sides has been enlarged.18 Common historical memory is an important factor in shaping national identity.In recent years,mainland media and academic discourse have demonstrated the common efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)and the KMT at fighting against the Japanese invasion back in the 1930s and 1940s,as were shown in various movies,films,newspapers,journals,etc.In particular,Tengchong,a frontier in southwest China and famous battleground between Japanese troops on the one side and KMT military with US aid on the other,has become a popular meeting place for holding academic conferences with scholars from Taiwan participating,including some from the Green camp.The Mainland's intention is clearly to build up common historical memory with Taiwan,even though young Taiwanese without connection with the old KMT regime may feel that historical events in Tengchong are irrelevant to them.From the same purpose,the aboriginal Wushe Uprising against the Japanese colonial rule during 1930s was highly appreciated by the Mainland to highlight the common fate of the two sides during a miserable period of Chinese history.Indeed,Japan's brutal crackdown of the aboriginal uprising and its massacre in Nanjing occurred in the same decade across the Taiwan Strait.Historical memories,in addition to cultural similarities and ethnic equivalence,have been employed by Beijing to retrospectively consolidate the ideational framework of"a community for two-shores'shared fortune." Prospectively,economic exchanges and integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are helpful to enhance national identity.According to neo-liberal or neo-functional assumptions,economic integration will eventually lead to political accommodation and even political integration as the experience of European Union has suggested.At least,the growing functional interdependency,according to Karl Wolfgang Deutsch's concept of a "security community,"will make war too mutually costly to be feasible.Business exchanges between the two sides have evolved from an indirect format in 1980s to a direct and comprehensive way nowadays,particularly since 2008.For example,cross-trade increased from $129 billion in 2008 to $197 billion in 2013,accounting for 29.5%of Taiwan's total foreign trade.Taiwanese direct investment to the mainland approved by the island's authorities increased from $10.7 billion in 2008 to $19.8 billion in 2012.Tourists from Taiwan to the mainland increased from 4.39 million person/times in 2008 to 5.34 million in 2012,while tourists from the mainland to Taiwan jumped from less than 300,000 to 2.54 million during the same period.19 This development has created a sort of"linkage communities"(liansuo shegun)between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait,as Wei Yong pointed out one decade ago.20 During the 2012 elections in Taiwan,a number of big entrepreneurs stood out to support the KMT idea of"one China with different interpretations," which is close to Beijing's one-China principle but different from the DPP's "state-to-state" position.On the other hand,most Taiwanese people have arguably not received direct benefits from the increasing economic integration process.Despite Beijing's "benefit-offering"(rangli) policy in Strait negotiation on economic affairs,including the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement"and "Service Trade Agreement,"ordinary people in Taiwan have not too much feeling about the utilities of strait exchange on economic revival on the island sLiu Xiangping."A Study on Basic Elements of Cross-Strait Identification and Approaches to Reach the Goal" (laingan rentong zhi jiben yaosu jiqi dacheng lujing taoxi),Taiwan Yanjiu,2011,No.1,1-6. 19 Su Chi,"The General Situation and Prospects of Cross-Strait Relation during Ma Administration"[ma zhengfi shiqi liangan guanxi de gaikuang he zhanwang],in Opportunities and Challenges for Cross-Strait Relations [liangan guanxi de jiyu yu tiaozhan](Taipei:Wunan Press,2013),8. Yung Wei,Toward'Intra-National Union':Theoretical Models on Cross-Taiwan Strait Interactions," Mainland China Studies,Vol.45,No.5 (September/October 2002),23. 1010 sides has been enlarged.18 Common historical memory is an important factor in shaping national identity. In recent years, mainland media and academic discourse have demonstrated the common efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT at fighting against the Japanese invasion back in the 1930s and 1940s, as were shown in various movies, films, newspapers, journals, etc. In particular, Tengchong, a frontier in southwest China and famous battleground between Japanese troops on the one side and KMT military with US aid on the other, has become a popular meeting place for holding academic conferences with scholars from Taiwan participating, including some from the Green camp. The Mainland’s intention is clearly to build up common historical memory with Taiwan, even though young Taiwanese without connection with the old KMT regime may feel that historical events in Tengchong are irrelevant to them. From the same purpose, the aboriginal Wushe Uprising against the Japanese colonial rule during 1930s was highly appreciated by the Mainland to highlight the common fate of the two sides during a miserable period of Chinese history. Indeed, Japan’s brutal crackdown of the aboriginal uprising and its massacre in Nanjing occurred in the same decade across the Taiwan Strait. Historical memories, in addition to cultural similarities and ethnic equivalence, have been employed by Beijing to retrospectively consolidate the ideational framework of “a community for two-shores’shared fortune.” Prospectively, economic exchanges and integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are helpful to enhance national identity. According to neo-liberal or neo-functional assumptions, economic integration will eventually lead to political accommodation and even political integration as the experience of European Union has suggested. At least, the growing functional interdependency, according to Karl Wolfgang Deutsch’s concept of a “security community,” will make war too mutually costly to be feasible. Business exchanges between the two sides have evolved from an indirect format in 1980s to a direct and comprehensive way nowadays, particularly since 2008. For example, cross-trade increased from $129 billion in 2008 to $197 billion in 2013, accounting for 29.5% of Taiwan’s total foreign trade. Taiwanese direct investment to the mainland approved by the island’s authorities increased from $10.7 billion in 2008 to $19.8 billion in 2012. Tourists from Taiwan to the mainland increased from 4.39 million person/times in 2008 to 5.34 million in 2012, while tourists from the mainland to Taiwan jumped from less than 300,000 to 2.54 million during the same period.19 This development has created a sort of “linkage communities” (liansuo shequn) between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as Wei Yong pointed out one decade ago.20 During the 2012 elections in Taiwan, a number of big entrepreneurs stood out to support the KMT idea of “one China with different interpretations,” which is close to Beijing’s one-China principle but different from the DPP’s “state-to-state” position. On the other hand, most Taiwanese people have arguably not received direct benefits from the increasing economic integration process. Despite Beijing’s “benefit-offering” (rangli) policy in Strait negotiation on economic affairs, including the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement” and “Service Trade Agreement,” ordinary people in Taiwan have not too much feeling about the utilities of strait exchange on economic revival on the island 18 Liu Xiangping, “A Study on Basic Elements of Cross-Strait Identification and Approaches to Reach the Goal” (laingan rentong zhi jiben yaosu jiqi dacheng lujing taoxi), Taiwan Yanjiu, 2011, No. 1, 1-6. 19 Su Chi, “The General Situation and Prospects of Cross-Strait Relation during Ma Administration” [ma zhengfu shiqi liangan guanxi de gaikuang he zhanwang], in Opportunities and Challenges for Cross-Strait Relations [liangan guanxi de jiyu yu tiaozhan] (Taipei: Wunan Press, 2013), 8. 20 Yung Wei, “Toward ‘Intra-National Union’: Theoretical Models on Cross-Taiwan Strait Interactions,” Mainland China Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5 (September/October 2002), 23