Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403 began to fade...into war-weariness and a longing for peace."45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain's uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the"long"eigh- teenth century.After all,Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s.In the two decades prior to the Revo- lutionary War,Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea- sure to expand its control over North America.46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo- leonic Wars.Between 1793 and 1815,Britain spent fl billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad-more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu- tionary War.7 Throughout this period,Britain remained materially capable of with- standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown.In 1782,it wanted resolve,not capacity. By comparing Britain's position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after,it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence.Indeed,we can construct several"easily imagined"counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown.48 Historical data show that each alternative path was "available,considered,and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors."4 Britain might simply have continued the war,albeit with a different military strategy.This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North,the Tory prime minister.so Assuming North would retain power,the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com- manders with his prime minister.3!King George III was not (yet)mad.Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown,but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through- out America.32 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam- paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government. Second,Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe- less pursued de facto dependence.33 After the defeat at Saratoga(in 1777),the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to"continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies"and,by "distressing the rebels,""secure the depen- dence of America."54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown- particularly after several major naval victories in 1782.Short of maintaining 45.See Harlow 1952,210;and Middlekauff 2007,590. 46.Harlow1952,454. 47.See Tombs and Tombs 2006,179;and Monod 2009,282. 48.Tetlock and Belkin 1996,8. 49.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,356. 50.Lord North(1732-92)was a leading Tory.As prime minister(1770-82),he reluctantly endeav- ored to pacify the American colonies. 51.Donne1867,392-402. 52.Mackesy1993,435. 53.Military capitulation may have determined the "form"of the Anglo-American relationship,but it did not dictate its "content."Ruggie 1982,382. 54.Donne1867,148.161-63,207.began to fade +++ into war-weariness and a longing for peace+”45 But this is diffi- cult to square with Britain’s uninterrupted bellicosity throughout the “long” eigh￾teenth century+ After all, Britain fought in a major military conflict in virtually every decade from the 1690s to the 1810s+ In the two decades prior to the Revo￾lutionary War, Britain had expended unprecedented quantities of blood and trea￾sure to expand its control over North America+ 46 But even these sums were dwarfed by the costs incurred just a few years later in the French Revolutionary and Napo￾leonic Wars+ Between 1793 and 1815, Britain spent £1 billion and suffered 250,000 casualties fighting abroad—more than ten times its costs in the American Revolu￾tionary War+ 47 Throughout this period, Britain remained materially capable of with￾standing losses like that suffered at Yorktown+ In 1782, it wanted resolve, not capacity+ By comparing Britain’s position in 1782 to its bleaker circumstances before and after, it becomes clear that military losses were necessary but insufficient to make Britain concede American independence+ Indeed, we can construct several “easily imagined” counterfactual courses that Britain might have taken after Yorktown+ 48 Historical data show that each alternative path was “available, considered, and narrowly defeated by the relevant actors+”49 Britain might simply have continued the war, albeit with a different military strategy+ This was precisely the option the king pressed upon Lord North, the Tory prime minister+ 50 Assuming North would retain power, the king spent much of the ensuing parliamentary recess discussing alternative military strategies and com￾manders with his prime minister+ 51 King George III was not ~yet! mad+ Britain had lost 8,000 troops at Yorktown, but it had another 30,000 garrisoned through￾out America+ 52 These forces easily could have been deployed on another cam￾paign had the pro-independence opposition not captured the government+ Second, Britain could have acknowledged de jure independence but nonethe￾less pursued de facto dependence+ 53 After the defeat at Saratoga ~in 1777!, the king had proposed using loyalist strongholds to “continue destroying the trade and ports of the rebellious colonies” and, by “distressing the rebels,” “secure the depen￾dence of America+”54 This strategy remained equally valid after Yorktown— particularly after several major naval victories in 1782+ Short of maintaining 45+ See Harlow 1952, 210; and Middlekauff 2007, 590+ 46+ Harlow 1952, 454+ 47+ See Tombs and Tombs 2006, 179; and Monod 2009, 282+ 48+ Tetlock and Belkin 1996, 8+ 49+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 356+ 50+ Lord North ~1732–92! was a leading Tory+ As prime minister ~1770–82!, he reluctantly endeav￾ored to pacify the American colonies+ 51+ Donne 1867, 392–402+ 52+ Mackesy 1993, 435+ 53+ Military capitulation may have determined the “form” of the Anglo-American relationship, but it did not dictate its “content+” Ruggie 1982, 382+ 54+ Donne 1867, 148, 161– 63, 207+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 403