Kevin Vallier (6)Exit mechanisms may vary in their capacity to Cohen,Joshua.1989."Deliberation and Democratic Legiti- satisfy different conceptions of justificatory reasons. macy."In The Good Polity:Normative Analysis of the State, One could argue,for instance,that exit will encourage a eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit.Oxford:Blackwell,17- person to find laws that conform to her private,conver- 34. Dietsch,Peter.2015.Catching Capital:The Ethics of Tax Competition. gent reasons,but not to the reasons she shares with oth- New York:Oxford University Press. ers.Citizens are,after all,more likely to make personal Downs,Anthony.1957.An Economic Theory of Democracy.New decisions about where to live based on private factors. York:Harper. including comprehensive reasons,whereas in demo- Follesdal,Andreas.2014.Federalism.Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy.Accessed on August 1.2018.http://plato.stanford.edu cratic deliberation they may be more likely to express entries/federalism. themselves in terms of shared reasons.So exit could be Gaus,Gerald.2011.The Order of Public Reason.New York:Cam- friendly to convergence approaches to public justifica- bridge University Press. tion,but hostile to the dominant consensus approaches. Gutmann,Amy.and Dennis Thompson.1996.Democracy and Dis- Even so,the consensus model might also be bolstered agreement.Cambridge,MA:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. by exit.If people self-sort into polities where others Hirschman,Albert.1969.Exit,Voice,and Loyalty.Cambridge,MA share their values,the polity will have more shared rea- Harvard University Press. sons,and so using shared reasons in politics will be eas- Jacobs,Jane.1992.The Death and Life of Great American Cities.New York:Random House. ier and less burdensome.That means consensus politics Kogelmann,Brian.2017."Justice,Diversity,and the Well-Ordered may actually be improved,since each federal unit will Society."Philosophical Ouarterly 67,663-84. track the consensus standard more closely for their cit- Oates,Wallace.1999.An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.Journal of Eco- izens,even if there is more variation between federal nomic Literature 37,1120-49. units.For this reason,I do not think the case for exit Ostrom,Elinor.1990.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of In- stitutions for Collective Action.Cambridge:Cambridge University mechanisms depends on adopting a particular concep- Press. tion of justificatory reasons. Quong.Jonathan.2011.Liberalism without Perfection.New York Oxford University Press. Rawls,John.2005.Political Liberalism.2nd ed.New York:Columbia CONCLUSION University Press. Schwartzman,M.2011."The Sincerity of Public Reason."Journal of Exit mechanisms like federalism can supplement voice Political Philosophy 19,375-98. in creating a publicly justified legal order and so de- Somin,Ilya.2016.Democracy and Political Ignorance:Why Smaller serve the enthusiasm that public reason liberals place Government Is Smarter(2nd edition).Palo Alto:Stanford Univer- sity Press. in public deliberation.We should eagerly explore mul- Taylor,Robert.2017.Exit Left:Markets and Mobility in Republican tiple methods of establishing a publicly justified polity. Thought.New York:Oxford University Press. Tiebout.,Charles.1956."A Pure Theory of Legal Expenditures."Jour- nal of Political Economy 64,416-24. REFERENCES Vallier,Kevin.2014.Liberal Politics and Public Faith:Beyond Sepa- ration.New York.Routledge. Vallier,Kevin.2018.Public Justification.Stanford Encyclopedia of Bohman,James,and William Rehg,eds.1998.Deliberative Democ- Philosophy.Accessed on August 1,2018.http://plato.stanford.edu/ racy:Essays on Reason and Politics.New York:MIT Press. entries/justification-public/. Christiano,Thomas.2010.The Constitution of Equality:Democratic Watts,Ronald.1998."Federalism,Federal Political Systems,and Fed- Authority and Its Limits.New York:Oxford University Press. erations."Annual Review of Political Science 1,117-37 1124Kevin Vallier (6) Exit mechanisms may vary in their capacity to satisfy different conceptions of justificatory reasons. One could argue, for instance, that exit will encourage a person to find laws that conform to her private, conver￾gent reasons, but not to the reasons she shares with oth￾ers. Citizens are, after all, more likely to make personal decisions about where to live based on private factors, including comprehensive reasons, whereas in demo￾cratic deliberation they may be more likely to express themselves in terms of shared reasons. So exit could be friendly to convergence approaches to public justifica￾tion, but hostile to the dominant consensus approaches. Even so, the consensus model might also be bolstered by exit. If people self-sort into polities where others share their values, the polity will have more shared rea￾sons, and so using shared reasons in politics will be eas￾ier and less burdensome.That means consensus politics may actually be improved, since each federal unit will track the consensus standard more closely for their cit￾izens, even if there is more variation between federal units. For this reason, I do not think the case for exit mechanisms depends on adopting a particular concep￾tion of justificatory reasons. CONCLUSION Exit mechanisms like federalism can supplement voice in creating a publicly justified legal order and so de￾serve the enthusiasm that public reason liberals place in public deliberation. We should eagerly explore mul￾tiple methods of establishing a publicly justified polity. REFERENCES Bohman, James, and William Rehg, eds. 1998. Deliberative Democ￾racy: Essays on Reason and Politics. New York: MIT Press. Christiano, Thomas. 2010. The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Joshua. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legiti￾macy.” In The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell, 17– 34. Dietsch,Peter. 2015.Catching Capital:The Ethics of Tax Competition. New York: Oxford University Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Føllesdal, Andreas. 2014. Federalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi￾losophy. Accessed on August 1, 2018. http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/federalism. Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason. New York: Cam￾bridge University Press. Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Dis￾agreement. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hirschman, Albert. 1969. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jacobs, Jane. 1992.The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House. Kogelmann, Brian. 2017. “Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society.” Philosophical Quarterly 67, 663–84. Oates,Wallace. 1999. An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Eco￾nomic Literature 37, 1120–49. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of In￾stitutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quong, Jonathan. 2011. Liberalism without Perfection. New York: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 2005. Political Liberalism. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Schwartzman, M. 2011. “The Sincerity of Public Reason.” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, 375–98. Somin, Ilya. 2016. Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter (2nd edition). Palo Alto: Stanford Univer￾sity Press. Taylor, Robert. 2017. Exit Left: Markets and Mobility in Republican Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Tiebout, Charles. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Legal Expenditures.”Jour￾nal of Political Economy 64, 416–24. Vallier, Kevin. 2014. Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Sepa￾ration. New York. Routledge. Vallier, Kevin. 2018. Public Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed on August 1, 2018. http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/justification-public/. Watts, Ronald. 1998. “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Fed￾erations.” Annual Review of Political Science 1, 117–37. 1124 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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