334 The China Quarterly agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.3 The issue of government personnel was more subtle,but no less intrac- table.For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic,those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims:the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office,versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings"(gan renging).If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption.Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely,some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance,and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men"was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu- larism of society in some sort of balance.0 In terms of institutions,the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage.Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men,"but clearly "good institutions"were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic,however,neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations,viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress,had been abolished in 1904-05,but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace- ment.Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modern civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern- ment,the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re- calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9.Young,The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai,pp.164-167.On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments,see S.A.M.Adshead,The Modemization of the Chinese Salt Administration,1900-1920 (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1970),pp.61-117.Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State:Rural North China,1900-42 (Stanford:Stanford University Press. 1988),pp.59-85,also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation,virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10.The relative weights of the perceived importance of"good institutions"and "good men"in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially,and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English,see Benjamin Schwartz.The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1985),pp.102-105 for a discussion of the importance of"good men."For the importance of "good institutions,"see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor,The Magistrate's Tael:Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China(Berkeley:University of California Press,1984). 11.Wolfgang Franke,The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System(Cambridge,MA:Harvard Monographs,1960)and Benjamin Elman,"Delegitimation and decanonization:the trap of civil service examination reform,1860-1910,"paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History,National Chung-shan University,Kaohsiung,Taiwan,19-21 November 1993.334 The China Quarterly agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993. agencies that were independent organizations but nominally supervised by the central government in the 1910s and 1920s.9 The issue of government personnel was more subtle, but no less intrac￾table. For centuries prior to the establishment of the Republic, those in state service in China had to strike a balance that could accommodate the inherent tensions between two sets of claims: the Confucian bureaucracy's demand that the individual in its employ be responsive to its standardized and impersonal rules and regulations while in office, versus the more enduring claims of the individual's friends and family to provide for them and "be sensitive to human feelings" (gan renqing). If left unchecked this latter set of pressures could easily lead to rampant corruption. Although real levels and subjective perceptions of corruption as a problem in the late imperial state certainly varied widely, some combination of "good institutions" through formal and bureaucratic sanctions of deviance, and normative socialization into behaviour as "good men" was the recognized way of keeping the tensions between a depersonalized bureaucracy and the particu￾larism of society in some sort of balance.10 In terms of institutions, the existence of Confucian civil service exams as the primary route into the bureaucracy cut off one obvious way of providing patronage. Years of studying the Confucian ethics may have pre-disposed individuals to be "good men," but clearly "good institutions" were also necessary to maintain an equilibrium between particularist interest and impartial law. By the early Republic, however, neither of these components obtained. The Confucian civil service examinations, viewed by progressives as hopelessly archaic and a brake on progress, had been abolished in 1904-05, but nothing convincing had been instituted as a replace￾ment.11 Although all Republican regimes repeatedly professed their desire to recruit talent through the institution of modem civil service examinations to create a technically competent and pro-active govern￾ment, the short-term pressures to provide patronage and buy off re￾calcitrant subordinates and would-be allies repeatedly stymied the 9. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 164-167. On the creation of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate and the revenues it remitted to the Beiyang governments, see S. A. M. Adshead, The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 61-117. Prasenjit Duara in Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 59-85, also suggests that the very late imperial and Republican proliferation of local tax bureaus and tankuan led to significant increases in the rate of real taxation, virtually none of which was passed up to the central government. 10. The relative weights of the perceived importance of "good institutions" and "good men" in late imperial Chinese statecraft varied substantially, and is a vast topic in its own right. For views in English, see Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 102-105 for a discussion of the importance of "good men." For the importance of "good institutions," see Madeleine Zelin's excellent study of the rationalizing fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng Emperor, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in 18th Century China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 11. Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Monographs, 1960) and Benjamin Elman, "Delegitimation and decanonization: the trap of civil service examination reform, 1860-1910," paper prepared for the First International Conference of Ch'ing Intellectual History, National Chung-shan University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 19-21 November 1993