before and after taking account of taxes, public transfers, compulsory support pay￾ments, and other private transfers. DATA AND METHODS Data for this paper are from the 1980-1993 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynam￾ics (PSID) and the income measures are from the Cross-National Equivalent File (Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer 1993).1 The PSID collects data from sample mem￾bers on an annual basis, typically in the spring of the survey year. Respondents are asked about marital status and household composition at the time of the survey as well as changes from the previous survey. Exten￾sive information is collected on individual 1 The income measures on the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) are constructed by aug￾menting the detailed income components in the PSID data with two components not available in the source data, namely the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing and imputed payroll and income taxes, calculated using the National Bureau of Economic Research's TAXSIM rou￾tine. We use the CNEF pre-government and post￾government income measures in our analyses, along with additional measures of post-support income constructed by combining the CNEF measures with information on support payments from the source data. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

250 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW and household income flows during the pre- ables that affect household economic status, vious calendar year.Our sample includes so that observations on men between the ages of 18 and 65 who identified themselves as either In yit =xiB+Ei (1) white or black (we excluded others because If we difference this model at two points sample sizes are too small)and who were in time,and if we collect all changes related partners in couple-headed households.Mar- to union dissolution and repartnering into ried men were included if they lived with dummy variables D and R,we obtain their spouse at time t.Men who were cohab- iting with a female partner were included if In(y+)-ln(y-)=△lny the same partner was in the household at =DYD+RYR+△xB+V, (2) time t-1 and time t.2 The analysis sample excludes unions that were dissolved through where yi-is a measure of economic status death or institutionalization between times t at time t-1,Ax;is the subset of control vari- and t+1. ables that change in value between t-1 and To be included in the sample,men who t+1,D is an indicator for union disruption were observed in unions at time t had to be between t-1 and t+1,and R is an indica- followed for the next two interviews,at time tor for a new partner between t-1 and t +1. t+1,by which time a disruption may or (To achieve greater clarity,we have sup- may not have occurred,and at time t+2 pressed explicit subscripts for calendar time when income data is collected retrospec- on the right side of equation 2.)Equation 2 tively for the previous calendar year.Sepa- assumes that change in economic status does ration is associated with a high risk of not depend on the level of economic status sample attrition among men in panel data at time t-1.Because this assumption may (D.Hill 1997;M.Hill 1992;Fitzgerald, not be correct,we estimated a slightly more Gottschalk,and Moffitt 1998),and this risk complex specification that relaxes this as- is particularly high for men with unstable sumption: work histories (Fitzgerald et al.1998).Our sample is therefore likely to underrepresent ln(+i)-ln(-i)=△lny men with the worst economic outcomes fol- lowing separation,and to overrepresent men =In(yi-Iy +DiYD+RYR who pay child support.However,a recent +△xB+V 3) study of attrition bias in the PSID found that the appropriate use of sample weights in re- Because pre-disruption income might be gression analyses produces consistent esti- correlated with other factors affecting in- mates despite the high levels of attrition come change,we estimated this equation (Fitzgerald et al.1998).To adjust for these using standard instrumental variables tech- unequal probabilities of sample selection niques (Greene 2000).One set of valid in- and attrition,we assigned each respondent a struments for equation 3 includes the con- single longitudinal weight equal to the cross- trol variables in equation 1,whose values sectional weight attached to that respondent were constant over time and thus do not ap- in the final year in which the respondent pear in the difference equation because they contributed to the data. cancel out of the right-hand side (e.g.,ques- Our regression model for the average im- tions about men's education are generally pact of union dissolution can be derived as asked only at the initial interview in the follows.Let yi:equal household economic PSID,so Ax =0 for schooling).An alterna- status at time t,and let xi be a vector of vari- tive strategy is to find instruments that do not appear at all in equation 1,such as in- 2 We include only cohabitants in long-term come at time t-2.We applied these two unions because the PSID prorates the income of strategies in turn to estimate instrumental the cohabiting partner to reflect the actual num- variables models,using education and ber of months spent in the same household,but twice-lagged income as the respective in- does not prorate the income of new marital part struments.The results from these two esti- ners. mation strategies were similar,and we re- This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

250 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW and household income flows during the pre￾vious calendar year. Our sample includes observations on men between the ages of 18 and 65 who identified themselves as either white or black (we excluded others because sample sizes are too small) and who were partners in couple-headed households. Mar￾ried men were included if they lived with their spouse at time t. Men who were cohab￾iting with a female partner were included if the same partner was in the household at time t - 1 and time t.2 The analysis sample excludes unions that were dissolved through death or institutionalization between times t and t + 1. To be included in the sample, men who were observed in unions at time t had to be followed for the next two interviews, at time t + 1, by which time a disruption may or may not have occurred, and at time t + 2 when income data is collected retrospec￾tively for the previous calendar year. Sepa￾ration is associated with a high risk of sample attrition among men in panel data (D. Hill 1997; M. Hill 1992; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998), and this risk is particularly high for men with unstable work histories (Fitzgerald et al. 1998). Our sample is therefore likely to underrepresent men with the worst economic outcomes fol￾lowing separation, and to overrepresent men who pay child support. However, a recent study of attrition bias in the PSID found that the appropriate use of sample weights in re￾gression analyses produces consistent esti￾mates despite the high levels of attrition (Fitzgerald et al. 1998). To adjust for these unequal probabilities of sample selection and attrition, we assigned each respondent a single longitudinal weight equal to the cross￾sectional weight attached to that respondent in the final year in which the respondent contributed to the data. Our regression model for the average im￾pact of union dissolution can be derived as follows. Let Yit equal household economic status at time t, and let xit be a vector of vari- 2 We include only cohabitants in long-term unions because the PSID prorates the income of the cohabiting partner to reflect the actual num￾ber of months spent in the same household, but does not prorate the income of new marital part￾ners. ables that affect household economic status, so that lnyit x+it- 1 If we difference this model at two points in time, and if we collect all changes related to union dissolution and repartnering into dummy variables D and R, we obtain ln(Yit+i) - ln(Yi,t-i) = A In yi Di7D =D~yD+R~y+ + Ri7R Axf + vi, (2) +AiD i where yit-l is a measure of economic status at time t - 1, Axi is the subset of control vari￾ables that change in value between t - 1 and t + 1, D is an indicator for union disruption between t - 1 and t + 1, and R is an indica￾tor for a new partner between t - 1 and t + 1. (To achieve greater clarity, we have sup￾pressed explicit subscripts for calendar time on the right side of equation 2.) Equation 2 assumes that change in economic status does not depend on the level of economic status at time t - 1. Because this assumption may not be correct, we estimated a slightly more complex specification that relaxes this as￾sumption: ln(Yit+i) - ln(Yi,t-1) = A In yj = ln(Yit-j ry + DiYD + RiYR + Axf'+vi. (3) Because pre-disruption income might be correlated with other factors affecting in￾come change, we estimated this equation using standard instrumental variables tech￾niques (Greene 2000). One set of valid in￾struments for equation 3 includes the con￾trol variables in equation 1, whose values were constant over time and thus do not ap￾pear in the difference equation because they cancel out of the right-hand side (e.g., ques￾tions about men's education are generally asked only at the initial interview in the PSID, so Ax = 0 for schooling). An alterna￾tive strategy is to find instruments that do not appear at all in equation 1, such as in￾come at time t - 2. We applied these two strategies in turn to estimate instrumental variables models, using education and twice-lagged income as the respective in￾struments. The results from these two esti￾mation strategies were similar, and we re￾This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 251 port the instrumental variables estimates us- come after income taxes (including state in- ing the twice-lagged income measure. come taxes and the Earned Income Tax To minimize the impact of outliers,we Credit),payroll taxes (health,unemploy- truncated the dependent variable to the range ment,and retirement),and public transfers. [-2,2],effectively capping losses at 86.5 Public transfers include AFDC,SSI,and percent and capping gains at 639 percent of other“welfare'”programs,Social Security, pre-disruption income or living standards.3 unemployment compensation,worker's com- Our final models include control variables pensation,and the face value of food stamps. for change in job tenure,for age (if age en- POST-GOVERNMENT HOUSEHOLD IN- ters the level model as a quadratic,it remains COME AFTER SUPPORT PAYMENTS.Re- as a linear predictor in the difference model), spondents in all survey years report the total dummy variables for calendar year,and the amount of money paid during the previous indicator for new partner at time t+1.To calendar year toward the support of persons simplify the presentation of results,we re- outside the household,including voluntary port only the coefficient and standard error out-transfers and mandatory support pay- for D.the indicator for union disruption.We ments.We subtracted this total support also report the economic impact of disrup- amount from household post-government in- tion,which equals exp(p)-1. come to create a measure of"net"household income.Beginning in 1985,respondents who reported paying support were then MEASUREMENT probed specifically for child-support and ali- MEASURING INCOME mony payments.We used these data to cre- ate an additional measure of household in- We used the following measures of house- come that subtracts only these compulsory hold income (all adjusted to 1990 dollars us- family-support payments from household ing the Consumer Price Index [CPI-U])as post-government income,thus allowing us to our dependent variables: distinguish these compulsory payments from TOTAL PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD INCOME. any additional support paid on an informal This is our measure of“gross income,”and or voluntary basis for the later subsample equals the combined earned income received Any missing data on support payments were by all household members from all employ- imputed to be zero. ment (including wages,salaries,farm in- Some caution is necessary when dealing come,business income,income from market with men's reports of support payments.Pre- gardening,and income from roomers and vious research has shown that divorced men boarders),assets,and private transfers (in- who pay child support report higher levels cluding alimony and child support)before of transfers than their former wives report taxes and government transfers.It also in- receiving (Braver,Fitzpatrick,and Bay cludes the imputed rental value of housing. 1991;Peters et al.1993;Schaeffer,Seltzer POST-GOVERNMENT HOUSEHOLD IN- and Klawitter 1991),and when third-party CoME.This equals the sum of household in- verification is available (e.g.,when the 3 The untruncated results produce much more 4 The wording of this sequence from the 1993 negative estimates of the average impact of union interview is as follows: dissolution because they are strongly influenced G103.In 1992,did you give any money toward the by those separating men who suffer precipitous support of anyone who was not living with income declines between time t-I and time you at the time? t+1.We experimented with alternative mea- G106.How much money was that altogether in sures that minimize the influence of these outli- 1992? ers,including a measure based on Duncan and G107.Was any of that child support? Hoffman (1985)that placed a floor of S3,000 on G108.How much did that child support amount to nominal income levels.The results for net in- in1992? come using this measure were similar to those G109.Was any of the money you gave in 1992 ali- presented here;however,the income floor ob- mony? scured important nuances in the specific mecha- G110.How much did that alimony amount to in nisms that structured income change. 1992? This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 251 port the instrumental variables estimates us￾ing the twice-lagged income measure. To minimize the impact of outliers, we truncated the dependent variable to the range [-2,2], effectively capping losses at 86.5 percent and capping gains at 639 percent of pre-disruption income or living standards.3 Our final models include control variables for change in job tenure, for age (if age en￾ters the level model as a quadratic, it remains as a linear predictor in the difference model), dummy variables for calendar year, and the indicator for new partner at time t + 1. To simplify the presentation of results, we re￾port only the coefficient and standard error for D, the indicator for union disruption. We also report the economic impact of disrup￾tion, which equals exp(yD) - 1. MEASUREMENT MEASURING INCOME We used the following measures of house￾hold income (all adjusted to 1990 dollars us￾ing the Consumer Price Index [CPI-U]) as our dependent variables: TOTAL PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD INCOME. This is our measure of "gross income," and equals the combined earned income received by all household members from all employ￾ment (including wages, salaries, farm in￾come, business income, income from market gardening, and income from roomers and boarders), assets, and private transfers (in￾cluding alimony and child support) before taxes and government transfers. It also in￾cludes the imputed rental value of housing. POST-GOVERNMENT HOUSEHOLD IN￾COME. This equals the sum of household in￾come after income taxes (including state in￾come taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit), payroll taxes (health, unemploy￾ment, and retirement), and public transfers. Public transfers include AFDC, SSI, and other "welfare" programs, Social Security, unemployment compensation, worker's com￾pensation, and the face value of food stamps. POST-GOVERNMENT HOUSEHOLD IN￾COME AFTER SUPPORT PAYMENTS. Re￾spondents in all survey years report the total amount of money paid during the previous calendar year toward the support of persons outside the household, including voluntary out-transfers and mandatory support pay￾ments. We subtracted this total support amount from household post-government in￾come to create a measure of "net" household income. Beginning in 1985, respondents who reported paying support were then probed specifically for child-support and ali￾mony payments.4 We used these data to cre￾ate an additional measure of household in￾come that subtracts only these compulsory family-support payments from household post-government income, thus allowing us to distinguish these compulsory payments from any additional support paid on an informal or voluntary basis for the later subsample. Any missing data on support payments were imputed to be zero. Some caution is necessary when dealing with men's reports of support payments. Pre￾vious research has shown that divorced men who pay child support report higher levels of transfers than their former wives report receiving (Braver, Fitzpatrick, and Bay 1991; Peters et al. 1993; Schaeffer, Seltzer and Klawitter 1991), and when third-party verification is available (e.g., when the 3 The untruncated results produce much more negative estimates of the average impact of union dissolution because they are strongly influenced by those separating men who suffer precipitous income declines between time t - 1 and time t + 1. We experimented with alternative mea￾sures that minimize the influence of these outli￾ers, including a measure based on Duncan and Hoffman (1985) that placed a floor of $3,000 on nominal income levels. The results for net in￾come using this measure were similar to those presented here; however, the income floor ob￾scured important nuances in the specific mecha￾nisms that structured income change. 4 The wording of this sequence from the 1993 interview is as follows: G103. In 1992, did you give any money toward the support of anyone who was not living with you at the time? G106. How much money was that altogether in 1992? G107. Was any of that child support? G108. How much did that child support amount to in 1992? G109. Was any of the money you gave in 1992 ali￾mony? GI 10. How much did that alimony amount to in 1992? This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

252 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW courts administer the collection and distribu- the amount of support they paid by 50 per- tion of support payments)the wives'reports cent,an amount that exceeds current esti- correspond more closely to the third-party mates of overreporting based on available reports (Schaeffer et al.1991).Part of the evidence).5 We report results based on the discrepancy between ex-partners'reports of adjusted measure of support along with re- money transfers may come about because sults based on men's actual reports. payers and recipients are likely to hold dif- ferent views on what constitutes support. MEASURING STANDARD OF LIVING: Those who pay support may be inclined to EQUIVALENCE SCALES report all expenditures on their children and former partners,including court-ordered tu- Nominal income is an important indicator of ition and health care payments as well as in- the economic status of a household,but an formal transfers,gifts,and loans,while re- imprecise measure of living standards. cipients may be inclined to define support as Economies of scale are important to the esti- compliance with court-ordered cash trans- mation of changes in men's standard of liv- fers (Schaeffer et al.1991).Reporting dis- ing following separation because separation crepancies can also come about when men entails not only a change in income,but also pay support to children from earlier liaisons a change in household composition.Nomi- in addition to the children residing with their nal income change would correspond per- most recent ex-partner.Even taking these fectly with change in living standards only factors into account,men who fail to com- if economies of scale were infinite,that is,if ply fully with court-ordered support have it cost no more to shelter,clothe,and feed a strong incentives to exaggerate support pay- family of four or six than it does to provide ments.Published reports suggest that men for a single-person household.Clearly this overreport by as little as 13.5 percent is not true. (Schaeffer et al.1991)to as much as 27 per- Zero economies of scale,in contrast, cent (Braver et al.1991). would imply that it costs twice as much to Using these data,supplemented with the provide for a couple as for an individual, preliminary PSID data for 1994-1996,we four times as much to provide for a family compared transfers paid by men to transfers of four,and so on.If there were no scale received by women for a small number of economies,living standards could be deter- couples (N =58)in which complete infor- mined by dividing income by the number of mation on alimony and child-support trans- persons in the household,and change in per fers was obtained from both ex-partners at capita income would correspond perfectly the interview following the separation.We with change in living standards.However, also used unmatched data to compare reports the assumption of zero economies of scale is of transfers received by custodial mothers to as implausible as the assumption of infinite reports of transfers paid by noncustodial fa- scale economies. thers in the first year following separation. When plausible assumptions about scale Our findings concur with previous research: economies are used to adjust household in- The proportion of men who claimed to have come by a weight based on the number of paid support was only slightly higher than "scale equivalents"in the household,the re- the proportion of women who claimed that sulting estimates of changes in living stan- they received support,but men's reports of dards are well within these two extremes. the amounts transferred exceeded women's There is no agreement on a single equiva- reports by 15 to 30 percent. lency scale,however,and the choice of scale To provide a reasonable set of bounds for is more consequential for analyses of men's the effects of transfers on living standards. outcomes than for analyses of women's out- we rely on alternative assumptions to con- struct two measures of post-transfer income. 5 We also constructed an adjusted measure that Our unadjusted measure assumes that men randomly assigns one-third of all reported trans- report payments accurately.Our adjusted fer payments to zero,leaving the remaining mea- measure deflates reported payments by one- sures as reported.Results based on this measure third,(i.e.,it assumes that men exaggerate were nearly the same as the results we report. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

252 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW courts administer the collection and distribu￾tion of support payments) the wives' reports correspond more closely to the third-party reports (Schaeffer et al. 1991). Part of the discrepancy between ex-partners' reports of money transfers may come about because payers and recipients are likely to hold dif￾ferent views on what constitutes support. Those who pay support may be inclined to report all expenditures on their children and former partners, including court-ordered tu￾ition and health care payments as well as in￾formal transfers, gifts, and loans, while re￾cipients may be inclined to define support as compliance with court-ordered cash trans￾fers (Schaeffer et al. 1991). Reporting dis￾crepancies can also come about when men pay support to children from earlier liaisons in addition to the children residing with their most recent ex-partner. Even taking these factors into account, men who fail to com￾ply fully with court-ordered support have strong incentives to exaggerate support pay￾ments. Published reports suggest that men overreport by as little as 13.5 percent (Schaeffer et al. 1991) to as much as 27 per￾cent (Braver et al. 1991). Using these data, supplemented with the preliminary PSID data for 1994-1996, we compared transfers paid by men to transfers received by women for a small number of couples (N = 58) in which complete infor￾mation on alimony and child-support trans￾fers was obtained from both ex-partners at the interview following the separation. We also used unmatched data to compare reports of transfers received by custodial mothers to reports of transfers paid by noncustodial fa￾thers in the first year following separation. Our findings concur with previous research: The proportion of men who claimed to have paid support was only slightly higher than the proportion of women who claimed that they received support, but men's reports of the amounts transferred exceeded women's reports by 15 to 30 percent. To provide a reasonable set of bounds for the effects of transfers on living standards, we rely on alternative assumptions to con￾struct two measures of post-transfer income. Our unadjusted measure assumes that men report payments accurately. Our adjusted measure deflates reported payments by one￾third, (i.e., it assumes that men exaggerate the amount of support they paid by 50 per￾cent, an amount that exceeds current esti￾mates of overreporting based on available evidence).5 We report results based on the adjusted measure of support along with re￾sults based on men's actual reports. MEASURING STANDARD OF LIVING: EQUIVALENCE SCALES Nominal income is an important indicator of the economic status of a household, but an imprecise measure of living standards. Economies of scale are important to the esti￾mation of changes in men's standard of liv￾ing following separation because separation entails not only a change in income, but also a change in household composition. Nomi￾nal income change would correspond per￾fectly with change in living standards only if economies of scale were infinite, that is, if it cost no more to shelter, clothe, and feed a family of four or six than it does to provide for a single-person household. Clearly this is not true. Zero economies of scale, in contrast, would imply that it costs twice as much to provide for a couple as for an individual, four times as much to provide for a family of four, and so on. If there were no scale economies, living standards could be deter￾mined by dividing income by the number of persons in the household, and change in per capita income would correspond perfectly with change in living standards. However, the assumption of zero economies of scale is as implausible as the assumption of infinite scale economies. When plausible assumptions about scale economies are used to adjust household in￾come by a weight based on the number of "scale equivalents" in the household, the re￾sulting estimates of changes in living stan￾dards are well within these two extremes. There is no agreement on a single equiva￾lency scale, however, and the choice of scale is more consequential for analyses of men's outcomes than for analyses of women's out- 5 We also constructed an adjusted measure that randomly assigns one-third of all reported trans￾fer payments to zero, leaving the remaining mea￾sures as reported. Results based on this measure were nearly the same as the results we report. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 253 comes following separation.This is because for white and black men,the coefficient es- the estimates produced by different scales timates and the estimated percentage impact are more likely to diverge for the financially of separation on total private (gross)house- stronger partner in a union,and the estimates hold income,per capita income,and stan- are also more likely to diverge when there is dard of living.White men who separate lose a large change in household size. roughly one-third of their total private We rely primarily on two equivalency household income,on average,and cohabi- scales in our analyses:One is the"Expended tants lose only slightly more than married Linear Extension System"(ELES)weights. men do.The losses for married African a total consumption-based scale developed American men are similar to those for mar- by Merz et al.(1993)that assumes moderate ried white men,but black cohabitants lose economies of scale for small households and relatively more of their pre-disruption gross large scale economies for large households. income than do whites.In terms of per capita The other is a food-based scale computed income,the disadvantages of losing using U.S.Census poverty thresholds.The partner's income are offset by fewer depen- poverty scale takes the adult/child composi- dents in the new,smaller household.On av- tion into account as well as household size, erage,per capita income increases,espe- and it assumes substantial economies of cially for married men,who tend to be sepa- scale for small families.Empirically,this rating from larger households. means that the estimated advantage of mov- These results summarize two well-known ing from a two-or three-person household facts about men's economic status following to a single-person household is smaller when separation and divorce:Household income the poverty scale is used than when the declines,but income per person increases. ELES scale is used. The equivalency measures are more useful as estimates of change in living standards. MEASURING SPECIALIZATION IN THE By either equivalency measure,the short- term impact of separation on men's gross BREADWINNER ROLE living standards is modest.The impact is We measure specialization in market provi- significant only for African American sion using the male partner's share of total cohabitors,for whom the steep decline in household labor income,or his share of tax- nominal income following separation pro- able income if he had no labor income.We duces a significant decline in gross standard set the male share to zero if there was no tax- of living. able income;in a few cases where business The gross impact of separation is prima- losses resulted in no income or negative in- rily because of changes in labor market in- come we measured market specialization us- come.The net economic impact also in- ing the ratio of the male partner's annual cludes changes in government taxes,public work hours in the year preceding separation transfers,and support payments.The lower to the sum of the hours worked by both part- panel of Table 1 shows that economic de- ners.We grouped men by their share of pre- clines are more pronounced after accounting disruption household income:less than 40 for these nonmarket leveling mechanisms percent of the total,at least 40 percent but White men experience a decline in living less than 60 percent,at least 60 percent but standards of 11 percent to 20 percent,and less than 80 percent,and 80 percent or more unmarried men lose more than married men do.The results for married African Ameri- can men are negative but nonsignificant,and RESULTS again,black cohabitants experience the most serious declines in their living standards fol- EFFECT OF SEPARATION ON MEN'S AVERAGE INCOME AND STANDARD lowing separation.On average,the eco- nomic status of men who separate slips be- OF LIVING low their previous level of material well-be- We begin with estimates of the average im- ing in the immediate aftermath of union dis- pact of separation for married men and co- solution,and both market and nonmarket habitants.The top panel of Table 1 shows, mechanisms contribute to this decline. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 253 comes following separation. This is because the estimates produced by different scales are more likely to diverge for the financially stronger partner in a union, and the estimates are also more likely to diverge when there is a large change in household size. We rely primarily on two equivalency scales in our analyses: One is the "Expended Linear Extension System" (ELES) weights, a total consumption-based scale developed by Merz et al. (1993) that assumes moderate economies of scale for small households and large scale economies for large households. The other is a food-based scale computed using U.S. Census poverty thresholds. The poverty scale takes the adult/child composi￾tion into account as well as household size, and it assumes substantial economies of scale for small families. Empirically, this means that the estimated advantage of mov￾ing from a two- or three-person household to a single-person household is smaller when the poverty scale is used than when the ELES scale is used. MEASURING SPECIALIZATION IN THE BREADWINNER ROLE We measure specialization in market provi￾sion using the male partner's share of total household labor income, or his share of tax￾able income if he had no labor income. We set the male share to zero if there was no tax￾able income; in a few cases where business losses resulted in no income or negative in￾come we measured market specialization us￾ing the ratio of the male partner's annual work hours in the year preceding separation to the sum of the hours worked by both part￾ners. We grouped men by their share of pre￾disruption household income: less than 40 percent of the total, at least 40 percent but less than 60 percent, at least 60 percent but less than 80 percent, and 80 percent or more. RESULTS EFFECT OF SEPARATION ON MEN'S AVERAGE INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING We begin with estimates of the average im￾pact of separation for married men and co￾habitants. The top panel of Table 1 shows, for white and black men, the coefficient es￾timates and the estimated percentage impact of separation on total private (gross) house￾hold income, per capita income, and stan￾dard of living. White men who separate lose roughly one-third of their total private household income, on average, and cohabi￾tants lose only slightly more than married men do. The losses for married African American men are similar to those for mar￾ried white men, but black cohabitants lose relatively more of their pre-disruption gross income than do whites. In terms of per capita income, the disadvantages of losing partner's income are offset by fewer depen￾dents in the new, smaller household. On av￾erage, per capita income increases, espe￾cially for married men, who tend to be sepa￾rating from larger households. These results summarize two well-known facts about men's economic status following separation and divorce: Household income declines, but income per person increases. The equivalency measures are more useful as estimates of change in living standards. By either equivalency measure, the short￾term impact of separation on men's gross living standards is modest. The impact is significant only for African American cohabitors, for whom the steep decline in nominal income following separation pro￾duces a significant decline in gross standard of living. The gross impact of separation is prima￾rily because of changes in labor market in￾come. The net economic impact also in￾cludes changes in government taxes, public transfers, and support payments. The lower panel of Table 1 shows that economic de￾clines are more pronounced after accounting for these nonmarket leveling mechanisms. White men experience a decline in living standards of 11 percent to 20 percent, and unmarried men lose more than married men do. The results for married African Ameri￾can men are negative but nonsignificant, and again, black cohabitants experience the most serious declines in their living standards fol￾lowing separation. On average, the eco￾nomic status of men who separate slips be￾low their previous level of material well-be￾ing in the immediate aftermath of union dis￾solution, and both market and nonmarket mechanisms contribute to this decline. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

254 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Table 1.Instrumental Variables Estimates for the Economic Consequences of Separation for Married and Cohabiting Men:Panel Study of Income Dynamics,1982 to 1992 White Men Black Men Standard of Standard of Type of Real Per Capita Living Scale Real Per Capita Living Scale Separation IncomeIncome ELES Poverty Income Income ELES Poverty Gross Private Household Income Separation from -.397* .385*+ -.005 -037 -.383** .546** .069 .068 marriage (.040) (.050) (.043) (.044) (.112) (.164) (.137) (.139) Separation from ,443 .349* -.033 -.107 -.885** .129 -,429* .379 cohabitation (.098) (.094) (.092) (.096) (.141) (.243) (.182) (.189) Average percentage impact of separation if: Separated from -33 47 4 -32 73 marriage Separated from -36 42 -3 -10 -59 14 -35 -32 cohabitation Net Household Income after Taxes,Transfers,and Support Payments Separation from -.513** ,293** -,116*块 -.146** .527* .516* -.030 -.032 marriage (.035) (.040) (.035) (.036) (.084) (.114) (.094) (.099) Separation from -.553* ,254* -.130° -.219* -.860* .260 -.363* -.313 cohabitation (.063) (.068) (.059) (.066) (.103) (.175) (.135) (.136) Average percentage impact of separation if: Separated from -40 34 -11 -14 68 3 -3 marriage Separated from 42 29 12 -20 -58 30 -30 -27 cohabitation Note:Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.Number of person-years for white men is 16,403; the number of person-years for black men is 5,410. p<.05 "p<.01 ""p<.001 (two-tailed tests) LEVELING MECHANISMS AND THE who separate.6 Along the way,we demon- AVERAGE IMPACT OF SEPARATION strate that the economic windfall that is con- ventionally attributed to men in general ac- Our next task is to unpack the market and tually applies to only a select group of men nonmarket mechanisms shaping the finan- who go through a separation or divorce. cial aftermath of separation.Married and co- There are clear economic winners;but there habiting men vary in their exposure to mar- are also clear economic losers. ket risk from the loss of their partner's in- The regression estimates in Table 2 show come,and separation almost certainly has the impact of separation on change in nomi- different consequences for sole breadwin- nal income for men according to breadwin- ners than for men who rely heavily on their ner status in the pre-disruption household. partner's income.Welfare state,judicial,and private,voluntary responses to the separa- tion may exacerbate or narrow these differ- 6 Married men in our sample had better post- ences.In the remainder of the analyses we separation outcomes than did cohabiting men,in part because they contributed proportionally use breadwinner status rather than marital more to pre-disruption household income.In status to show how variation in men's pre- supplemental analyses restricted to the sub- disruption household situation contributes to sample of married men,we obtained results simi- a heterogeneous set of outcomes for men lar to those presented here. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTO All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

254 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Table 1. Instrumental Variables Estimates for the Economic Consequences of Separation for Married and Cohabiting Men: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1982 to 1992 White Men Black Men Standard of Standard of Type of Real Per Capita Living Scale Real Per Capita Living Scale Separation Income Income ELES Poverty Income Income ELES Poverty Gross Private Household Income Separation from -.397*** .385*** -.005 -.037 -.383*** .546*** .069 .068 marriage (.040) (.050) (.043) (.044) (.112) (.164) (.137) (.139) Separation from -.443** .349*** -.033 -.107 -.885*** .129 -.429* -.379* cohabitation (.098) (.094) (.092) (.096) (.141) (.243) (.182) (.189) Average percentage impact of separation if: Separated from -33 47 0 -4 -32 73 7 7 marriage Separated from -36 42 -3 -10 -59 14 -35 -32 cohabitation Net Household Income after Taxes, Transfers, and Support Payments Separation from -.513*** .293*** -.116*** -.146*** -.527*** .516*** -.030 -.032 marriage (.035) (.040) (.035) (.036) (.084) (.114) (.094) (.099) Separation from -.553*** .254*** -.130* -.219*** -.860*** .260 -.363** -.313* cohabitation (.063) (.068) (.059) (.066) (.103) (.175) (.135) (.136) Average percentage impact of separation if: Separated from -40 34 -11 -14 -41 68 -3 -3 marriage Separated from -42 29 -12 -20 -58 30 -30 -27 cohabitation Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of person-years for white men is 16,403; the number of person-years for black men is 5,410. *p <.05 ** < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) LEVELING MECHANISMS AND THE AVERAGE IMPACT OF SEPARATION Our next task is to unpack the market and nonmarket mechanisms shaping the finan￾cial aftermath of separation. Married and co￾habiting men vary in their exposure to mar￾ket risk from the loss of their partner's in￾come, and separation almost certainly has different consequences for sole breadwin￾ners than for men who rely heavily on their partner's income. Welfare state, judicial, and private, voluntary responses to the separa￾tion may exacerbate or narrow these differ￾ences. In the remainder of the analyses we use breadwinner status rather than marital status to show how variation in men's pre￾disruption household situation contributes to a heterogeneous set of outcomes for men who separate.6 Along the way, we demon￾strate that the economic windfall that is con￾ventionally attributed to men in general ac￾tually applies to only a select group of men who go through a separation or divorce. There are clear economic winners; but there are also clear economic losers. The regression estimates in Table 2 show the impact of separation on change in nomi￾nal income for men according to breadwin￾ner status in the pre-disruption household. 6 Married men in our sample had better post￾separation outcomes than did cohabiting men, in part because they contributed proportionally more to pre-disruption household income. In supplemental analyses restricted to the sub￾sample of married men, we obtained results simi￾lar to those presented here. This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 255 Table 2.Instrumental Variables Estimates for the Average Impact of Separation on Men's Nominal Income,by Share of Pre-Disruption Income:Panel Study of Income Dynamics,1982 to 1992 White Men Black Men Male Share Pre- Post- Net Income after Pre- Post- Net Income after of Pre- Gov't Gov't Support Payments Gov't Gov't Support Payments Disruption Income Income Adjusted Reported Income Income Adjusted Reported Income (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Less than 40% -.968** .899* .957** -.983*4 -.516 -.612* -.630* -.640** (.155) (.115) (.113) (.111) (.285) (.196) (.197) (.198) At least 40% -.588* -.554* -.611* -.633* -.665* -.592* -.605* -.611* but <60% (.062) (.053) (.056) (.056) (.168) (.130) (.132) (.133) At least 60% -.409** -.394* -,473* -.507* -.702** -.662* -,710* -.742* but <80% (.046) (.035) (.040) (.042) (.147) (.118) (.117) (.117) 80%or more -.162* .215* -.314** -.353* -.351 -.466* -.529** -.565** (.052) (.041) (.046) (.047) (.137) (.110) (.098) (.092) Percentage impact of separation on nominal income: Less than 40% -62 -59 -62 -63 40 46 47 47 At least 40% -44 -43 -46 -47 -49 45 -45 -46 but <60% At least 60% -34 -33 -38 40 -50 48 -51 -52 but <80% 80%or more -15 -19 -27 -30 -30 -37 -41 -43 Note:Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.Number of person-years for white men is 16,403; number of person-years for black men is 5,410. "p<.05 "p<01 p<001(two-tailed tests) Not surprisingly,the expected loss in nomi- tion in that they experienced greater de- nal income following separation is strongly clines in post-government than in pre-gov- related to pre-separation relative income ernment income. contributions.Men who earned less than Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the es- their partners before separating experienced timated impact of separation using the the greatest income loss.But these men also (downward-)adjusted measure of transfer replaced more of their lost income,on aver- payments (column 3)and the unadjusted age,than did men in more traditionally spe- measure (column 4).Support payments in- cialized households,largely because the ini- creased average income declines following tial labor supply of men who were second- separation,even among men who earned ary breadwinners was unusually low. less than their partners in the pre-disruption Welfare state tax and transfer policies household.For white men,support pay- level the market consequences to some ex- ments erased all mitigation from the wel- tent (see Table 2,column 2).As a group, fare state,and for both black men and white men who contributed the largest share to men the negative impact of support pay- pre-disruption income experienced the ments increased with the prominence of the smallest post-disruption drop in gross male breadwinner role. household income,but the separation-in- Next,we replaced nominal income as the duced changes in welfare state taxes and outcome of interest with standard of living, transfers considerably increased their net fi- measured using the ELES scale.These re- nancial decline.For other men,welfare sults,shown in the top panel of Table 3, policy typically buffered the income loss show that market forces alone-loss of slightly.African American men with low partner's income and the inability to com- pre-disruption contributions were an excep- pensate-have a powerful impact on men's This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon,15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MALE LOSERS AND WINNERS AFTER SEPARATION/DIVORCE 255 Table 2. Instrumental Variables Estimates for the Average Impact of Separation on Men's Nominal Income, by Share of Pre-Disruption Income: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1982 to 1992 White Men Black Men Male Share Pre- Post- Net Income after Pre- Post- Net Income after of Pre- Gov't Gov't Support Payments Gov't Gov't Support Payments Disruption Income Income Adjusted Reported Income Income Adjusted Reported Income (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Less than 40% -.968*** -.899*** -.957*** -.983*** -.516 -.612** -.630*** -.640*** (.155) (.115) (.113) (.111) (.285) (.196) (.197) (.198) At least 40% -.588*** -.554*** -.611*** -.633*** -.665*** -.592*** -.605*** -.61 1*** but <60% (.062) (.053) (.056) (.056) (.168) (.130) (.132) (.133) At least 60% -.409*** -.394*** -.473*** -.507*** -.702*** -.662*** -.710*** -.742*** but <80% (.046) (.035) (.040) (.042) (.147) (.118) (.117) (.117) 80% or more -. 162** -.215*** -.314*** -.353*** -.351* -.466*** -.529*** -.565*** (.052) (.041) (.046) (.047) (.137) (.110) (.098) (.092) Percentage impact of separation on nominal income: Less than 40% -62 -59 -62 -63 -40 -46 -47 -47 At least 40% -44 -43 -46 -47 -49 -45 -45 -46 but <60% At least 60% -34 -33 -38 -40 -50 -48 -51 -52 but <80% 80% or more -15 -19 -27 -30 -30 -37 -41 -43 Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of person-years for white men is 16,403; number of person-years for black men is 5,410. *p < .05 ** < .01 *** < .001 (two-tailed tests) Not surprisingly, the expected loss in nomi￾nal income following separation is strongly related to pre-separation relative income contributions. Men who earned less than their partners before separating experienced the greatest income loss. But these men also replaced more of their lost income, on aver￾age, than did men in more traditionally spe￾cialized households, largely because the ini￾tial labor supply of men who were second￾ary breadwinners was unusually low. Welfare state tax and transfer policies level the market consequences to some ex￾tent (see Table 2, column 2). As a group, men who contributed the largest share to pre-disruption income experienced the smallest post-disruption drop in gross household income, but the separation-in￾duced changes in welfare state taxes and transfers considerably increased their net fi￾nancial decline. For other men, welfare policy typically buffered the income loss slightly. African American men with low pre-disruption contributions were an excep￾tion in that they experienced greater de￾clines in post-government than in pre-gov￾ernment income. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the es￾timated impact of separation using the (downward-) adjusted measure of transfer payments (column 3) and the unadjusted measure (column 4). Support payments in￾creased average income declines following separation, even among men who earned less than their partners in the pre-disruption household. For white men, support pay￾ments erased all mitigation from the wel￾fare state, and for both black men and white men the negative impact of support pay￾ments increased with the prominence of the male breadwinner role. Next, we replaced nominal income as the outcome of interest with standard of living, measured using the ELES scale. These re￾sults, shown in the top panel of Table 3, show that market forces alone-loss of partner's income and the inability to com￾pensate-have a powerful impact on men's This content downloaded from 129.96.252.188 on Mon, 15 Feb 2016 15:26:54 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions