on behalf of the Confederacy;London preferred a weak and the border between Alaska and Canada.Following divided America to one whose ascent might come at the settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in expense of British hegemony.After the Union's victory and 1903,President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the for decades thereafter,the United States and Great Britain dispute "was the last serious trouble between ourselves and remained watchful antagonists.Britain's naval superiority the British Empire."3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North writing that an Anglo-American war was "practically and South America stood in the way of the United States' impossible now"and "will grow entirely so as the years go growing interest in extending its sway throughout the by.In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into Western Hemisphere. account a war with England.I treat it as out of the question."4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London.In A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in A.H.Lee,the civil lord of the Admiralty,noted that "I Anglo-American relations.In the midst of growing cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to nationalist sentiment in the United States,President contemplate it under any circumstances."5 Grover Cleveland,backed by Congress,insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of States.London initially refused,rejecting Washington's high politics;at the outset,it was exclusively diplomats and claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that voice in the dispute.But after the prospect of war emerged, enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry.But by London promptly backed down,and agreed to submit its 1898,advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal.The main societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty's Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. resources to go to war with the United States.Accordingly, After an outpouring of British support for the U.S.victory London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to over Spain,the New York Chamber of Commerce held a accommodate Washington's demands.As Kenneth Bourne dinner meeting at which the British and American flags describes London's predicament,"Great Britain's resources were hanging side-by-side;the participants sang both"God were now stretched beyond their limit."Stephen Rock Save the Queen”and“The Star-Spangled Banner..” agrees that,"Britain's cultivation of American friendship Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation,a in London and New York to lobby for improved relations cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic and greater cooperation.6 position."2 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing London's conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an role in broadening and deepening societal support for explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen Anglo-American rapprochement.After the Spanish. geopolitical rivalry with the United States.It succeeded. American War,according to Robert George Neale,"Public During the next few years,London and Washington traded opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, unanimous in its support for United States action against including fishing rights in the Bering Sea,the Spanish- Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific....Leaders and American War and U.S.imperial expansion in the Pacific, articles from all the major newspapers and journals the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal,and practically without exception were in favour of America's NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 3new america foundation page 3 on behalf of the Confederacy; London preferred a weak and divided America to one whose ascent might come at the expense of British hegemony. After the Union’s victory and for decades thereafter, the United States and Great Britain remained watchful antagonists. Britain’s naval superiority in the Western Atlantic and its imperial presence in North and South America stood in the way of the United States’ growing interest in extending its sway throughout the Western Hemisphere. A border dispute that broke out between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895 was to serve as the turning point in Anglo-American relations. In the midst of growing nationalist sentiment in the United States, President Grover Cleveland, backed by Congress, insisted that London submit the dispute to arbitration with the United States. London initially refused, rejecting Washington’s claim that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States a voice in the dispute. But after the prospect of war emerged, London promptly backed down, and agreed to submit its dispute with Venezuela to an arbitration tribunal. The main impetus behind the change of course was the Admiralty’s insistence that Great Britain did not have sufficient naval resources to go to war with the United States. Accordingly, London had little choice but to turn to diplomacy to accommodate Washington’s demands. As Kenneth Bourne describes London’s predicament, “Great Britain’s resources were now stretched beyond their limit.” Stephen Rock agrees that, “Britain’s cultivation of American friendship was part of a broader policy of imperial consolidation, a cautious retreat dictated by the exigencies of her strategic position.”2 London’s conciliation of Washington in 1896 was an explicit effort to use strategic restraint to dampen geopolitical rivalry with the United States. It succeeded. During the next few years, London and Washington traded concessions and reached accords on a host of issues, including fishing rights in the Bering Sea, the Spanish￾American War and U.S. imperial expansion in the Pacific, the construction and fortification of the Panama Canal, and the border between Alaska and Canada. Following settlement by arbitration of the Alaska/Canada boundary in 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the dispute “was the last serious trouble between ourselves and the British Empire.”3 In 1905 Roosevelt went further, writing that an Anglo-American war was “practically impossible now” and “will grow entirely so as the years go by. In keeping ready for possible war I never even take into account a war with England. I treat it as out of the question.”4 Similar attitudes prevailed in London. In reflecting on the prospect of war with the United States, A.H. Lee, the civil lord of the Admiralty, noted that “I cannot conceive that any British statesman is willing to contemplate it under any circumstances.”5 Anglo-American rapprochement started in the realm of high politics; at the outset, it was exclusively diplomats and high office-holders who negotiated the bargains that enabled the two countries to back away from rivalry. But by 1898, advancing reconciliation cleared the way for broader societal engagement in the process of rapprochement. Traders and financiers with vested interests in transatlantic commerce became vocal proponents of improved relations. After an outpouring of British support for the U.S. victory over Spain, the New York Chamber of Commerce held a dinner meeting at which the British and American flags were hanging side-by-side; the participants sang both “God Save the Queen” and “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Branches of the Anglo-American Committee were founded in London and New York to lobby for improved relations and greater cooperation.6 The media and mobilized citizenry also played a growing role in broadening and deepening societal support for Anglo-American rapprochement. After the Spanish￾American War, according to Robert George Neale, “Public opinion in Great Britain outside court circles was almost unanimous in its support for United States action against Spain in both the Caribbean and Pacific. . . . Leaders and articles from all the major newspapers and journals practically without exception were in favour of America’s