Taking ideas and discourse seriously 9 utility to maximize (interests),how to maximize it (strategies),and to what end (goals)explains not only changes in their identity,as they moved from seeing themselves as national champions to global players,but also changes in institutions, as trade in services was developed in a context of single-level(US)games spurred by business and multi-level (EU)games in which global liberalization was linked to attempts to spur business support for liberalization in the member states.But Woll (2008:161),as she herself notes,reifies a single corporate rationality for the sake of parsimony,and thus misses out on the negotiation processes inside firms as well as between them that make for a much more complex ideational construction of interests than the stylized one she developed. Culpepper(2005)shows how one might zoom in to consider such ideational processes in detail,in the institutional changes(or continuities)of the corporate governance systems of France and Germany in the 1990s.In the case of France,he argues that CEOs underwent a joint belief shift at a critical juncture,when a central figure in the system of cross-shareholding exited,thereby 'signalling'an idea that led to a shift in belief system when other French CEOs followed suit after an exchange of ideas.German CEOs,by contrast,did not change the rules of the game at their own critical juncture,when a major firm was taken over by a foreign company,because the outsider nature of the takeover had little effect on the CEOs'belief system. Culpepper's approach has the advantage for RI of helping to maintain the possibility of game-theoretic analysis,by positing an equilibrium state with fixed preferences and stable institutions before and after the period of ideational change.The disadvantage is that it formalizes an empirical process that was,in reality,a lot more messy and uncertain than the discussion suggests(see Schmidt, 1997,2002:Ch.6),making 'revolutionary'a process of change that was a lot more incremental.French CEOs had already voiced dissatisfaction with the sys- tem prior to the central figure's precipitating action while the Germans were a lot more dissatisfied with the system,as was evident from their partial defection once the rules were changed with regard to capital gains tax in 2002(Schmidt,2002: Ch.6;Kinderman,2005).Moreover,by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional 'game'and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional 'game',we have changing DI ideas within a critical moment preceded and followed by RI crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions,however,as Rothstein(2005)shows,also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change.This is because,as he argues,institutions them- selves should not be treated as neutral structures of incentives but,rather,as the carriers of ideas or 'collective memories'which make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors'ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance.Rothstein(2005:168-198) illustrates this with the case of the long-term survival of the institutions of Sweden's collective bargaining system,which became the carriers of ideas or 'collectiveutility to maximize (interests), how to maximize it (strategies), and to what end (goals) explains not only changes in their identity, as they moved from seeing themselves as national champions to global players, but also changes in institutions, as trade in services was developed in a context of single-level (US) games spurred by business and multi-level (EU) games in which global liberalization was linked to attempts to spur business support for liberalization in the member states. But Woll (2008: 161), as she herself notes, reifies a single corporate rationality for the sake of parsimony, and thus misses out on the negotiation processes inside firms as well as between them that make for a much more complex ideational construction of interests than the stylized one she developed. Culpepper (2005) shows how one might zoom in to consider such ideational processes in detail, in the institutional changes (or continuities) of the corporate governance systems of France and Germany in the 1990s. In the case of France, he argues that CEOs underwent a joint belief shift at a critical juncture, when a central figure in the system of cross-shareholding exited, thereby ‘signalling’ an idea that led to a shift in belief system when other French CEOs followed suit after an exchange of ideas. German CEOs, by contrast, did not change the rules of the game at their own critical juncture, when a major firm was taken over by a foreign company, because the outsider nature of the takeover had little effect on the CEOs’ belief system. Culpepper’s approach has the advantage for RI of helping to maintain the possibility of game-theoretic analysis, by positing an equilibrium state with fixed preferences and stable institutions before and after the period of ideational change. The disadvantage is that it formalizes an empirical process that was, in reality, a lot more messy and uncertain than the discussion suggests (see Schmidt, 1997, 2002: Ch. 6), making ‘revolutionary’ a process of change that was a lot more incremental. French CEOs had already voiced dissatisfaction with the sys￾tem prior to the central figure’s precipitating action while the Germans were a lot more dissatisfied with the system, as was evident from their partial defection once the rules were changed with regard to capital gains tax in 2002 (Schmidt, 2002: Ch. 6; Kinderman, 2005). Moreover, by limiting the importance of ideas to the period of uncertainty between the end of the old institutional ‘game’ and the beginning of the newly agreed institutional ‘game’, we have changing DI ideas within a critical moment preceded and followed by RI crystallized preferences and frozen institutions. Institutions, however, as Rothstein (2005) shows, also change over time as the ideas that infuse them change. This is because, as he argues, institutions them￾selves should not be treated as neutral structures of incentives but, rather, as the carriers of ideas or ‘collective memories’ which make them objects of trust or mistrust and changeable over time as actors’ ideas and discourse about them change in tandem with changes in their performance. Rothstein (2005: 168–198) illustrates this with the case of the long-term survival of the institutions of Sweden’s collective bargaining system, which became the carriers of ideas or ‘collective Taking ideas and discourse seriously 9