1102 American Anthropologist VoL 104, No 4. December 2002 one child in the 1980s and 1990s. Both generations of and let wealthier siblings pick up the slack. Because most women worked all day, every day. The main difference is men earned more than most women, these wealthier sib that employed mothers had part of their work valorized lings were more likely to be brothers rather than sisters with monthly wages, which constantly reminded them as Still, my students'mothers had at least proven daughters well as their husbands, parents, and parents-in-law of were capable of providing financial support for their par their power and indispensability ents. This reassured my students' parents that their daugh Because of the Chinese government's policy of assign ters could have the same capability, especially if they were ing apartments that were too small to accommodate joint given the resources to take full advantage of socioeco families, most urban Chinese people have "networked nomic opportunities families"(Davis and Harrell 1993; Unger 1993), in which married children live neolocally but in close proximity to DEALING STRATEGICALLY WITH GENDER NORMS oth sets of parents. Only 17 percent of my survey respon- The strategy of raising a brotherless daughter to fill the dents(N=2,188)indicated that at least one grandparent kinship role usually reserved for sons was occasionally lived in their home. Neolocality allows couples consider practiced even in prerevolutionary China ( ordan 1972 able flexibility in the negotiation of relationships with 91-92: Pasternak 1985; Rofel 1999: 80-94). The approp both sets of parents. In the flexible kinship system en- ateness of such a strateg oo proclaimed by legends like joyed by urban families, paid work gave women the lever that of Mulan, a girl who took her fathers place in the age they needed to maintain ties to their own parents. As a army because he had no son old enough to do so. As a junior high school student's mother told her husband when he complained that she was giving too much money rare and difficult last resort, the strategy of raising a to her parents, Why shouldnt I give them the money daughter as a son"(guniang dang erzi yang) had little influ I' ve earned? You should be grateful that I don't give all my ence on dominant chinese cultural models or the scholars wages to them! who studied them. This strategy gained popularity after Elderly parents who were widowed or disabled usually the one-child policy made it a necessity for half of my stu- moved into an adult childs household. Which child they dents’ families. ended up living with depended less on gender than on in- Parents whose love, hope, and need for old-age sup terpersonal dynamics and on the amount of time and liv. port are all pinned on just one child tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, re- families, elderly parents rotated between all their children, gardless of the child's gender. Daughters and their parents staying a few weeks to a few months in the household of face the extra challenge of winning happiness and success each son or daughter. Regardless of their gender, adult in a society structured by gender norms that have long dis- children tended to contribute as much in care, compan advantaged women. They meet this challenge with a stra- ionship, money, and gifts to their parents as they could af. tegic combination of conformity and resistance ford. Many of my students' mothers provided monetary For academically unsuccessful daughters of poor par- support and nursing care for their own elderly parents ents, gender norms provide a means of upward mobility (often getting their husbands to help), most who per- through marriage and job markets unavailable to their formed annual worship rituals for their husbands' de- male counterparts. Women face a glass ceiling produced ceased parents also did so for their own deceased parents by their extra burden of domestic responsibility, by gender and some inherited money, goods, and housing from their norms that favor men in elite professions, and by in- parents. While 12 percent of my survey respondents(N= equalities between elite husbands and their less elite, hy 2, 187)were living with at least one paternal grandparent pergamous wives. Women also enjoy the protection of a at the time of the survey, 5 percent(N=2, 188)were living glass floor created by the hypergamous marriage system, with at least one maternal grandparent. Because of my stu- by gender norms that favor nonelite women in the educa dents'mothers'success in diverting resources to their own tional system, and by the rapidly expanding market for parents, my students'families accept that daughters can feminine jobs in the service and light industry sectors be as filial as sons This glass floor makes it less likely that women will sink to My students'mothers were not able to completely the bottom of society, into poverty, crime, and unemploy obliterate patrilineal assumptions Because women tended ment. Men have neither the obstacle of the glass ceiling to earn less than men, they also tended to contribute less nor the protection of the glass floor. While elite men are to their parents than their brothers could. This became es- more likely than their female counterparts to rise to the pecially apparent in the 1990s, after the economic reforms top of their society, nonelite men are also more likely than caused layoffs and early retirements that disproportion- their female counterparts to fall to the bottom. ately targeted women. According to survey respondents, 25 percent of their mothers(N= 2, 190)and 12 percent of ple's expectations of how males and females would be- their fathers(N= 2, 190)have been laid off or given early have. They were not interested in debating the extent to retirement. Men and women who lost their jobs tended to which such expectations corresponded with the way peo- reduce the financial support they provided their parents ple actually behaved. Rather, they focused on weighingone child in the 1980s and 1990s. Both generations of women worked all day, every day. The main difference is that employed mothers had part of their work valorized with monthly wages, which constantly reminded them as well as their husbands, parents, and parents-in-law of their power and indispensability. Because of the Chinese government’s policy of assign￾ing apartments that were too small to accommodate joint families, most urban Chinese people have “networked families” (Davis and Harrell 1993; Unger 1993), in which married children live neolocally but in close proximity to both sets of parents. Only 17 percent of my survey respon￾dents (N = 2,188) indicated that at least one grandparent lived in their home. Neolocality allows couples consider￾able flexibility in the negotiation of relationships with both sets of parents. In the flexible kinship system en￾joyed by urban families, paid work gave women the lever￾age they needed to maintain ties to their own parents. As a junior high school student’s mother told her husband when he complained that she was giving too much money to her parents, “Why shouldn’t I give them the money I’ve earned? You should be grateful that I don’t give all my wages to them!” Elderly parents who were widowed or disabled usually moved into an adult child’s household. Which child they ended up living with depended less on gender than on in￾terpersonal dynamics and on the amount of time and liv￾ing space each child’s household could spare. In many families, elderly parents rotated between all their children, staying a few weeks to a few months in the household of each son or daughter. Regardless of their gender, adult children tended to contribute as much in care, compan￾ionship, money, and gifts to their parents as they could af￾ford. Many of my students’ mothers provided monetary support and nursing care for their own elderly parents (often getting their husbands to help), most who per￾formed annual worship rituals for their husbands’ de￾ceased parents also did so for their own deceased parents, and some inherited money, goods, and housing from their parents. While 12 percent of my survey respondents (N = 2,187) were living with at least one paternal grandparent at the time of the survey, 5 percent (N = 2,188) were living with at least one maternal grandparent. Because of my stu￾dents’ mothers’ success in diverting resources to their own parents, my students’ families accept that daughters can be as filial as sons. My students’ mothers were not able to completely obliterate patrilineal assumptions. Because women tended to earn less than men, they also tended to contribute less to their parents than their brothers could. This became es￾pecially apparent in the 1990s, after the economic reforms caused layoffs and early retirements that disproportion￾ately targeted women. According to survey respondents, 25 percent of their mothers (N = 2,190) and 12 percent of their fathers (N = 2,190) have been laid off or given early retirement. Men and women who lost their jobs tended to reduce the financial support they provided their parents and let wealthier siblings pick up the slack. Because most men earned more than most women, these wealthier sib￾lings were more likely to be brothers rather than sisters. Still, my students’ mothers had at least proven daughters were capable of providing financial support for their par￾ents. This reassured my students’ parents that their daugh￾ters could have the same capability, especially if they were given the resources to take full advantage of socioeco￾nomic opportunities. DEALING STRATEGICALLY WITH GENDER NORMS The strategy of raising a brotherless daughter to fill the kinship role usually reserved for sons was occasionally practiced even in prerevolutionary China (Jordan 1972: 91–92; Pasternak 1985; Rofel 1999:80–94). The appropri￾ateness of such a strategy was proclaimed by legends like that of Mulan, a girl who took her father’s place in the army because he had no son old enough to do so.6 As a rare and difficult last resort, the strategy of “raising a daughter as a son” (guniang dang erzi yang) had little influ￾ence on dominant Chinese cultural models or the scholars who studied them. This strategy gained popularity after the one-child policy made it a necessity for half of my stu￾dents’ families. Parents whose love, hope, and need for old-age sup￾port are all pinned on just one child tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, re￾gardless of the child’s gender. Daughters and their parents face the extra challenge of winning happiness and success in a society structured by gender norms that have long dis￾advantaged women. They meet this challenge with a stra￾tegic combination of conformity and resistance. For academically unsuccessful daughters of poor par￾ents, gender norms provide a means of upward mobility through marriage and job markets unavailable to their male counterparts. Women face a glass ceiling produced by their extra burden of domestic responsibility, by gender norms that favor men in elite professions, and by in￾equalities between elite husbands and their less elite, hy￾pergamous wives. Women also enjoy the protection of a glass floor created by the hypergamous marriage system, by gender norms that favor nonelite women in the educa￾tional system, and by the rapidly expanding market for feminine jobs in the service and light industry sectors. This glass floor makes it less likely that women will sink to the bottom of society, into poverty, crime, and unemploy￾ment. Men have neither the obstacle of the glass ceiling nor the protection of the glass floor. While elite men are more likely than their female counterparts to rise to the top of their society, nonelite men are also more likely than their female counterparts to fall to the bottom. My students and their parents often talked about peo￾ple’s expectations of how males and females would be￾have. They were not interested in debating the extent to which such expectations corresponded with the way peo￾ple actually behaved. Rather, they focused on weighing 1102 American Anthropologist • Vol. 104, No. 4 • December 2002