Exit,Voice,and Public Reason perhaps more so than public deliberation.based on the (3)Hirschman (1969,43)argued,"The presence of differing incentives for rational reflection for voice and the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the exit. development of the art of voice."So one danger of ap- Federal structures should therefore prove critical for pealing to exit is that exit will make voice less effective. matching the legal order to what is publicly justified.In Institutions will have fewer incentives to change if their many cases,there is simply too much diversity at the most articulate and committed citizens exit the polity. national level to solve political problems,or to hope Institutions will rot as their quality degrades.However that deliberation will yield agreement.Effective solu- we must balance the benefits of developed voice with tions to these pressing issues might be unjustifiable at the potential benefits of developed exit.The fact that the national level.but could be solved at lower levels of exit mechanisms may decrease the art and exercise government,where there is less diversity and disagree- of voice is a cost,but if exit mechanisms more than ment.This is because states and provinces often have compensate for this cost,then expanding exit is still more unified political cultures and so can be expected worthwhile.And exit might surprise us by encourag- to come to consensus,or something near enough,when ing majorities to listen to exiting minorities,as well as a national government cannot.Federations thereby inspiring emigres to participate in deliberation given become appropriate when a political decision is nec- their greater satisfaction with their new political unit. essary but where no solution can be justified at the (4)Competition between political units may create a national level.Second.as noted.federations can incen race to the bottom,with polities changing laws and poli- tivize good deliberation and reasoned decision-making cies in ways that make the laws and policies less justi- since people will sometimes make more rational exit- fied for their members,especially those who lack the re- decisions than voice-decisions sources to leave their political orders.These issues also arise in economic competition between nation-states (Dietsch 2015).A race to the bottom is a real risk.but OBJECTIONS TO FEDERATIVE it has to be weighed against the hope of a race to the 4号 DECENTRALIZATION top.Exit can trigger a reduction in justified policies,but I will now address six objections to using federations in it can also trigger an increase in justified policies. public reason. The race to the bottom might beat the race to the top & (1)In the United States,the language of states' because richer and more influential citizens are more rights has often served to legitimize the mistreatment able to exercise exit,and so polities will offer policies of black Americans,so American federalism might be that favor these citizens over poorer,less influential a bad idea.Of course,historical injustices against black citizens.But.first.rich and influential citizens don't al- Americans will not demonstrate the inadequacy of fed- ways or even usually vote purely in their self-interest. eralism in states without this legacy.But,even in Amer- Many favor egalitarian and progressive policies,and ica,worries about discrimination at more local levels their sense of justice will still operate in a world with only provide reason to avoid decentralization on racial more exit than we currently have.Second,the poor can policy and related issues,perhaps such as higher educa- still exit,even if exit is sometimes expensive,and states tion,health care,pensions,real estate,civil rights,and can adopt policies that reduce exit costs for the poor, so on.Unconnected issues can still have a federalist say by providing moving incentives to poor citizens of solution. other polities,like health-insurance portability or re- (2)Federations raise a minority-within-a-minority location vouchers.So polities may often feel competi- problem.3 Were the US federal government to hand tion to become more social democratic rather than less. 平 decisions down to Texas.liberal cities like Austin would Third,the overwhelming majority of global migrants find policy less to their liking,and Illinois outside of are from the poorest and most vulnerable groups,and Chicago might find public policy skews further left so have a strong incentive to use exit rights,whereas than they find acceptable.Federation-style decentral- wealthier people face a weaker incentive to take the ization can therefore undermine public justification if costly step of exiting their political institutions.Fourth, it produces regimes that establish public justification even our exit-limited democracy must grapple with po- for a smaller proportion of persons than the proportion litically powerful citizens misusing their influence,so found in the larger governing body.We can sometimes the difference between exit-friendly democracy and address the minority-within-a-minority problem with exit-limited democracy is only a matter of degree. further decentralization.Work on polycentric legal (5)Citizens might only exit (i)if local units have arrangements (Jacobs 1992:Ostrom 1990)shows that distinct policies,(ii)some policies better match what decentralized social institutions can often produce effi- is publicly justified for them,and(ii)citizens can de- cient solutions to social problems.4 Local groups some- termine whether (i)and (ii)hold.Conditions (i)-(iii) times provide creative,novel solutions to these prob- are hard to meet,perhaps limiting the attraction of exit. ems as well. But federalist policy markets should yield preemptive policy changes so long as the marginal emigre is pre- pared to exit.Local units may respond by advertising 3 Thomas Christiano(2010,288-99)addresses a similar minority- and offering new policies and helping citizens relocate, within-a-minority problem much as firms respond to the marginal buyer.Also,sim- 4 Brian Kogelmann (2017)links public reason to polycentric ar- ilar difficulties hamper deliberation,but this is a reason rangements. to encourage voice,not limit it.The same goes for exit. 1123Exit, Voice, and Public Reason perhaps more so than public deliberation, based on the differing incentives for rational reflection for voice and exit. Federal structures should therefore prove critical for matching the legal order to what is publicly justified. In many cases, there is simply too much diversity at the national level to solve political problems, or to hope that deliberation will yield agreement. Effective solu￾tions to these pressing issues might be unjustifiable at the national level, but could be solved at lower levels of government, where there is less diversity and disagree￾ment. This is because states and provinces often have more unified political cultures and so can be expected to come to consensus, or something near enough, when a national government cannot. Federations thereby become appropriate when a political decision is nec￾essary but where no solution can be justified at the national level. Second, as noted, federations can incen￾tivize good deliberation and reasoned decision-making since people will sometimes make more rational exit￾decisions than voice-decisions. OBJECTIONS TO FEDERATIVE DECENTRALIZATION I will now address six objections to using federations in public reason. (1) In the United States, the language of states’ rights has often served to legitimize the mistreatment of black Americans, so American federalism might be a bad idea. Of course, historical injustices against black Americans will not demonstrate the inadequacy of fed￾eralism in states without this legacy. But, even in Amer￾ica, worries about discrimination at more local levels only provide reason to avoid decentralization on racial policy and related issues, perhaps such as higher educa￾tion, health care, pensions, real estate, civil rights, and so on. Unconnected issues can still have a federalist solution. (2) Federations raise a minority-within-a-minority problem.3 Were the US federal government to hand decisions down to Texas,liberal cities like Austin would find policy less to their liking, and Illinois outside of Chicago might find public policy skews further left than they find acceptable. Federation-style decentral￾ization can therefore undermine public justification if it produces regimes that establish public justification for a smaller proportion of persons than the proportion found in the larger governing body. We can sometimes address the minority-within-a-minority problem with further decentralization. Work on polycentric legal arrangements (Jacobs 1992; Ostrom 1990) shows that decentralized social institutions can often produce effi￾cient solutions to social problems.4 Local groups some￾times provide creative, novel solutions to these prob￾lems as well. 3 Thomas Christiano (2010, 288-99) addresses a similar minority￾within-a-minority problem. 4 Brian Kogelmann (2017) links public reason to polycentric ar￾rangements. (3) Hirschman (1969, 43) argued, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice.” So one danger of ap￾pealing to exit is that exit will make voice less effective. Institutions will have fewer incentives to change if their most articulate and committed citizens exit the polity. Institutions will rot as their quality degrades. However, we must balance the benefits of developed voice with the potential benefits of developed exit. The fact that exit mechanisms may decrease the art and exercise of voice is a cost, but if exit mechanisms more than compensate for this cost, then expanding exit is still worthwhile. And exit might surprise us by encourag￾ing majorities to listen to exiting minorities, as well as inspiring émigrés to participate in deliberation given their greater satisfaction with their new political unit. (4) Competition between political units may create a race to the bottom,with polities changing laws and poli￾cies in ways that make the laws and policies less justi￾fied for their members, especially those who lack the re￾sources to leave their political orders. These issues also arise in economic competition between nation-states (Dietsch 2015). A race to the bottom is a real risk, but it has to be weighed against the hope of a race to the top. Exit can trigger a reduction in justified policies, but it can also trigger an increase in justified policies. The race to the bottom might beat the race to the top because richer and more influential citizens are more able to exercise exit, and so polities will offer policies that favor these citizens over poorer, less influential citizens. But, first, rich and influential citizens don’t al￾ways or even usually vote purely in their self-interest. Many favor egalitarian and progressive policies, and their sense of justice will still operate in a world with more exit than we currently have. Second, the poor can still exit, even if exit is sometimes expensive, and states can adopt policies that reduce exit costs for the poor, say by providing moving incentives to poor citizens of other polities, like health-insurance portability or re￾location vouchers. So polities may often feel competi￾tion to become more social democratic rather than less. Third, the overwhelming majority of global migrants are from the poorest and most vulnerable groups, and so have a strong incentive to use exit rights, whereas wealthier people face a weaker incentive to take the costly step of exiting their political institutions. Fourth, even our exit-limited democracy must grapple with po￾litically powerful citizens misusing their influence, so the difference between exit-friendly democracy and exit-limited democracy is only a matter of degree. (5) Citizens might only exit (i) if local units have distinct policies, (ii) some policies better match what is publicly justified for them, and (iii) citizens can de￾termine whether (i) and (ii) hold. Conditions (i)–(iii) are hard to meet, perhaps limiting the attraction of exit. But federalist policy markets should yield preemptive policy changes so long as the marginal émigré is pre￾pared to exit. Local units may respond by advertising and offering new policies and helping citizens relocate, much as firms respond to the marginal buyer.Also, sim￾ilar difficulties hamper deliberation, but this is a reason to encourage voice, not limit it. The same goes for exit. 1123 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539