630 International Organization ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns,when they occur,are not due to leaders'offering distortionary protection to industries.Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convo- luted policy instruments,because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition.2 Looking at the human rights regime,Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court(ICC)statute as a means of rais- ing expectations among the general populace about the government's will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts:"the frustration of these expec- tations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support."3 In all these instances,theoretical claims rest on a common premise:when inter- national legal institutions inform constituents of their governments'violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support,whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent.It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international com- mitments.As with all audience cost models,4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents'forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments. But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements?These models'validity rests on this being the case,yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other.The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rul- ings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization(WTO)can easily appear far-fetched.Thus far,the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys. However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing,such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends.More importantly,they come up against a consistent problem,which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question:typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about.High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results.5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge,respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects.Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand.For these reasons,and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested,surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate's likely behavior in reaction to its government's (non)compliance with international rules. 1.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002. 2.Kono2006. 3.Simmons and Danner 2010.24. 4.Fearon 1998. 5.Berinsky 2004. 6.See Druckman 2001:and Hiscox 2006.ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns, when they occur, are not due to leaders’ offering distortionary protection to industries+ 1 Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convo￾luted policy instruments, because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition+ 2 Looking at the human rights regime, Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court ~ICC! statute as a means of rais￾ing expectations among the general populace about the government’s will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts: “the frustration of these expec￾tations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support+”3 In all these instances, theoretical claims rest on a common premise: when inter￾national legal institutions inform constituents of their governments’ violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support, whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent+ It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international com￾mitments+ As with all audience cost models, 4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents’ forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments+ But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements? These models’ validity rests on this being the case, yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other+ The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rul￾ings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization ~WTO! can easily appear far-fetched+ Thus far, the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys+ However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing, such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends+ More importantly, they come up against a consistent problem, which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question: typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about+ High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results+ 5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge, respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects+ 6 Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand+ For these reasons, and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested, surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate’s likely behavior in reaction to its government’s ~non!compliance with international rules+ 1+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ 2+ Kono 2006+ 3+ Simmons and Danner 2010, 24+ 4+ Fearon 1998+ 5+ Berinsky 2004+ 6+ See Druckman 2001; and Hiscox 2006+ 630 International Organization