The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 39 where nationalism motivates citizens to support the home government from outside interference.It can also make compliance more difficult due to "loss of face"both nationally and internationally.14 This effect can not only undercut sanctions,but can strengthen the target government by pro- viding an excuse for other failed policies.Private sanctions can also be used against states with which the sender wants to maintain essentially friendly relations over the long run.On the other hand,in some settings publicity will be an important component of the sanctions effort.Publicity makes it easier to facilitate cooperation from other states.It is also essential for sig- 景 naling-either to other states,or to provide support for opposition groups within the target state. In practice,there are several levels of publicity.There are at least four distinct audiences that a sanctioner may wish to address,or,alternately,to keep in the dark:constituencies within its own borders,the general popula- tion of the target state,elites in the target government,and third parties. There may be instances where the optimal sanction is one of which the tar- get is completely unaware.At other times,it may be crucial that central governments are able to communicate with each other without the knowl- edge of their own citizens. Since sending governments always have the option of declaring their ac- tions,the key to differentiating sanctions in this area is evaluating the extent to which each has an essential public component.At one extreme,mone- tary sanctions have the least essentially public quality,5 while trade sanc- reyuey tions tend to have the most.Given the dominance of private actors in trade,such sanctions must be legislated and made public for them to be enacted.Similar legal necessities can be found in the case of asset seizure. 6 Aid and finance fall somewhere in the middle:although most aid is legis- lated publicly,aid flows can be delayed and covert aid suspended very dis- papeol creetly.Given the close relationship between a government's monetary in- stitutions and large private banks,informal financial boycotts are at least UMOC feasible,which is not the case with trade. Variations across the dimension of robustness is a crucial determinant of when different types of sanctions will be more or less appropriate for a given situation.Robustness refers to how the power of sanctions is affected by actions taken by private actors,as well as the defenses of the target 14.See for example Baldwin,Economic Statecraf,108. 15.Monetary power can be exercised quite privately.It requires no legislation-in fact, many in the home country might not even notice what's going on.If it were so inclined,the home country would not even have to tell the target government that it was the source of their monetary trouble.The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 39 where nationalism motivates citizens to support the home government from outside interference. It can also make compliance more difficult due to "loss of face" both nationally and internationally.14 This effect can not only undercut sanctions, but can strengthen the target government by pro￾viding an excuse for other failed policies. Private sanctions can also be used against states with which the sender wants to maintain essentially friendly relations over the long run. On the other hand, in some settings publicity will be an important component of the sanctions effort. Publicity makes it easier to facilitate cooperation from other states. It is also essential for sig￾naling—either to other states, or to provide support for opposition groups within the target state. In practice, there are several levels of publicity. There are at least four distinct audiences that a sanctioner may wish to address, or, alternately, to keep in the dark: constituencies within its own borders, the general popula￾tion of the target state, elites in the target government, and third parties. There may be instances where the optimal sanction is one of which the tar￾get is completely unaware. At other times, it may be crucial that central governments are able to communicate with each other without the knowl￾edge of their own citizens. Since sending governments always have the option of declaring their ac￾tions, the key to differentiating sanctions in this area is evaluating the extent to which each has an essential public component. At one extreme, mone￾tary sanctions have the least essentially public quality,15 while trade sanc￾tions tend to have the most. Given the dominance of private actors in trade, such sanctions must be legislated and made public for them to be enacted. Similar legal necessities can be found in the case of asset seizure. Aid and finance fall somewhere in the middle: although most aid is legis￾lated publicly, aid flows can be delayed and covert aid suspended very dis￾creedy. Given the close relationship between a government's monetary in￾stitutions and large private banks, informal financial boycotts are at least feasible, which is not the case with trade. Variations across the dimension of robustness is a crucial determinant of when different types of sanctions will be more or less appropriate for a given situation. Robustness refers to how the power of sanctions is affected by actions taken by private actors, as well as the defenses of the target 14. See for example Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 108. 15. Monetary power can be exercised quite privately. It requires no legislation—in fact, many in the home country might not even notice what's going on. If it were so inclined, the home country would not even have to tell the target government that it was the source of their monetary trouble. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013