in general and on their daily life in particular.Social cleavages in Taiwan between the rich and poor and upper strata and lower strata have partly contributed to the strong reaction against the progress of cross-Strait economic and social exchanges,as was vividly revealed by the anti-service trade "sunflower student movement"in March 2014.In view of social cleavages in Taiwan,Beijing has put more attention to the voice of Taiwan's grassroots people and youth,who felt frustrated and relatively exploited amid the process of regional economic integration. To rebuild Chinese national identity across the Taiwan Strait,Beijing's Taiwan policy makers are informed by neo-functionalism and propose to resolve "economic and easier issues first,and political and difficult issues later."Beijing's immediate political end is to sign a peace agreement with Taipei and reach a common standing on the nature of political relations between them prior to China's reunification.The years 2013 and 2014 witnessed Beijing's greater efforts at pushing political dialogue with Taipei on these sorts of issues within the one-China framework.From Beijing's perspective,if the two sides can have political talks on the basis of one China and appropriately resolve the issue of Taiwan's participation in the international arena,it will greatly improve the state of political relations between the two sides and increase Taiwanese political identity with the Mainland. Another issue regarding national political identity is the different political institutions between the two sides.Beijing has tried to resolve this structural problem by increasing the attractiveness of the unification model for Taiwan.Whereas "one country,two systems"is the standard model decided by Deng Xiaoping and followed by successive Chinese leaders,Xi Jinping has attempted to make it acceptable to Taiwan through two measures.First,Beijing makes it clear that the Taiwan model of "one country,two systems"is different from the Hong Kong model,which is particularly important in the wake of social protests in Hong Kong against the 2017 electoral formula approved by Beijing.When meeting with Lien Chan,the honorary chairman of KMT in February 2014,Xi expressed his understanding that the Taiwanese people cherish(zhenshi)the social system and living style they had chosen for themselves.While "social system"here obviously included both economic and political systems,the word cherish suggested that these systems were good for Taiwan and therefore should be appreciated.According to Xi,the Mainland not only respects the social system and living style in Taiwan,but also wants to share the developmental opportunities in the Mainland with the Taiwanese people.21 When Yu Zhengsheng,chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultation Conference,made opening remarks at the 6th Strait Forum,he reiterated Beijing's respect for the Taiwanese social system and living style and added value and ideas to the list.22 TAO Director Zhang Zhijun repeated what Xi had told Lien Chan while meeting with Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu in June 2014.Xi's September 2014 remarks of "one country,two systems,"when meeting with several pro-unification or pro-integration delegations from Taiwan,could be interpreted from the same consideration. Second,Xi used some sentimentally appealing terms,such as "two shores,one close family" (liangan yijia qin)and "both sides effecting the Chinese dream"(gongyuan zhongguo meng)to convey the similar ideas of"both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China"and"striving for China's reunification."What he has emphasized is that the unification is a common project contributed to by people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait,and the unification can be achieved a Xi Jinping's Speech at Meeting with Lien Chexan,reported by New Chinese News Agency,February 18,2014. 2 Yu Zhengsheng.Opening Remarks at the 6h Strait Forum,China Taiwan Web,June 15,2014. 1111 in general and on their daily life in particular. Social cleavages in Taiwan between the rich and poor and upper strata and lower strata have partly contributed to the strong reaction against the progress of cross-Strait economic and social exchanges, as was vividly revealed by the anti-service trade “sunflower student movement” in March 2014. In view of social cleavages in Taiwan, Beijing has put more attention to the voice of Taiwan’s grassroots people and youth, who felt frustrated and relatively exploited amid the process of regional economic integration. To rebuild Chinese national identity across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing’s Taiwan policy makers are informed by neo-functionalism and propose to resolve “economic and easier issues first, and political and difficult issues later.” Beijing’s immediate political end is to sign a peace agreement with Taipei and reach a common standing on the nature of political relations between them prior to China’s reunification. The years 2013 and 2014 witnessed Beijing’s greater efforts at pushing political dialogue with Taipei on these sorts of issues within the one-China framework. From Beijing’s perspective, if the two sides can have political talks on the basis of one China and appropriately resolve the issue of Taiwan’s participation in the international arena, it will greatly improve the state of political relations between the two sides and increase Taiwanese political identity with the Mainland. Another issue regarding national political identity is the different political institutions between the two sides. Beijing has tried to resolve this structural problem by increasing the attractiveness of the unification model for Taiwan. Whereas “one country, two systems” is the standard model decided by Deng Xiaoping and followed by successive Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping has attempted to make it acceptable to Taiwan through two measures. First, Beijing makes it clear that the Taiwan model of “one country, two systems” is different from the Hong Kong model, which is particularly important in the wake of social protests in Hong Kong against the 2017 electoral formula approved by Beijing. When meeting with Lien Chan, the honorary chairman of KMT in February 2014, Xi expressed his understanding that the Taiwanese people cherish (zhenshi) the social system and living style they had chosen for themselves. While “social system” here obviously included both economic and political systems, the word cherish suggested that these systems were good for Taiwan and therefore should be appreciated. According to Xi, the Mainland not only respects the social system and living style in Taiwan, but also wants to share the developmental opportunities in the Mainland with the Taiwanese people.21 When Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, made opening remarks at the 6 th Strait Forum, he reiterated Beijing’s respect for the Taiwanese social system and living style and added value and ideas to the list.22 TAO Director Zhang Zhijun repeated what Xi had told Lien Chan while meeting with Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu in June 2014. Xi’s September 2014 remarks of “one country, two systems,” when meeting with several pro-unification or pro-integration delegations from Taiwan, could be interpreted from the same consideration. Second, Xi used some sentimentally appealing terms, such as “two shores, one close family” (liangan yijia qin) and “both sides effecting the Chinese dream” (gongyuan zhongguo meng) to convey the similar ideas of “both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China” and “striving for China’s reunification.” What he has emphasized is that the unification is a common project contributed to by people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the unification can be achieved 21 Xi Jinping’s Speech at Meeting with Lien Chexan, reported by New Chinese News Agency, February 18, 2014. 22 Yu Zhengsheng, Opening Remarks at the 6 th Strait Forum, China Taiwan Web, June 15, 2014