The Power of the Multitude state capture.As Somin and others correctly observe tors in the first place-perhaps by separating commer- constraining and decentralizing political power can of- cial and investment banking,for instance,or breaking ten make capture more difficult or less consequential. up structurally important firms.In combination with Meanwhile,there is much to be said for democratic em- non-electoral modes of democratic oversight,Rahman powerment through“exit”rather than“voice'”(War claims.this will allow us to minimize capture within ren 2011).As these examples show,however,limiting the regulatory state while retaining crucial capacities state power can also serve to enable dangerous forms of for prophylactic action against concentrated private elite entrenchment.In particular,when popular efforts power. to counteract social and economic inequalities are rou- My aim in this section,of course,has not been to tinely foiled by privileged classes using tools like judi- defend any particular configuration of "offensive"and cial review,federalism,and local governance,their abil- "defensive"strategies for resisting state capture-such ity to prevent centralized redistribution certainly looks as that proposed by Rahman-but simply to show that suspiciously like arbitrary control of the state. some such balancing act is necessary.Discretionary Regardless of whether we extend the concept of state power may be dangerous,but so are many of "state capture"to this kind of obstruction,moreover, the limitations often proposed as solutions.As a re- the increasing concentration of private power it en- sult,some gambles will inevitably be lost.Some ex- ables will often be used to perpetrate capture in even pansions of state prerogative intended to curb concen- more straightforward ways.As the social and economic trated economic power,for example,may ultimately power of privileged classes,interest groups,corpora- strengthen the oligarchs'position.But surrendering the tions,and individuals continues to grow,their political ability to take such prophylactic action is both unnec- clout will inevitably expand as well.Once they become essary and ultimately counterproductive.Though some powerful enough,no well-intentioned constraints will constraint and decentralization is advisable,it can- effectively prevent them from using the state to im- not represent a general solution to entrenchment and plement what Lindsey and Teles(2017)call "upward capture redistribution."If a state's commitment to strict limits on its discretionary power prevents it from resisting the rise of such actors,therefore.this commitment will ul timately prove self-undermining.6 To stipulate other- CONCLUSION:AN APPROPRIATELY ENTHUSIASTIC APPRAISAL OF wise is to engage in the sort of wishful thinking charac- teristic of central planners who assume incorruptible ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY state agents,or meritocrats who rely on moral educa- Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over tion to sustain independent power centers. the wisdom of the multitude.As epistemic critics draw- As a result,a state seeking to resist capture must ing on a wealth of empirical evidence have cast doubt not only"play defense"by means of self-imposed lim- on the political competence of ordinary citizens,epis- its on their discretionary power,which can enable temic democrats have offered a defense of democracy rampant concentration of social and economic power, grounded largely in analogies and formal results.In my in turn creating private actors and privileged classes view,the critics have been far more convincing.Never- with dangerous capacities to perpetrate capture.17 In theless,I believe that electoral democracy can be de- addition,it must go on the offensive,undermining fended on instrumental grounds and,in this article,I these threats before they become impossible to re- have demonstrated an alternative approach.Instead of sist.A state that merely refrains from perpetuating championing the peerless wisdom of average voters,I oligarchy or racism-without proactively combating have shown that competitive elections,universal suf- these systemic forces-will become their instrument frage,and discretionary state power all disable potent eventually. mechanisms of elite entrenchment.Though the insti- What might constitute an appropriate balance be- tutions of electoral democracy do not grant the demos tween offensive and defensive strategies?Drawing on ultimate sovereignty,they do reserve particular forms Progressive-era thinkers like Louis Brandeis,Sabeel of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens.thus Rahman (2016)outlines a promising approach that making democratic states more resistant to dangerous avoids the pitfalls of both“laissez-faire”and“man forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives agerialist"solutions,applying it to the important ques- The most important function of competitive elec- tion of financial regulation.Rather than letting mar- tions,first of all,is not to enable popular authorization kets run riot or engaging in capture-ripe fine-tuning of of law,nor to aggregate widely dispersed information, their daily operations,he argues,"structuralist"regula- but to prevent incumbents from undermining indepen- tion would seek to eliminate the shared interests en- dent constraints on their power.Given significant un- abling financial giants to collude and capture regula- certainty about electoral outcomes and the presence of strong opposition,I have argued,democratic incum- bents are more likely to exhibit restraint than their 16 Militant democrats have long made this observation about prin- peers in non-competitive systems.So long as they must ciples such as toleration(Kirshner 2014),but few have noted that it pplitton state powerwell fear electoral defeat,more substantively,their actions will be tethered (albeit very loosely)to public opin- 士 As Tilly(2007)shows,democratization normally requires substan- tial state capacity,because weak states are far more vulnerable to ion.Though hardly realizing the classical dream of col- capture and/or subversion by powerful private interests. lective self-rule,elections provide some leverage over 901The Power of the Multitude state capture. As Somin and others correctly observe, constraining and decentralizing political power can of￾ten make capture more difficult or less consequential. Meanwhile, there is much to be said for democratic em￾powerment through “exit” rather than “voice” (War￾ren 2011). As these examples show, however, limiting state power can also serve to enable dangerous forms of elite entrenchment. In particular, when popular efforts to counteract social and economic inequalities are rou￾tinely foiled by privileged classes using tools like judi￾cial review, federalism, and local governance, their abil￾ity to prevent centralized redistribution certainly looks suspiciously like arbitrary control of the state. Regardless of whether we extend the concept of “state capture” to this kind of obstruction, moreover, the increasing concentration of private power it en￾ables will often be used to perpetrate capture in even more straightforward ways. As the social and economic power of privileged classes, interest groups, corpora￾tions, and individuals continues to grow, their political clout will inevitably expand as well. Once they become powerful enough, no well-intentioned constraints will effectively prevent them from using the state to im￾plement what Lindsey and Teles (2017) call “upward redistribution.” If a state’s commitment to strict limits on its discretionary power prevents it from resisting the rise of such actors, therefore, this commitment will ul￾timately prove self-undermining.16 To stipulate other￾wise is to engage in the sort of wishful thinking charac￾teristic of central planners who assume incorruptible state agents, or meritocrats who rely on moral educa￾tion to sustain independent power centers. As a result, a state seeking to resist capture must not only “play defense” by means of self-imposed lim￾its on their discretionary power, which can enable rampant concentration of social and economic power, in turn creating private actors and privileged classes with dangerous capacities to perpetrate capture.17 In addition, it must go on the offensive, undermining these threats before they become impossible to re￾sist. A state that merely refrains from perpetuating oligarchy or racism—without proactively combating these systemic forces—will become their instrument eventually. What might constitute an appropriate balance be￾tween offensive and defensive strategies? Drawing on Progressive-era thinkers like Louis Brandeis, Sabeel Rahman (2016) outlines a promising approach that avoids the pitfalls of both “laissez-faire” and “man￾agerialist” solutions, applying it to the important ques￾tion of financial regulation. Rather than letting mar￾kets run riot or engaging in capture-ripe fine-tuning of their daily operations, he argues, “structuralist” regula￾tion would seek to eliminate the shared interests en￾abling financial giants to collude and capture regula- 16 Militant democrats have long made this observation about prin￾ciples such as toleration (Kirshner 2014), but few have noted that it applies to limits on state power as well. 17 As Tilly (2007) shows, democratization normally requires substan￾tial state capacity, because weak states are far more vulnerable to capture and/or subversion by powerful private interests. tors in the first place—perhaps by separating commer￾cial and investment banking, for instance, or breaking up structurally important firms. In combination with non-electoral modes of democratic oversight, Rahman claims, this will allow us to minimize capture within the regulatory state while retaining crucial capacities for prophylactic action against concentrated private power. My aim in this section, of course, has not been to defend any particular configuration of “offensive” and “defensive” strategies for resisting state capture—such as that proposed by Rahman—but simply to show that some such balancing act is necessary. Discretionary state power may be dangerous, but so are many of the limitations often proposed as solutions. As a re￾sult, some gambles will inevitably be lost. Some ex￾pansions of state prerogative intended to curb concen￾trated economic power, for example, may ultimately strengthen the oligarchs’ position. But surrendering the ability to take such prophylactic action is both unnec￾essary and ultimately counterproductive. Though some constraint and decentralization is advisable, it can￾not represent a general solution to entrenchment and capture. CONCLUSION: AN APPROPRIATELY ENTHUSIASTIC APPRAISAL OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over the wisdom of the multitude. As epistemic critics draw￾ing on a wealth of empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence of ordinary citizens, epis￾temic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results. In my view, the critics have been far more convincing. Never￾theless, I believe that electoral democracy can be de￾fended on instrumental grounds and, in this article, I have demonstrated an alternative approach. Instead of championing the peerless wisdom of average voters, I have shown that competitive elections, universal suf￾frage, and discretionary state power all disable potent mechanisms of elite entrenchment. Though the insti￾tutions of electoral democracy do not grant the demos ultimate sovereignty, they do reserve particular forms of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens, thus making democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives. The most important function of competitive elec￾tions, first of all, is not to enable popular authorization of law, nor to aggregate widely dispersed information, but to prevent incumbents from undermining indepen￾dent constraints on their power. Given significant un￾certainty about electoral outcomes and the presence of strong opposition, I have argued, democratic incum￾bents are more likely to exhibit restraint than their peers in non-competitive systems. So long as they must fear electoral defeat, more substantively, their actions will be tethered (albeit very loosely) to public opin￾ion. Though hardly realizing the classical dream of col￾lective self-rule, elections provide some leverage over 901 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527