482:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces."7 Further,Nixon sent the message that if Beijing"took measures to protect its security"as a result of the situation in South Asia,the United States would "oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC."Clearly,the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian mil- itary attention away from Pakistan,by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time.Kissinger stated in his memoirs that "an active if tacit collaboration"developed.*Yet,the White House's belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December,including Nixon's order for the U.S.naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.*9 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S.offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.3 In January 1972,Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a "rehearsal"for the president's visit,and the White House tried to use Haig's brusque,military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat.For instance,Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to "encircle the PRC with unfriendly states."Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh,offer of assistance to Pakistan,increased material support for Hanoi,and Gromyko's planned visit to Japan.The United States objected to these Soviet moves because "the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest."Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself,the United States and PRC "must concert at this critical juncture."In Washing- ton's first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union,Haig told Zhou that the United States would,as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan,attempt to "neutralize"Soviet threats in the PRC's periphery,and to "deter threats against the PRC]."Specifically,the White House would-"unilaterally and without any reciprocity"-provide Beijing with U.S.strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.3 27.Kissinger's talking points for this meeting,however,suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide,as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or begin- ning of January,when,as it turned out,the crisis had already passed.See NSC,"Talking Points South Asia,"n.d.,NSA Doc.229,p.7. 28.Kissinger,Wbite House Years,9o6. 29.Ibid.,91o. 30.Haig-Huang memcon,12/12/71,Box 330,Lord Files. 31.Zhou-Haig memcon,1/3/72,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.2-4,6;NSC,"Talking Points for Haig Trip,"n.d.,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.6-7.Haig's presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented,"To worry about us,[the Americans]are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse!When [the Soviets]are in Vietnam,they want to surround Chinaligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces.”27 Further, Nixon sent the message that if Beijing “took measures to protect its security” as a result of the situation in South Asia, the United States would “oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC.” Clearly, the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian mil￾itary attention away from Pakistan, by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time. Kissinger stated in his memoirs that “an active if tacit collaboration” developed.28 Yet, the White House’s belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December, including Nixon’s order for the U.S. naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.29 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S. offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.30 In January 1972, Kissinger’s deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a “rehearsal” for the president’s visit, and the White House tried to use Haig’s brusque, military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat. For instance, Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states.” Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh, offer of assistance to Pakistan, increased material support for Hanoi, and Gromyko’s planned visit to Japan. The United States objected to these Soviet moves because “the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.” Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself, the United States and PRC “must concert at this critical juncture.” In Washing￾ton’s first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union, Haig told Zhou that the United States would, as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan, attempt to “neutralize” Soviet threats in the PRC’s periphery, and to “deter threats against the [PRC].” Specifically, the White House would—“unilaterally and without any reciprocity”—provide Beijing with U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.31 482 : diplomatic history 27. Kissinger’s talking points for this meeting, however, suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide, as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or begin￾ning of January, when, as it turned out, the crisis had already passed. See NSC, “Talking Points South Asia,” n.d., NSA Doc. 229, p. 7. 28. Kissinger, White House Years, 906. 29. Ibid., 910. 30. Haig-Huang memcon, 12/12/71, Box 330, Lord Files. 31. Zhou-Haig memcon, 1/3/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2–4, 6; NSC, “Talking Points for Haig Trip,” n.d., Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 6–7. Haig’s presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented, “To worry about us, [the Americans] are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse! When [the Soviets] are in Vietnam, they want to surround China