actions.Addresses were received by the government from The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,1902-1923 numerous political associations in support of Anglo- At the same time that the rise of the United States American friendship."7 The same was true of the media challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, and public in the United States.One diplomat in the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain's Washington observed that "unanimous,or almost naval position in the Pacific.As in the Atlantic,Britain unanimous support for England is now manifested by the turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval Press throughout the length and breadth of the country... deficiencies in the Pacific.It concluded an alliance with pass[ing]the bound of moderation in as great degree as the Japan in 1902,which lasted until 1923.During the bulk of dislike and distrust of yesterday."8 these two decades,the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers A shared sense of cultural commonality played an and for coordinating naval operations against shared important role in consolidating rapprochement.Indeed,a threats.After World War I,however,the alliance frayed. "cult of Anglo-Saxonism"was emerging in both Britain and Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States the United States by the turn of the century.British elites only deepened over time,Britain and Japan drifted apart in regularly spoke of a"common kinship of race"and "ties of the interwar era.The two powers were allies in World War blood,"and began referring to the prospect of war with the I,but direct adversaries in World War II. United States as a"civil war"or "fratricidal strife."9 On the other side of the Atlantic,Richard Olney,who had served as The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized secretary of state under President William McKinley, the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British referred to Britain as America's "best friend"and noted interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy,in “the close community·.·in origin,speech,thought,, combination with the Japanese fleet,sufficient strength to literature,institutions,ideals-in the kind and degree of retain superiority over Russia and France,allies since 1892. civilization enjoyed by both." In return,Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London's ostensible backing of Japan's These shifts in public discourse helped transform the territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula,which had identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into been fueled by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of the identities of friendship which consolidated 1984-1895.London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to rapprochement.By 1901,Britain had removed the United include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean,but States from the two-power standard,effectively Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer northeast Asia. contemplating operations against the United States.The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906.By Amid Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- the early 19oos,the U.S.General Staff concluded that war 1905,the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened.Tokyo with Britain was"the least of all possible conflicts." agreed to accede to London's request to extend the pact to include India,while London acquiesced to Tokyo's de facto It would not be until the 194os that Britain and the United occupation of Korea.The alliance was again revised and States fashioned the "special relationship"of today.But extended in 191,with Japan effectively winning Britain's rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910.Britain was for strategic partnership-and made possible the first motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over peaceful power transition in history. Japan and the imperative,given Britain's need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 4new america foundation page 4 actions. Addresses were received by the government from numerous political associations in support of Anglo￾American friendship.”7 The same was true of the media and public in the United States. One diplomat in Washington observed that “unanimous, or almost unanimous support for England is now manifested by the Press throughout the length and breadth of the country . . . pass[ing] the bound of moderation in as great degree as the dislike and distrust of yesterday.”8 A shared sense of cultural commonality played an important role in consolidating rapprochement. Indeed, a “cult of Anglo-Saxonism” was emerging in both Britain and the United States by the turn of the century. British elites regularly spoke of a “common kinship of race” and “ties of blood,” and began referring to the prospect of war with the United States as a “civil war” or “fratricidal strife.”9 On the other side of the Atlantic, Richard Olney, who had served as secretary of state under President William McKinley, referred to Britain as America’s “best friend” and noted “the close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.”10 These shifts in public discourse helped transform the identities of opposition which had fueled antagonism into the identities of friendship which consolidated rapprochement. By 1901, Britain had removed the United States from the two-power standard, effectively acknowledging that the Royal Navy was no longer contemplating operations against the United States. The last contingent of British regulars left Canada in 1906. By the early 1900s, the U.S. General Staff concluded that war with Britain was “the least of all possible conflicts.”11 It would not be until the 1940s that Britain and the United States fashioned the “special relationship” of today. But rapprochement between 1985 and 1906 laid the foundation for strategic partnership – and made possible the first peaceful power transition in history. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1923 At the same time that the rise of the United States challenged British interests in the Western Hemisphere, the expansion of the Japanese fleet threatened Britain’s naval position in the Pacific. As in the Atlantic, Britain turned to diplomacy to address its emerging naval deficiencies in the Pacific. It concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902, which lasted until 1923. During the bulk of these two decades, the alliance proved to be a vital tool for preserving cooperative relations between the two powers and for coordinating naval operations against shared threats. After World War I, however, the alliance frayed. Whereas cooperation between Britain and the United States only deepened over time, Britain and Japan drifted apart in the interwar era. The two powers were allies in World War I, but direct adversaries in World War II. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in 1902 neutralized the threat that the growing Japanese fleet posed to British interests in the Far East and provided the Royal Navy, in combination with the Japanese fleet, sufficient strength to retain superiority over Russia and France, allies since 1892. In return, Japan earned British protection of its home islands and London’s ostensible backing of Japan’s territorial ambitions on the Korean peninsula, which had been fueled by Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1984-1895. London pressed Tokyo to extend the pact to include the Malay peninsula and the Indian Ocean, but Japanese leaders insisted on restricting the alliance to northeast Asia. Amid Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was broadened. Tokyo agreed to accede to London’s request to extend the pact to include India, while London acquiesced to Tokyo’s de facto occupation of Korea. The alliance was again revised and extended in 1911, with Japan effectively winning Britain’s acceptance of its annexation of Korea in 1910. Britain was motivated primarily by its desire to maintain influence over Japan and the imperative, given Britain’s need to concentrate its naval strength against the rising German