The Evolution of Republican Government 335 re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality,however attractive they remained in principle.Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization,made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic.Clearly,in this highly unfavourable environment of frag- mented organizations,ambiguous loyalties,internal divisions,slender resources and external pressures,what the central governments of Repub- lican China needed was,in effect,an "institutional breakthrough"-some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period,there were two analytically distinct methods or"logics"by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity.The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions"for government and administration."Good"was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy,characterized by ob- jectively oriented,efficient,rule-based technocracy,with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it,and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth- ority."13 The second"logic,"which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men."In this conception,"good men"were the raw materials who would effect institu- tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends,and,where "correct"values and norms were lacking,would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs:Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen- tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of"government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive"did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s,there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12.For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough,"I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough"for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems.In contrast to"revolutionary breakthroughs,"which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic"programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society,"institutional breakthroughs"are more generic,and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones).However,both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented.See Kenneth Jowitt,Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley:University of California Press,1971),pp.94-95. 13.This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber,Economy and Sociery (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978),pp.223-26.The Evolution of Republican Government re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. re-institutionalization of norms of objectivity and impartiality, however attractive they remained in principle. Fairly consistent foreign pressure, combined with distressing levels of domestic militarization, made the operations and institutions of civil Republican government even more problematic. Clearly, in this highly unfavourable environment of frag￾mented organizations, ambiguous loyalties, internal divisions, slender resources and external pressures, what the central governments of Repub￾lican China needed was, in effect, an "institutional breakthrough" - some means by which to climb out of this morass of weakness and begin to implement a vision of centrally led institution building and development while standing up to external pressure.2 Over the course of the Republican period, there were two analytically distinct methods or "logics" by which government elites worked to build institutional capacity. The first was to try to create a new set of "good institutions" for government and administration. "Good" was now redefined to be impersonal Weberian bureaucracy, characterized by ob￾jectively oriented, efficient, rule-based technocracy, with a de facto division of labour between politicians who set policy and bureaucrats who implemented it, and a sharp legal distinction between office and office-holder as the "most rational known means of exercising auth￾ority."'3 The second "logic," which arose with the reorganization of the KMT and the expansion of revolutionary sentiment in the mid-1920s, used long-standing beliefs in the importance of "good men." In this conception, "good men" were the raw materials who would effect institu￾tional breakthroughs via a controlled mobilization whereby political leadership would arouse the pre-existing values and commitments of those below towards collective ends, and, where "correct" values and norms were lacking, would inculcate those norms. Attempting Institutional Breakthroughs: Pre-1927 Visions and Implemen￾tation of Statist Technocracy Although the full-fledged articulation of the vision of "government as statist technocracy responsive to the executive" did not occur until the emergence of a group of Kuomintang administrative reformers in the mid-1930s, there can be little doubt that in embryo very similar principles animated both the Yuan Shikai and Beiyang governments of the 1910s 12. For the idea of an "institutional breakthrough," I slightly adapt Kenneth Jowitt's concept of a "revolutionary breakthrough" for the early developmental stage of Leninist systems. In contrast to "revolutionary breakthroughs," which are highly specific to Leninist regimes attempting to consolidate and carry out a "heroic" programme of modernization through collectivization and transformation of the basic units of society, "institutional breakthroughs" are more generic, and can be directed towards any number of different ends (including socially quite conservative ones). However, both revolutionary and institutional breakthroughs are sought after by executive elites wherever institutions are weak and fragmented. See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 94-95. 13. This list of attributes is drawn from Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 223-26. 335