Googling the WTO:What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J.Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior?Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior,yet these assumptions are rarely questioned.Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations?I propose a novel approach to test the prem- ise behind models of international treaty-making,using web-search data.Such data are widely used in epidemiology:in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy.Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fun- damental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of:information seek- ing.Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization.Applying web-search data to international trade disputes,I pro- vide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law,even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand.This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory. How does international law affect state behavior?A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer.These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power,country rep- utation,and reciprocity,focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place,and how they behave within treaties subsequently.Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior.Yet strikingly,these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined. The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade,investment,or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theoriz- ing.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agree- I thank Marc L.Busch,Stephen Chaudoin,Betsy Levy Paluck,Stuart Soroka,and Erik Voeten,as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.Yanick Touchette provided excel- lent research assistance.I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la societe et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.All remain- ing errors are my own. International Organization 67,Summer 2013,pp.629-55 2013 by The IO Foundation. do:10.1017/S0020818313000179Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J+ Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior? Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior, yet these assumptions are rarely questioned+ Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations? I propose a novel approach to test the prem￾ise behind models of international treaty-making, using web-search data+ Such data are widely used in epidemiology; in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy+ Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fun￾damental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of: information seek￾ing+ Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization+ Applying web-search data to international trade disputes, I pro￾vide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law, even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand+ This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory+ How does international law affect state behavior? A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer+ These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power, country rep￾utation, and reciprocity, focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place, and how they behave within treaties subsequently+ Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior+ Yet strikingly, these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined+ The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade, investment, or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theoriz￾ing+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agree￾I thank Marc L+ Busch, Stephen Chaudoin, Betsy Levy Paluck, Stuart Soroka, and Erik Voeten, as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments+ Yanick Touchette provided excel￾lent research assistance+ I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council+ All remain￾ing errors are my own+ International Organization 67, Summer 2013, pp+ 629–55 © 2013 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818313000179