Journal of Sociology Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures ahighlyinfluentialarticleon"Modern Moral Philosophy, Anscombe(1958)argued that the "law conception of ethics was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawin on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill,s Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontol- ogy(or duty-based ethics)and Mills utilitarianism is an un- helpfully inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral"musts"and shoulds"of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoret ical justification. At the same time, Kupperman( 1991)argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness--understood as pleasure--to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse(Anscombe, 1958) With their focus on making decisions about how to act y applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the de- cision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individuals life(see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg,& Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a rogram for deciding moral questions(Kupperman, 1991).But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sen- sitivity, training, and experience-in short, on their character Traits of character not only suit us for life, " but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what86 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Limitations of Decision Procedures In a highly influential article on "Modern Moral Philosophy, " Anscombe (1958) argued that the "law conception of ethics" was focused overwhelmingly on obligation and duty, drawing on abstract, universally applicable principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative or Mill's Greatest Happiness principle, to serve as a test for maxims. The result of both Kant's deontol￾ogy (or duty-based ethics) and Mill's utilitarianism is an im￾helpfuUy inflexible moral code and, in Kant's case, a concept of law and obligation that was meaningless in the absence of an authoritative lawgiver. The force of those moral "musts" and "shoulds" of deontology were unexplained and lacked theoret￾ical justification. At the same time, Kupperman (1991) argues, the resulting emphasis on decision procedures is indeterminate in the results it yields. For example, does Kant's deontology universally rule out suicide, lying, or theft? Utilitarianism, in its reliance on the maximization of happiness—understood as pleasure—to judge an action or rule of action, seems to make it possible to justify the most monstrous acts, such as torture of detainees or murder of children, if one reasonably calculates that the expected consequence of not doing those acts is likely to be worse (Anscombe, 1958). With their focus on making decisions about how to act by applying universal principles, decision trees typically (though not always) neglect the decision-maker and the de￾cision-maker's character, culture, history, and all that shapes the person who is to make the decision, as well as how the particular decision relates to other decisions in the individual's life (see, for example, the discussion of guidelines for ethical decision making in social work in Dolgoff, Loewenberg, & Harrington, 2008). It is as if each of us were a computer with a program for deciding moral questions (Kupperman, 1991). But determining what inputs from the environment are relevant or salient, as an ethical decision-maker must do, is not a neutral task. How practitioners assess an ethically problematic social situation depends, in Kupperman's terms, on their moral sen￾sitivity, training, and experience—in short, on their character. Traits of character not only suit us for life, "but shape our vision of life, helping to determine not only who we are but what