40 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 state.16 Actions taken by private actors represent the "market"response to sanctions:will the sanctions provide opportunities for profit that under- mine their intended effect?It is also logical to assume that the target will take whatever steps it can to circumvent the sanctions.Once again,the specific constellation of variables in each case will privilege some tech- niques of statecraft while impoverishing others.This can be seen with monetary sanctions.Private market forces can react to pressure on the tar- get currency by(wittingly or unwittingly)bandwagoning with or balancing against that pressure,depending on whether the depreciation is perceived as undervaluing the currency or signaling the start of a new decline.These forces will often determine whether the weight of monetary sanctions will aunf be intensified or mitigated.This will depend on a number of variables:the scale of the pressure relative to the normal trading volume of the currency, the reputation of the currency,and macroeconomic status of the target economy.Thus,some senders will find monetary sanctions highly robust while others would expect their initial effect to dissipate rapidly.7 What is 前 important is that this is not a random occurrence:particularly vulnerable(or 白 insulated)targets should be identifiable beforehand. The problem of robustness is often the weak link in trade sanctions;in fact it is often held out as the principal reason why economic sanctions do not work.This problem exists because there is profit in circumventing trade sanctions,and private networks which will divert and direct trade through third parties will spring up spontaneously owing to natural market forces.Geography and the composition of trade will be important determi- rey3ueqs] nants here:for example,it is particularly challenging to senders when highly uniform goods such as commodities are involved.18 Financial sanctions are also vulnerable to circumvention from this 合 source,because the profit motive exists in this case as well:when one agent pulls out,another will be tempted to replace him.Circumvention is not as easy as in the trade case,however,because it is harder to divide up a large loan amongst hundreds of faceless agents.Hence the private violators of sanctions are more likely to have to stand up and be counted,and therefore the potential for surveillance and control is greater. With sanctions aimed at aid and assets,there is no logical private re- sponse.Robustness here centers on the ability of the target to replace the 16.It does not include the response of other states.It was assumed above that the level of cooperation and the probability of success is positively correlated,ceteris paribus. 17.Sec Kirshner,Curengy and Coercion,chap.2,"The Viability of Monetary Power." 18.Sce,for example,Thomas D.Willet and Mehrdad Jalaighajar,"U.S.Trade Strategy and National Security,"Cato Journal3,no.3 (winter 1983/84):723-24.40 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 state.16 Actions taken by private actors represent the "market" response to sanctions: will the sanctions provide opportunities for profit that under￾mine their intended effect? It is also logical to assume that the target will take whatever steps it can to circumvent the sanctions. Once again, the specific constellation of variables in each case will privilege some tech￾niques of statecraft while impoverishing others. This can be seen with monetary sanctions. Private market forces can react to pressure on the tar￾get currency by (wittingly or unwittingly) bandwagoning with or balancing against that pressure, depending on whether the depreciation is perceived as undervaluing the currency or signaling the start of a new decline. These forces will often determine whether the weight of monetary sanctions will be intensified or mitigated. This will depend on a number of variables: the scale of the pressure relative to the normal trading volume of the currency, the reputation of the currency, and macroeconomic status of the target economy. Thus, some senders will find monetary sanctions highly robust while others would expect their initial effect to dissipate rapidly.17 What is important is that this is not a random occurrence: particularly vulnerable (or insulated) targets should be identifiable beforehand. The problem of robustness is often the weak link in trade sanctions; in fact it is often held out as the principal reason why economic sanctions do not work. This problem exists because there is profit in circumventing trade sanctions, and private networks which will divert and direct trade through third parties will spring up spontaneously owing to natural market forces. Geography and the composition of trade will be important determi￾nants here: for example, it is particularly challenging to senders when highly uniform goods such as commodities are involved.18 Financial sanctions are also vulnerable to circumvention from this source, because the profit motive exists in this case as well: when one agent pulls out, another will be tempted to replace him. Circumvention is not as easy as in the trade case, however, because it is harder to divide up a large loan amongst hundreds of faceless agents. Hence the private violators of sanctions are more likely to have to stand up and be counted, and therefore the potential for surveillance and control is greater. With sanctions aimed at aid and assets, there is no logical private re￾sponse. Robustness here centers on the ability of the target to replace the 16. It does not include the response of other states. It was assumed above that the level of cooperation and the probability of success is positively correlated, ceteris paribus. 17. See Kirshner, Currency and Coercion, chap. 2, "The Viability of Monetary Power." 18. See, for example, Thomas D. Willet and Mehrdad Jalaighajar, "U.S. Trade Strategy and National Security," Cato Journals, no. 3 (winter 1983/84): 723-24. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013