74 International Organization entists,and less orthodox scholars,have all embraced some form of the theory.'Given the diversity of intellectual and political commitments among these people,such a degree of consensus is quite remarkable.Unfortunately, it is also quite premature.Important conceptual and empirical difficulties have not been addressed,and alternative explanations for open regimes have received scant attention. 1.Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels Hegemonic stability theorists agree that the hegemonic state has both the motivation and the capability to create and maintain open regimes.(Indeed, since theorists do not posit any other method by which these regimes can be created and maintained,the existence of the hegemonic state is both sufficient and necessary for open regimes to exist.)The hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats.Those who emphasize bribery tend to treat open regimes as collective goods.They discuss the hegemonic state in terms reminiscent of Frohlich,Oppenheimer,and Young's discussion of the role of entrepreneurship in the creation of such goods,and worry about the cost to the hegemonic state of all those side-payments.2 Those who emphasize coercion worry less about benefits to other members of the system and more about the benefits flowing to the hegemonic state.3 In either case,it is argued, the hegemonic state has the resources to invest in creating and maintaining compliance with the regime in the face of member states'constant temptations to defect and take a“free ride.” In addition to the capability to create an open regime,the hegemonic state must possess a motivation for doing so.The motivation generally implied (if not actually cited)is that the decision makers of the hegemonic state expect that the open regime,while perhaps conferring benefits on all states, will confer special benefits on the hegemonic power.Its superior capabilities- in producing commodities efficiently,in financing and transporting these commodities,and in protecting these activities with military force,if nec- 1.C.P.Kindleberger,The World in Depression (Boston:Little,Brown,1973);R.Gilpin, U.S.Power and the Multinational Corporation:The Political Economy of Foreign Direct In- vestment (New York:Basic Books,1975);S.D.Krasner,"State Power and the Structure of International Trade,"World Politics 28 (1976),pp.317-47;R.O.Keohane and J.S.Nye, Power and Interdependence:World Politics in Transition (Boston:Little,Brown,1977);H. Magdoff,The Age of Imperialism (New York:Monthly Review Press,1969);A.MacEwan, "The Development of the Crisis in the World Economy,"in B.Steinberg et al.,eds.,U.S. Capitalism in Crisis (New York:Union for Radical Political Economics,1978);I.Wallerstein, The Modern World System,vol.2:Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World- Economy,1600-1750 (New York:Academic Press,1980). 2.Kindleberger,World in Depression;M.v.N.Whitman,"Leadership without Hegemony," Foreign Policy no.20 (1975),pp.138-64;N.Frohlich,J.A.Oppenheimer,and O.Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1971). 3.See the works by Krasner,Magdoff,and MacEwan cited in note I above.74 International Organization entists, and less orthodox scholars, have all embraced some form of the theory.' Given the diversity of intellectual and political commitments among these people, such a degree of consensus is quite remarkable. Unfortunately, it is also quite premature. Important conceptual and empirical difficulties have not been addressed, and alternative explanations for open regimes have received scant attention. 1. Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels Hegemonic stability theorists agree that the hegemonic state has both the motivation and the capability to create and maintain open regimes. (Indeed, since theorists do not posit any other method by which these regimes can be created and maintained, the existence of the hegemonic state is both sufficient and necessary for open regimes to exist.) The hegemonic state is able to offer both bribes and threats. Those who emphasize bribery tend to treat open regimes as collective goods. They discuss the hegemonic state in terms reminiscent of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young's discussion of the role of entrepreneurship in the creation of such goods, and worry about the cost to the hegemonic state of all those side- payment^.^ Those who emphasize coercion worry less about benefits to other members of the system and more about the benefits flowing to the hegemonic state.3 In either case, it is argued, the hegemonic state has the resources to invest in creating and maintaining compliance with the regime in the face of member states' constant temptations to defect and take a "free ride." In addition to the capability to create an open regime, the hegemonic state must possess a motivation for doing so. The motivation generally implied (if not actually cited) is that the decision makers of the hegemonic state expect that the open regime, while perhaps conferring benefits on all states, will confer special benefits on the hegemonic power. Its superior capabilities￾in producing commodities efficiently, in financing and transporting these commodities, and in protecting these activities with military force, if nec- 1. C. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); R. Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct In￾vestment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); S. D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (1976), pp. 31747; R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); A. MacEwan, "The Development of the Crisis in the World Economy," in B. Steinberg et al., eds., U.S. Capitalism in Crisis (New York: Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978); I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World￾Economy, 1600-1 750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 2. Kindleberger, World in Depression; M. v. N. Whitman, "Leadership without Hegemony," Foreign Policy no. 20 (1975), pp. 138-64; N. Frohlich, J. A. Oppenheimer, and 0.Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 197 1). 3. See the works by Krasner, Magdoff, and MacEwan cited in note 1 above