Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe Timothy J.McKeown Can the degree of"openness"of the international system,or at least of its capitalist state members,be explained by the existence of a single wealthy, powerful,and technologically advanced state that possesses both the capability and the motivation to create and maintain an open international system?In the past decade a number of students of international politics have essentially answered "yes"to this question.They have argued that the existence of a state possessing clear superiority over its nearest rivals-the United Kingdom in much of the 19th century and the United States in much of the 20th- is a necessary and sufficient condition for such an open system to emerge. They have explained the development of low-tariff trading systems and of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 19th and 20th centuries in terms of the emergence of such"hegemonic"states.They have argued further that it is the power of these hegemonic states that leads to the emergence of open international economic systems. A hegemonic stability explanation of the existence of open regimes has obvious attractions.It is simple:openness is explained as a function of a certain distribution of capabilities among states.It is plausible:both the United Kingdom and the United States in their respective periods of preem- inence seem to fit the notion of a hegemonic state,both seem to have wanted an open system,both seem to have acted-at least at certain times-to create such a system,and a relatively open system did in fact emerge during the periods of their preeminence.It is also"political":it explains the configuration of the international economic system in terms of "power"rather than in terms of rational exchange. Perhaps for these reasons hegemonic stability theory has attracted an im- pressive assemblage of adherents.Mainstream economists and political sci- This article is based on the author's dissertation,"The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century,"Stanford University,1982.I would like to thank Robert Keohane,David Sylvan,and two anonymous referees for their comments. International Organization 37,1,Winter 1983 0020-8183/83/010073-18 $1.50 C 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation-- - - Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe Timothy J. McKeown Can the degree of "openness" of the international system, or at least of its capitalist state members, be explained by the existence of a single wealthy, powerful, and technologically advanced state that possesses both the capability and the motivation to create and maintain an open international system? In the past decade a number of students of international politics have essentially answered "yes" to this question. They have argued that the existence of a state possessing clear superiority over its nearest rivals- the United Kingdom in much of the 19th century and the United States in much of the 20th￾is a necessary and sufficient condition for such an open system to emerge. They have explained the development of low-tariff trading systems and of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 19th and 20th centuries in terms of the emergence of such "hegemonic" states. They have argued further that it is the power of these hegemonic states that leads to the emergence of open international economic systems. A hegemonic stability explanation of the existence of open regimes has obvious attractions. It is simple: openness is explained as a function of a certain distribution of capabilities among states. It is plausible: both the United Kingdom and the United States in their respective periods of preem￾inence seem to fit the notion of a hegemonic state, both seem to have wanted an open system, both seem to have acted-at least at certain times-to create such a system, and a relatively open system did in fact emerge during the periods of their preeminence. It is also "political": it explains the configuration of the international economic system in terms of "power" rather than in terms of rational exchange. Perhaps for these reasons hegemonic stability theory has attracted an im￾pressive assemblage of adherents. Mainstream economists and political sci￾This article is based on the author's dissertation, "The Rise and Decline of the Open Trading Regime of the Nineteenth Century," Stanford University, 1982. I would like to thank Robert Keohane, David Sylvan, and two anonymous referees for their comments. International Organization 37, 1, Winter 1983 0020-8 183/83/0 10073- 18 $1 .SO O 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation