The second major focus of this essay is the domestic transition in the global distribution of power can be politics of grand strategy.During the years prior to World handled with equal equanimity and tranquility.On the War I,the British government faced contradictory other hand,Great Britain's deft diplomacy did not succeed pressures on the home front -rising anti-German in preventing the outbreak of World War I,largely because sentiment on the one hand,but aversion to a continental Germany,for domestic reasons,was unwilling-or unable commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas -to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its imperial commitments on the other.Nonetheless,London geopolitical ambition.The result was a classic insecurity did an impressive job of managing these pressures, spiral that escalated to war.The inter-war era provides undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic the fleet,preparing for a continental commitment,and economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation,however,Britain Managing Power Transition: nonetheless found itself at war in 1914.The main cause was British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany,a factor the United States,Japan,and Germany over which Britain had little influence.The outbreak of By the end of the 18oos,Britain faced a power transition on World War I underscores the intimate connection between three fronts:the ascent of the United States in the Western policy and politics and the degree to which domestic Hemisphere;the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power;and pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound Germany's decision to draw on its mounting economic and strategic calculations. industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a During the years prior to World War II,domestic politics different way.It accommodated the United States, again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary strategy.The political consequences of the economic and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced has lasted to this day.London fashioned a formal alliance under-balancing in Great Britain;preoccupied with its with Japan,with the two powers combining their naval economic fragility,London refused to rearm until it was too assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific.The Anglo- late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Japanese alliance,however,ultimately proved hollow as Germany.Other status quo powers similarly turned inward each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for and avoided alliance commitments.At the same time, unilateral gain.With Germany,Britain practiced economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism deterrence,making clear to Berlin that it intended to do in both Germany and Japan.The combination of under- what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the balancing by status quo states and excessive ambition European theater.Germany saw Britain as seeking to block among revisionist states produced gross power its rise,not defend its legitimate security interests.A classic asymmetries-with disastrous consequences. spiral ensued.The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. This essay's historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in Anglo-American Rapprochement,1895-1906 the distribution of global power.On the one hand,Great The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United enemies.The American colonies revolted against British States,marking the only peaceful power transition in rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. history.Perhaps the rise of China and the coming Amid the U.S.Civil War,Britain came close to intervening NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 2new america foundation page 2 The second major focus of this essay is the domestic politics of grand strategy. During the years prior to World War I, the British government faced contradictory pressures on the home front – rising anti-German sentiment on the one hand, but aversion to a continental commitment and strong support for the defense of overseas imperial commitments on the other. Nonetheless, London did an impressive job of managing these pressures, undertaking a timely redistribution and augmentation of the fleet, preparing for a continental commitment, and relying on diplomacy to reduce threats in the periphery. Despite this strategic reorientation, however, Britain nonetheless found itself at war in 1914. The main cause was the domestic politics of grand strategy in Germany, a factor over which Britain had little influence. The outbreak of World War I underscores the intimate connection between policy and politics and the degree to which domestic pressures can overwhelm and make short shrift of sound strategic calculations. During the years prior to World War II, domestic politics again had a profound effect on the conduct of grand strategy. The political consequences of the economic dislocation caused by the Great Depression produced under-balancing in Great Britain; preoccupied with its economic fragility, London refused to rearm until it was too late to deter or even effectively prepare for war with Nazi Germany. Other status quo powers similarly turned inward and avoided alliance commitments. At the same time, economic duress produced virulent strains of nationalism in both Germany and Japan. The combination of under￾balancing by status quo states and excessive ambition among revisionist states produced gross power asymmetries – with disastrous consequences. This essay’s historical reflections provide cause for both optimism and pessimism about the coming transition in the distribution of global power. On the one hand, Great Britain peacefully ceded global hegemony to the United States, marking the only peaceful power transition in history. Perhaps the rise of China and the coming transition in the global distribution of power can be handled with equal equanimity and tranquility. On the other hand, Great Britain’s deft diplomacy did not succeed in preventing the outbreak of World War I, largely because Germany, for domestic reasons, was unwilling – or unable – to practice strategic restraint and calibrate the scope of its geopolitical ambition. The result was a classic insecurity spiral that escalated to war. The inter-war era provides equally sobering lessons about the potential for domestic economic shock to produce strategic pathologies. Managing Power Transition: British Grand Strategy and the Rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany By the end of the 1800s, Britain faced a power transition on three fronts: the ascent of the United States in the Western Hemisphere; the rise of Japan as a Pacific naval power; and Germany’s decision to draw on its mounting economic and industrial might to build a world-class fleet of battleships. Britain responded to each of these three challengers in a different way. It accommodated the United States, advancing rapprochement with its longstanding adversary and laying the foundation for the strategic partnership that has lasted to this day. London fashioned a formal alliance with Japan, with the two powers combining their naval assets to ensure superiority in the Pacific. The Anglo￾Japanese alliance, however, ultimately proved hollow as each country saw the other as taking advantage of it for unilateral gain. With Germany, Britain practiced deterrence, making clear to Berlin that it intended to do what was necessary to retain naval supremacy in the European theater. Germany saw Britain as seeking to block its rise, not defend its legitimate security interests. A classic spiral ensued. The essay briefly summarizes these three episodes and then draws lessons. Anglo-American Rapprochement, 1895-1906 The United States and Great Britain were long-term bitter enemies. The American colonies revolted against British rule in 1775 and the two parties again went to war in 1812. Amid the U.S. Civil War, Britain came close to intervening