Samuel Bagg leaders.as well as non-violent means for overthrowing isters of the democratic ideal.First,I have suggested, would-be tyrants. we must proliferate non-electoral modes of account- The point of universal suffrage,similarly,is not to ability and countervailing power,like the randomly se- give individuals an equal say over collective decisions, lected oversight bodies proposed by Rahman and oth- nor to reap the elusive benefits of diversity,but ers (e.g.,Guerrero 2014).Even more importantly,we to prevent incumbents from manipulating suffrage must pursue more radical redistribution of social and restrictions to entrench their power.Though the economic power-both through maximally capture- franchise does not meaningfully empower ordinary proof centralized policies like unconditional basic in citizens as individuals,it does make politicians think come,and through decentralized organizing and action twice before ignoring the shared interests of the (e.g.,Phulwani 2016;Stout 2012).Once we take our fo- groups to which they belong.While hardly a sufficient cus off of elections as the singular site of democratic safeguard of the interests of all groups,this ensures sovereignty,I conclude,we open ourselves to a far more that all groups have some access to whatever minimal expansive ideal of democracy. leverage is provided by competitive elections.If groups sometimes use this leverage in suboptimal ways,this hardly implies that their interests would be more REFERENCES reliably protected by others. Finally,democratic states must have substantial dis- Acemoglu,Daron,and James Robinson.2012.Why Nations Fail:The cretionary power,but not because popular sovereignty Origins of Power,Prosperity,and Poverty.New York:Crown Busi- is sacred,nor because popularly elected leaders are ness Ancell,Aaron.2017."Democracy Isn't That Smart (but We Can likely to use that power especially well.Indeed Make It Smarter):On Landemore's Democratic Reason."Epis- certain limits are necessary to prevent entrench- teme14(2):161-75 ment and capture.Yet others-namely,constraints Achen,Christopher H.and Larry M.Bartels.2016.Democracy for on redistribution-may represent forms of capture Realists:Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. 4号元 Princeton:Princeton University Press. themselves.By frustrating efforts to rectify inequality Anderson,Elizabeth.2007."The Epistemology of Democracy."Epis and curtail concentrated private power,for one teme:A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):8-22. such constraints facilitate the perpetuation of social Anderson,Elizabeth.2008."An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: and economic hierarchies.These,in turn,feed back David Estlund's Democratic Authority."Episteme:A Journal of into the political system,ultimately enabling more Social Epistemology 5(1):129-39. Anderson,Elizabeth.2010.The Imperative of Integration.Princeton: active,straightforward forms of capture.Here again, Princeton University Press. frustrating dangerous elite entrenchment requires Arneson,Richard.1993."Democratic Rights at National and Work granting greater power to the multitude. place Levels."In The Idea of Democracy,eds.David Copp. What emerges from these concerns is an integrated Jean Hampton,and John Roemer.Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press.118-48. theory of electoral democracy-that is,as a limited yet Arneson,Richard.2004."Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just."In indispensable tool for resisting state capture-which Justice and Democracy:Essays for Brian Barry,eds.Keith Dowd- accurately appraises its value.On the one hand,my ing,Robert Goodin,and Carole Pateman.Cambridge:Cambridge account offers historically robust,broadly convincing University Press,40-58. reasons for unwavering support of competitive elec- Bagg.Samuel.2016."Between Critical and Normative Theory:Pre- dictive Political Theory as a Deweyan Realism."Political Research tions,universal suffrage,and discretionary state power. Quarterly 69 (2):233-44. In the face of mounting challenges on both theoreti- Bagg.Samuel.2017."What Makes a Political Theory Political?A cal and practical fronts,it thus fulfills a real need.On Comment on Waldron."Political Studies Review.https://doi.org/10. the other hand,few could mistake my account as naive 1177/1478929917704815(December18,2017). or complacent.It refuses to ignore the overwhelming Bagg.Samuel.2018a."Beyond the Search for the Subject:An Anti-Essentialist Ontology for Liberal Democracy."European empirical evidence of the epistemic deficits of ordi- Journal of Political Theory OnlineFirst.https://doi.org/10.1177 nary citizens,or downplay the extent to which many 1474885118763881(March29,2018). existing democracies are already substantially captured Bagg.Samuel 2018b."Can Deliberation Neutralise Power?"Euro. pean Journal of Political Theory 17 (3):257-79. by various elites,and thus offers a sober view of elec Beitz.Charles R.1989.Political Equality:An Essay in Democratic toral democracy's limitations.Following the evidence. Theory.Princeton:Princeton University Press. moreover,it suggests that many traditional propos- Bell,Daniel A.2015.The China Model:Political Meritocracy and the als for improving the quality of collective decisions Limits of Democracy.Princeton:Princeton University Press. within electoral democracy-including education,de- Bohman,James.2006."Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity."Episteme:A Journal of Social Epistemology liberation,and more direct popular participation-will 3(3:175-91. turn out to be less useful than democratic theorists Brennan,Jason.2016.Against Democracy.Princeton:Princeton Uni- commonly suppose. versity Press. Far from encouraging pessimism,however,the point Campbell,Angus,Philip E.Converse,Warren E.Miller,and Don of this reality check is to suggest new priorities,set- ald E.Stokes.1960.The American Voter.Chicago:University of Chicago Press. ting a more productive political agenda for those in- Caplan,Bryan.2007.The Myth of the Rational Voter:Why Democra- terested in meaningful popular empowerment.Rather cies Choose Bad Policies.Princeton:Princeton University Press. than striving to perfect electoral democracy through Christiano,Thomas.1996.The Rule of the Many:Fundamental Issues tighter correspondence between public policy and a in Democratic Theory.Boulder,CO:Westview Press. Coulthard,Glen Sean.2014.Red Skin,White Masks:Rejecting the better informed,more deliberative,more equally con- Colonial Politics of Recognition.Minneapolis:University of Min- stituted public opinion,we should emphasize other reg- nesota Press. 902Samuel Bagg leaders, as well as non-violent means for overthrowing would-be tyrants. The point of universal suffrage, similarly, is not to give individuals an equal say over collective decisions, nor to reap the elusive benefits of diversity, but to prevent incumbents from manipulating suffrage restrictions to entrench their power. Though the franchise does not meaningfully empower ordinary citizens as individuals, it does make politicians think twice before ignoring the shared interests of the groups to which they belong. While hardly a sufficient safeguard of the interests of all groups, this ensures that all groups have some access to whatever minimal leverage is provided by competitive elections. If groups sometimes use this leverage in suboptimal ways, this hardly implies that their interests would be more reliably protected by others. Finally, democratic states must have substantial dis￾cretionary power, but not because popular sovereignty is sacred, nor because popularly elected leaders are likely to use that power especially well. Indeed, certain limits are necessary to prevent entrench￾ment and capture. Yet others—namely, constraints on redistribution—may represent forms of capture themselves. By frustrating efforts to rectify inequality and curtail concentrated private power, for one, such constraints facilitate the perpetuation of social and economic hierarchies. These, in turn, feed back into the political system, ultimately enabling more active, straightforward forms of capture. Here again, frustrating dangerous elite entrenchment requires granting greater power to the multitude. What emerges from these concerns is an integrated theory of electoral democracy—that is, as a limited yet indispensable tool for resisting state capture—which accurately appraises its value. On the one hand, my account offers historically robust, broadly convincing reasons for unwavering support of competitive elec￾tions, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power. In the face of mounting challenges on both theoreti￾cal and practical fronts, it thus fulfills a real need. On the other hand, few could mistake my account as naïve or complacent. It refuses to ignore the overwhelming empirical evidence of the epistemic deficits of ordi￾nary citizens, or downplay the extent to which many existing democracies are already substantially captured by various elites, and thus offers a sober view of elec￾toral democracy’s limitations. Following the evidence, moreover, it suggests that many traditional propos￾als for improving the quality of collective decisions within electoral democracy—including education, de￾liberation, and more direct popular participation—will turn out to be less useful than democratic theorists commonly suppose. Far from encouraging pessimism, however, the point of this reality check is to suggest new priorities, set￾ting a more productive political agenda for those in￾terested in meaningful popular empowerment. Rather than striving to perfect electoral democracy through tighter correspondence between public policy and a better informed, more deliberative, more equally con￾stituted public opinion,we should emphasize other reg￾isters of the democratic ideal. First, I have suggested, we must proliferate non-electoral modes of account￾ability and countervailing power, like the randomly se￾lected oversight bodies proposed by Rahman and oth￾ers (e.g., Guerrero 2014). Even more importantly, we must pursue more radical redistribution of social and economic power—both through maximally capture￾proof centralized policies like unconditional basic in￾come, and through decentralized organizing and action (e.g., Phulwani 2016; Stout 2012). Once we take our fo￾cus off of elections as the singular site of democratic sovereignty, I conclude,we open ourselves to a far more expansive ideal of democracy. REFERENCES Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Busi￾ness. Ancell, Aaron. 2017. “Democracy Isn’t That Smart (but We Can Make It Smarter): On Landemore’s Democratic Reason.” Epis￾teme 14 (2): 161–75. Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Anderson, Elizabeth. 2007. “The Epistemology of Democracy.”Epis￾teme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1): 8–22. Anderson, Elizabeth. 2008. “An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund’s Democratic Authority.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1): 129–39. Anderson, Elizabeth. 2010. The Imperative of Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Arneson, Richard. 1993. “Democratic Rights at National and Work￾place Levels.” In The Idea of Democracy, eds. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer￾sity Press, 118–48. Arneson, Richard. 2004. “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just.” In Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry, eds. Keith Dowd￾ing, Robert Goodin, and Carole Pateman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 40–58. Bagg, Samuel. 2016. “Between Critical and Normative Theory: Pre￾dictive Political Theory as a Deweyan Realism.”Political Research Quarterly 69 (2): 233–44. Bagg, Samuel. 2017. “What Makes a Political Theory Political? A Comment on Waldron.”Political Studies Review.https://doi.org/10. 1177/1478929917704815 (December 18, 2017). Bagg, Samuel. 2018a. “Beyond the Search for the Subject: An Anti-Essentialist Ontology for Liberal Democracy.” European Journal of Political Theory OnlineFirst. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1474885118763881 (March 29, 2018). Bagg, Samuel. 2018b. “Can Deliberation Neutralise Power?” Euro￾pean Journal of Political Theory 17 (3): 257–79. Beitz, Charles R. 1989. Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bell, Daniel A. 2015. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bohman, James. 2006. “Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (3): 175–91. Brennan, Jason. 2016.Against Democracy. Princeton: Princeton Uni￾versity Press. Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Don￾ald E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democra￾cies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Christiano, Thomas. 1996.The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Coulthard, Glen Sean. 2014. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minneapolis: University of Min￾nesota Press. 902 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527