Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974 483 During the February 1972 summit,Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would "oppose"any attempt by the Soviets to engage in "aggressive action"against China.*The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger-along with his aides Winston Lord,Jonathan Howe,and John Holdrige-briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying,the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua,the vice minister of foreign affairs,about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border.The briefing included details about ground forces,tactical aircraft and missiles,strategic air defense systems,and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.3 Kissinger's assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger's subsequent trips to Beijing.Winston Lord,Kissinger's key aide on China,confirms that these briefings occurred,but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance;the main purpose was "to build trust,confidence,a sense of shared danger."There was also a degree of "political symbolism":according to Lord,the White House assumed that the Soviets might well "get to hear of it,"and by implication,had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable,as the full documentary record is not available.However,the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces from Indochina,and again,when they are in the subcontinent,the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent....What about Taiwan,the Philippines,and South Korea?Do all these countries need [U.S.]protection?Isn't it dangerous that China's independence and living should be protected by you?"Accordingly,Zhou took umbrage with Haig,stating that he was"surprised"that the United States seemed to be"all of a sudden express[ing]doubts over China's viability,asserting that it wants to maintain China's independence and viability." Zhou retorted that China would never rely on "external forces"to maintain its independence and viability,because this would make it"a protectorate or a colony."Gong Li,"Chinese Deci- sion Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,"in Re-examining the Cold War:US-Cbina Diplomacy,1954-1973,eds.Robert S.Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge,MA,2001), 352-53;Hong Zhaohui,"The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations,1949-1972,"in Image,Perception,and the Making of US-Cbina Relations,eds.Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham,MD,1998),358;Memcon,1//72,Box 1o37,NSE,NPM,pp.2,4. 32.Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/23/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.21.Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33.See Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/22/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.Io;Kissinger-Yeh memcon,2/23/72,Box 92,NSE,NPM.These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBBIo6/index.htm. 34.See Robert MacFarlane,Special Trust (New York,1994),149-69.MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border,they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35.Author interview with Winston Lord,3/7/o1.Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information:Anatoly Dobrynin,the Soviet ambassador in Washing- ton,told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese "a complete rundown of the 'dislocation'of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations."Kissinger denied it.See Memcon, 3/9/72,Box 493,NSF,NPM,p.3.During the February 1972 summit, Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would “oppose” any attempt by the Soviets to engage in “aggressive action” against China.32 The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger—along with his aides Winston Lord, Jonathan Howe, and John Holdrige—briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying, the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua, the vice minister of foreign affairs, about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The briefing included details about ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic air defense systems, and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.33 Kissinger’s assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger’s subsequent trips to Beijing.34 Winston Lord, Kissinger’s key aide on China, confirms that these briefings occurred, but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance; the main purpose was “to build trust, confidence, a sense of shared danger.” There was also a degree of “political symbolism”: according to Lord, the White House assumed that the Soviets might well “get to hear of it,” and by implication, had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable, as the full documentary record is not available. However, the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 483 from Indochina, and again, when they are in the subcontinent, the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent. ... What about Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea? Do all these countries need [U.S.] protection? Isn’t it dangerous that China’s independence and living should be protected by you?” Accordingly, Zhou took umbrage with Haig, stating that he was “surprised” that the United States seemed to be “all of a sudden express[ing] doubts over China’s viability, asserting that it wants to maintain China’s independence and viability.” Zhou retorted that China would never rely on “external forces” to maintain its independence and viability, because this would make it “a protectorate or a colony.” Gong Li, “Chinese Deci￾sion Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,” in Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 352–53; Hong Zhaohui, “The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations, 1949–1972,” in Image, Perception, and the Making of US-China Relations, eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham, MD, 1998), 358; Memcon, 1/7/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2, 4. 32. Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/23/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 21. Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33. See Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/22/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 10; Kissinger-Yeh memcon, 2/23/72, Box 92, NSF, NPM. These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm. 34. See Robert MacFarlane, Special Trust (New York, 1994), 149–69. MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border, they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35. Author interview with Winston Lord, 3/7/01. Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information: Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washing￾ton, told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese “a complete rundown of the ‘dislocation’ of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations.” Kissinger denied it. See Memcon, 3/9/72, Box 493, NSF, NPM, p. 3