646 Security Dialogue vol.41,no.6,December 2010 Strategic Studies as a Cold War Artifact? The third broad element in Buzan Hansen's analysis of traditional stra- tegic studies is that they see it very much as a creature of the Cold War.It was born and institutionalized during the Cold War and was preoccupied with Cold War topics.However,war and other politically motivated violence did not begin with the Cold War,and nothing in the modern history of the international system suggests that it would end with the Cold War.To be pre- occupied with the particular problems of war and peace in the Cold War era did not mean that problems of war and peace were confined to the Cold War -as events of the subsequent two decades have vividly demonstrated. In Buzan Hansen's analysis,however,the end of the Cold War should have represented a stunning blow to the traditionalists.With the Cold War now history',they explain,'the traditional core of international security stud- ies faced the simple and potentially devastating question of how to survive in the face of the peaceful and voluntary dismantling of the bipolar order'(Buzan Hansen,2009:159;emphasis in original).The disintegration from inter- nal weaknesses of a failed challenger to the leading state in the system is somehow construed as a possible death-blow to the traditionalists,as though traditional strategic studies required that the Cold War end violently.Further, the very conceptual foundations of the traditionalists were called into ques- tion by the end of the Cold War:key normative and political assumptions at the heart of Strategic Studies were thrown into potentially unsalvageable doubt'(Buzan Hansen,2009:160).As Buzan Hansen see it,the tradition- alists faced a seemingly 'inevitable'institutional crisis(Buzan Hansen,2009: 186),their agenda harmed',their subfield confronting a 'crisis of relevance (Buzan Hansen,2009:91). This mortal crisis should have happened but did not,as Buzan Hansen, with commendable integrity,acknowledge.Perhaps surprisingly,'they write, traditional strategic studies 'underwent no major existential crisis'(Buzan Hansen,2009:158).The'traditionalist wing',they note,'showed considerable continuity and noteworthy robustness'(Buzan Hansen,2009:184).The tra- ditionalists displayed a good deal of adaptation to the new realities of the post-Cold War world'(Buzan Hansen,2009:185).Writing about traditional strategic studies in the post-Cold War era,they conclude:The institutional crisis for international security studies that seemed inevitable at the end of the Cold War largely did not happen'(Buzan Hansen,2009:186). How did Buzan Hansen get their diagnosis so wrong?They offer an explanation (Buzan Hansen,2009:185)that emphasizes the institution- alization of the traditionalists and dynamics of internal academic debates. To these points I would add several others.First,the authors underestimate the extent to which the emergence of the field of international security stud- ies was a response not only to the nuclear revolution and the onset of the Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012646 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 Strategic Studies as a Cold War Artifact? The third broad element in Buzan & Hansen’s analysis of traditional stra￾tegic studies is that they see it very much as a creature of the Cold War. It was born and institutionalized during the Cold War and was preoccupied with Cold War topics. However, war and other politically motivated violence did not begin with the Cold War, and nothing in the modern history of the international system suggests that it would end with the Cold War. To be pre￾occupied with the particular problems of war and peace in the Cold War era did not mean that problems of war and peace were confined to the Cold War – as events of the subsequent two decades have vividly demonstrated. In Buzan & Hansen’s analysis, however, the end of the Cold War should have represented a stunning blow to the traditionalists. ‘With the Cold War now history’, they explain, ‘the traditional core of international security stud￾ies faced the simple and potentially devastating question of how to survive in the face of the peaceful and voluntary dismantling of the bipolar order’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 159; emphasis in original). The disintegration from inter￾nal weaknesses of a failed challenger to the leading state in the system is somehow construed as a possible death-blow to the traditionalists, as though traditional strategic studies required that the Cold War end violently. Further, the very conceptual foundations of the traditionalists were called into ques￾tion by the end of the Cold War: ‘key normative and political assumptions at the heart of Strategic Studies were thrown into potentially unsalvageable doubt’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 160). As Buzan & Hansen see it, the tradition￾alists faced a seemingly ‘inevitable’ institutional crisis (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 186), their agenda ‘harmed’, their subfield confronting a ‘crisis of relevance’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 91). This mortal crisis should have happened but did not, as Buzan & Hansen, with commendable integrity, acknowledge. ‘Perhaps surprisingly,’ they write, traditional strategic studies ‘underwent no major existential crisis’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 158). The ‘traditionalist wing’, they note, ‘showed considerable continuity and noteworthy robustness’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 184). The tra￾ditionalists displayed ‘a good deal of adaptation to the new realities of the post-Cold War world’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 185). Writing about traditional strategic studies in the post-Cold War era, they conclude: ‘The institutional crisis for international security studies that seemed inevitable at the end of the Cold War largely did not happen’ (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 186). How did Buzan & Hansen get their diagnosis so wrong? They offer an explanation (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 185) that emphasizes the institution￾alization of the traditionalists and dynamics of internal academic debates. To these points I would add several others. First, the authors underestimate the extent to which the emergence of the field of international security stud￾ies was a response not only to the nuclear revolution and the onset of the Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012