Virtues and the Ethical Social Worker world we see, "as Meilaender (1984, p. 11)puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle(2002)warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experi- ence. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or prac ical wisdom (phronesis), which develops only with maturity and cannot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or"ethical issues, "and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved Virtue ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last half- century of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos(a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of char- acter)and the virtues that are necessar for flourishing and well-being or happiness(eudaimonia) of individuals and com munities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm disposi- tions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judg ment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage(fortitude), moderation(temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or"hinge"virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. a virtue in this sense is a character trait--that is, a disposition that in volves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one s seat belt in a car However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single(even conscious or rational)tendencyVirtues and the Ethical Social Worker 87 world we see," as Meilaender (1984, p. 11) puts it. The ability to apply a decision procedure, as Aristotle (2002) warned in different terms, thus presupposes moral education and experi￾ence. It requires, in particular, the virtue of prudence or prac￾tical wisdom {phronesis), which develops orily with maturity and carmot be acquired at one's mother's knee or by a clever fifteen-year-old. The decision-procedure approach to professional ethics orients the teaching of values and ethics to the identification of quandaries or "ethical issues," and to applying consistent, rational decision procedures to their resolution. It addresses itself, then, to individual decisions, without attention to pattern and continuity of character, or to the stable dispositions of the actor that make for virtuous professional conduct as a matter of conscious habit and will, whether or not a particular ethical quandary or dilemma is involved. Virtue Ethics Considerations like these led to a revival over the last half￾century of the classical tradition of ethics that extends in the West from the Greek world of Aristotle to the high Middle Ages of Aquinas. This tradition understands ethics as about ethos (a Greek word for habit leaning toward the sense of char￾acter) and the virtues that are necessary for flourishing and well-being or happiness {eudaimonia) of individuals and com￾munities. Virtues in this context are stable and firm disposi￾tions to do the good, to act, for example, with practical judg￾ment or wisdom (prudence, phronesis), courage (fortitude), moderafion (temperance), and justice. These are the cardinal or "hinge" virtues shared by ancient Greeks and Romans and integrated into the Christian ethical tradition as part of a list that added the grace-dependent or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. They are habits of the heart and mind. A virtue in this sense is a character trait—that is, a disposition that in￾volves the will and is part of the stable core of the human being in question, as distinct from an automatic habit like fastening one's seat belt in a car. However, such a disposition, like courage or wisdom, is not an isolated or single (even conscious or rational) tendency