The“Other”Geneva Conference 61 themselves.Second,American relations with the Republic of Korea(ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client rela- tions that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War,es- pecially in Asia.Syngman Rhee,the South Korean president, depended on American support,and he knew it.But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam,also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credi- bility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him,and he played this advantage for all it was worth.It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations,the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26,1954.The first,and in some ways the most trying,task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference.In mid-February,the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States,the Soviet Union,Britain,and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina.No sooner had the com- munique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokes- men began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation,and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction,in the opinion of American officials,was entirely in character.In the months before the armistice of 1953,Rhee had been extremely obstructive,fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Commu- nists.Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup,ar- rest Rhee,and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22.04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThe "Other" Geneva Conference 61 themselves. Second, American relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client rela￾tions that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War, es￾pecially in Asia. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean president, depended on American support, and he knew it. But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam, also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credi￾bility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him, and he played this advantage for all it was worth. It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations, the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26, 1954. The first, and in some ways the most trying, task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference. In mid-February, the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina. No sooner had the com￾munique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokes￾men began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation, and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction, in the opinion of American officials, was entirely in character. In the months before the armistice of 1953, Rhee had been extremely obstructive, fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Commu￾nists. Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup, ar￾rest Rhee, and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions