Steven E.Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 647 Cold War,but also to the great convulsion of state-generated violence that occurred during the first half of the 20th century.Tens of millions perished, cities were reduced to ruins,countries were laid waste,relocated,partitioned, empires were undermined,governments were overturned,the distribution of power was dramatically altered,and the international system was shaken to its core and restructured.This great violence was a catalyst in provoking more serious and systematic thought about security issues. Second,the traditionalists were never purely Cold War-centric.Indeed, within the academic scene much of the influential work that propelled the field forward and fueled some of its theoretical debates was focused on pre- Cold War history.There is much work that addresses interwar military policy. There has been a veritable cottage industry preoccupied with World War I. Studies of the sources of grand strategy have drawn on late 19th-and early 20th-century cases.And so on.It is certainly fair to say that Cold War issues occupied a central role on the agenda of the traditionalists,but the substantial streams of work that transcended the Cold War should not be overlooked. Finally,the post-Cold War era is already two decades old-that is,it is already half the length of the Cold War.Its birth coincided with the first Gulf War in 1991,in which the United States deployed forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands half way around the globe and engaged in the largest armored combat operations since World War II.There followed a distressing series of interstate wars(the Balkans,Afghanistan,Iraq 2003,Lebanon,Georgia),ghast- ly civil wars (Chechnya,Sri Lanka,Sudan,the Congo),genocides (Rwanda, Darfur),severe nuclear-proliferation crises (North Korea,Iran),and countless terrorist attacks (above all,9/11).Since the September 2001 attacks,the most powerful state in the system has been on a national security rampage:it has invaded two countries and overthrown their governments;it has used force (notably air strikes and drone attacks)in many other countries;it has enor- mous air,sea,and land forces deployed in distant locales(particularly in the greater Middle East);it has aggressively confronted and attempts to coerce other states it regards as hostile and dangerous(notably Iran and North Korea); it has engaged in what the Bush administration called the great global man- hunt,seeking out and assassinating alleged terrorists around the planet;and under its new,more moderate president it is planning to spend well over $700 billion on defense and the drone attacks and assassinations have increased. Meanwhile,the US policy elite is increasingly worried about a rising China and a rejuvenated Russia.What is it in this picture that suggests a crisis of relevance for traditional strategic studies?Is this the sort of environment in which the traditionalists are likely to experience an existential collapse? In short,the Cold War had its own distinctive features,and these com- manded great attention within traditional strategic studies.However,the 50 years before the Cold War and the 20 years after it provide ample evidence of the enduring character of the traditionalist agenda. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12,2012Steven E. Miller Traditional Strategic Studies In Context 647 Cold War, but also to the great convulsion of state-generated violence that occurred during the first half of the 20th century. Tens of millions perished, cities were reduced to ruins, countries were laid waste, relocated, partitioned, empires were undermined, governments were overturned, the distribution of power was dramatically altered, and the international system was shaken to its core and restructured. This great violence was a catalyst in provoking more serious and systematic thought about security issues. Second, the traditionalists were never purely Cold War-centric. Indeed, within the academic scene much of the influential work that propelled the field forward and fueled some of its theoretical debates was focused on preCold War history. There is much work that addresses interwar military policy. There has been a veritable cottage industry preoccupied with World War I. Studies of the sources of grand strategy have drawn on late 19th- and early 20th-century cases. And so on. It is certainly fair to say that Cold War issues occupied a central role on the agenda of the traditionalists, but the substantial streams of work that transcended the Cold War should not be overlooked. Finally, the post-Cold War era is already two decades old – that is, it is already half the length of the Cold War. Its birth coincided with the first Gulf War in 1991, in which the United States deployed forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands half way around the globe and engaged in the largest armored combat operations since World War II. There followed a distressing series of interstate wars (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq 2003, Lebanon, Georgia), ghastly civil wars (Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Congo), genocides (Rwanda, Darfur), severe nuclear-proliferation crises (North Korea, Iran), and countless terrorist attacks (above all, 9/11). Since the September 2001 attacks, the most powerful state in the system has been on a national security rampage: it has invaded two countries and overthrown their governments; it has used force (notably air strikes and drone attacks) in many other countries; it has enormous air, sea, and land forces deployed in distant locales (particularly in the greater Middle East); it has aggressively confronted and attempts to coerce other states it regards as hostile and dangerous (notably Iran and North Korea); it has engaged in what the Bush administration called the great global manhunt, seeking out and assassinating alleged terrorists around the planet; and under its new, more moderate president it is planning to spend well over $700 billion on defense and the drone attacks and assassinations have increased. Meanwhile, the US policy elite is increasingly worried about a rising China and a rejuvenated Russia. What is it in this picture that suggests a crisis of relevance for traditional strategic studies? Is this the sort of environment in which the traditionalists are likely to experience an existential collapse? In short, the Cold War had its own distinctive features, and these commanded great attention within traditional strategic studies. However, the 50 years before the Cold War and the 20 years after it provide ample evidence of the enduring character of the traditionalist agenda. Downloaded from sdi.sagepub.com at LIB SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV on March 12, 2012