THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 2I5 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule,especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao,a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities,the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district.With respect to the centre,it is the largest sphere of self-government.To attain the goals of republicanism,one must seek to develop people's rights (minch'tian],and in seeking to develop people's rights,the scope of self-government must be enlarged.'Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained,so that province is set off from province,and prefecture from prefecture...'.But Tai would reverse the argument.China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions,which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire.'Seen in this light,the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.'Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs,Tai felt,were keys to national political progress and tranquillity. These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureau- crats,including the country's president.Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely.The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels.After the revolution,the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly.In the Ch'ing plan,these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education,under the guidance of centrally appointed of- ficials.With the revolution,some local assemblies became politically ag- gressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities,including county magistrates.Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer,more organic connection between local elites and their administrators.As a practical matter in I9rz and 1913,it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking;it also defied provincial authority.Generally speaking,provincial authority prevailed.But judging from provincial budgets in these years,the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao,Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi(Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao)(Taipei reprint edn, 1962),187-95. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ORDER 215 in the face of the stifling centralization that was believed to have marked Ch'ing rule, especially in its final years. Among the many presentations of the case for provincial autonomy was that written in 1912 by Tai Chi-t'ao, a young journalist in Shanghai. 'With respect to the localities, the role of the province is that of the highest administrative district. With respect to the centre, it is the largest sphere of self-government. To attain the goals of republicanism, one must seek to develop people's rights [min-ch'iian], and in seeking to develop people's rights, the scope of self-government must be enlarged.' Tai noted that advocates of centralization 'argue that the reason for China's not prospering is that localism is too ingrained, so that province is set off from province, and prefecture from prefecture. . .'. But Tai would reverse the argument. China was too large and its people too numerous to be ruled through centralized institutions, which had often caused decay and collapse under the empire. 'Seen in this light, the reason China has not prospered is that the ideas of centralization are too ingrained and the concept of self-government too weak.' Provincial autonomy and the popular election of provincial chiefs, Tai felt, were keys to national political progress and tranquillity.' These sentiments were squarely opposed to those of Peking's bureau￾crats, including the country's president. Tai's analysis also implied the need to check the attempt of sub-provincial districts to escape provincial power. The actual success of provincial governments in extending their power throughout their provinces varied widely. The Ch'ing in its last few years had begun establishing self-government councils and assemblies at the hsien and lesser levels. After the revolution, the incidence of such bodies mounted rapidly. In the Ch'ing plan, these local representative organs were supposed to manage and finance a range of local reforms, particularly in education, under the guidance of centrally appointed of￾ficials. With the revolution, some local assemblies became politically ag￾gressive and presumed to select their own executive authorities, including county magistrates. Such assertiveness harmonized with one persistent school of political thought over the centuries that urged a closer, more organic connection between local elites and their administrators. As a practical matter in 1912 and 1913, it not only violated the conceptions entertained for the Chinese polity by the centralizers in Peking; it also defied provincial authority. Generally speaking, provincial authority prevailed. But judging from provincial budgets in these years, the success 1 Tai Chi-t'ao, Tai T'ien-ch'ou wen-chi (Collected essays of Tai Chi-t'ao) (Taipei reprint edn, 1962), 187-95. 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