214 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI,1912-16 In most provinces,political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army,especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing,and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels,it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed.The top executive was in every province the military governor (-)If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu,where conditions differed and comparison is difficult,then I2 of the remaining 17'home'provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912.(Of these 12,six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.)There were five men without mili- tary backgrounds in this post,two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication.The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province.In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government.In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly.In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even,as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government.In some cases,important sections of the army,not necessarily including the military governor,were ad- herents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism,as in Hupei and Kiangsu.The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably,sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally.Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli,Honan and Shantung and,somewhat less confidently,in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control;they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off.The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process.One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial re- volutionary governments,often at the prefectural level.Their subor- dination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely.But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces,the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912.This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution-its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized.It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008214 TH E ER A O F YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6 In most provinces, political leadership was drawn from two institutions: the army, especially the leaders of the modern New Army units formed around the country in the late Ch'ing, and the provincial assemblies. Although the precipitation of the revolution had often begun at lower levels, it was people from these two groups who had consolidated power as Ch'ing authority collapsed. The top executive was in every province the military governor (tu-tu). If we exclude the Manchurian provinces and Kansu, where conditions differed and comparison is difficult, then 12 of the remaining 17 'home' provinces had soldiers as military governors in the mid summer of 1912. (Of these 12, six were Chinese graduates of the Japanese Army Officers Academy.) There were five men without mili￾tary backgrounds in this post, two of them in provinces that had not joined the revolution before the Ch'ing abdication. The balance between army and provincial assembly varied considerably from province to province. In Yunnan the New Army officers maintained rigid control over the provincial government. In Hunan they gave way to leaders out of the provincial assembly. In a few provinces the revolutionary party and its adherents were a third force and might even, as in Kwangtung, dominate the provincial government. In some cases, important sections of the army, not necessarily including the military governor, were ad￾herents of the revolutionary party or shared its relative radicalism, as in Hupei and Kiangsu. The resulting politics was often quite confusing. Remarkably, sufficient cohesion was achieved in most of the formerly revolutionary provinces to prevent Peking from injecting its power locally. Only in the three northern provinces of Chihli, Honan and Shantung and, somewhat less confidently, in Manchuria could Yuan unilaterally appoint important officials. Most provincial governments were not only immune to Peking's control; they were also able to muster sufficient energy to prevent lesser administrative units from splitting off. The consolidation of provincial authority was in several cases a difficult process. One pattern by which the revolution had spread was the establishment of sub-provincial re￾volutionary governments, often at the prefectural level. Their subor￾dination to the provincial government was not always accomplished either swiftly or completely. But in comparison with Peking's authority in the formerly revolutionary provinces, the fiscal and appointive powers of provincial governments in their own domain were extensive by the end of 1912. This was due partly to the circumstances of the revolution - its primary act having been the destruction of central authority and its form being internally decentralized. It also owed much to the assertion that provinces could best serve China's interests by insisting on their autonomy Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008