8 VIVIEN A.SCHMIDT to the actors within a given'meaning context'rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests.Material interests,economic in particular,which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature,are not ignored.But in discursive institutionalism, scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them,such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests (see Schmidt,2008). The kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may also differ,depending upon the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned.Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Wittgenstein's(1972)little-noticed distinction between the language- games based on our everyday experiences in the world,which tend to admit of few doubts or mistakes,and language-games based on our (social)scientific pictures of the world,which may always allow for doubts,mistakes,and even gestalt switches (see Schmidt,2008).The problem with RI is that it tends to develop(social)scientific pictures-games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experience- games-a point also made by Taleb and Pilpel(2005;see discussion in Blyth,2010), who demonstrate that the world in which we live is a lot more uncertain than the world of risk economists and rational choice institutionalists generally assume,given the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. As Blyth(2002:31-39,2010;see also Schmidt,2008)argues,the problem with RI is that it assumes that most phenomena are explainable in terms of 'Knightian risk',because they are part of a directly observable world that agents can perceive more or less well and in which they can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences,such as in the US Congress.Such phenomena, Blyth shows,are in actuality better explained in terms of 'Knightian uncertainty, because they are part of a world that is not directly observable,such as the global economy,in which agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but unsure of what their interests are,given that the uncertainties are too great,the moment unique,prediction impossible,and agents'interests always structurally underdetermined.Blyth (2002)illustrates this by noting that the Great Depression in the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were cases of Knightian uncertainty for both the United States and Sweden,as governments,business,and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative 'narratives'and 'causal stories'about the reasons for the crisis,seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action,with ideas serving as 'weapons'and 'blueprints'in the struggle to replace existing institutions. Woll (2008)demonstrates that there are also less dramatic instances of Knightian uncertainty,such as the kind faced by multinational businesses lobbying for the deregulation of international trade in services.Here,firms'ideas about whichto the actors within a given ‘meaning context’ rather than in terms of some set of universally identifiable interests. Material interests, economic in particular, which are at the basis of much of the institutional incentives in the rational choice institutionalist literature, are not ignored. But in discursive institutionalism, scholars tend to separate material interests analytically into material reality and interests rather than to conflate them, such that material reality constitutes the setting within which or in response to which agents may conceive of their interests (see Schmidt, 2008). The kind of knowledge and degree of certainty agents may have with regard to their ideas about material reality may also differ, depending upon the aspect of material reality with which they are concerned. Illustrative of this epistemological observation is Wittgenstein’s (1972) little-noticed distinction between the language￾games based on our everyday experiences in the world, which tend to admit of few doubts or mistakes, and language-games based on our (social) scientific pictures of the world, which may always allow for doubts, mistakes, and even gestalt switches (see Schmidt, 2008). The problem with RI is that it tends to develop (social) scientific pictures-games of the world that it treats as if they had the certainty of experience￾games – a point also made by Taleb and Pilpel (2005; see discussion in Blyth, 2010), who demonstrate that the world in which we live is a lot more uncertain than the world of risk economists and rational choice institutionalists generally assume, given the impossibility of knowing let alone statistically predicting the effects of all the forces that may have an impact on economic and political realities. As Blyth (2002: 31–39, 2010; see also Schmidt, 2008) argues, the problem with RI is that it assumes that most phenomena are explainable in terms of ‘Knightian risk’, because they are part of a directly observable world that agents can perceive more or less well and in which they can calculate the subjective probability of the likely outcomes of their preferences, such as in the US Congress. Such phenomena, Blyth shows, are in actuality better explained in terms of ‘Knightian uncertainty’, because they are part of a world that is not directly observable, such as the global economy, in which agents are not simply unsure about how to achieve their interests but unsure of what their interests are, given that the uncertainties are too great, the moment unique, prediction impossible, and agents’ interests always structurally underdetermined. Blyth (2002) illustrates this by noting that the Great Depression in the 1930s and the economic crisis following the oil shocks of the 1970s were cases of Knightian uncertainty for both the United States and Sweden, as governments, business, and labor at these critical junctures all sought to reconstitute interests through alternative ‘narratives’ and ‘causal stories’ about the reasons for the crisis, seeking to produce new political coalitions for collective action, with ideas serving as ‘weapons’ and ‘blueprints’ in the struggle to replace existing institutions. Woll (2008) demonstrates that there are also less dramatic instances of Knightian uncertainty, such as the kind faced by multinational businesses lobbying for the deregulation of international trade in services. Here, firms’ ideas about which 8 VIVIEN A . SCHMIDT