62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages.The United States,after all,had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives pro- tecting Rhee's government;at this late date,the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving,or worse,that it would assist in his removal.Rejecting the coup plan,Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquies- cence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30,1953,Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the secu- rity of the ROK,Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations.On June 18,he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape"of 25,000 North Korean POWs.Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated,it still infuriated American leaders,coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks.However,there was little that could be done after the fact,and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice,Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own. As a consequence of these actions,Rhee developed a 3.The contingency plan was labeled"Everready"and was described in a paper submitted by U.S.Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4,1953.See U.S.Dept.of State,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,Vol.XV:Korea(2 pts.,Washington,D.C.,1984),965-968.Also,memo- randum of State-JCS meeting,May 29,ibid.,1114-1119;memorandum for record, June 1,1953,ibid.,1126-1129.In addition,see Barton J.Bernstein,"The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea,"Foreign Service Journal,55(1978),10-13,34;and John Kotch,"The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea,"in Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-1953 (Seattle,1983),239-259. 4.Goulden,Untold Story,638-641;Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,185- 186;minutes of NSC meeting,June 18,1953,Foreign Relations,1952-1954,XV, 1,200-1.205. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages. The United States, after all, had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives pro￾tecting Rhee's government; at this late date, the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving, or worse, that it would assist in his removal. Rejecting the coup plan, Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquies￾cence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30, 1953, Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the secu￾rity of the ROK, Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations. On June 18, he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape" of 25,000 North Korean POWs. Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated, it still infuriated American leaders, coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks. However, there was little that could be done after the fact, and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice, Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own.4 As a consequence of these actions, Rhee developed a 3. The contingency plan was labeled "Everready" and was described in a paper submitted by U.S. Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4, 1953. See U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XV: Korea (2 pts., Washington, D.C., 1984), 965-968. Also, memo￾randum of State-JCS meeting, May 29, ibid., 1114-1119; memorandum for record, June 1, 1953, ibid., 1126-1129. In addition, see BartonJ. Bernstein, "The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea," Foreign Service Journal, 55 (1978), 10-13, 34; and John Kotch, "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea," in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle, 1983), 239-259. 4. Goulden, Untold Story, 638-641; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 185- 186; minutes of NSC meeting, June 18, 1953, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XV, 1,200-1,205. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions