Hegemony theory and tariff levels 77 power could successfully coerce less developed countries,isolated both geo- graphically and diplomatically from potential allies,then most students of international politics would correctly conclude that they were being offered nothing more substantial than a rather uninteresting prediction based on a standard"power"theory ofinternational outcomes.Clearly,the critical chal- lenge to the hegemonic state is to win the adherence of its important rivals to the open system;the challenge to hegemonic stability theory is to explain how the hegemonic state manages this victory. Krasner's argument relies primarily on"potential economic power"as the basis of the hegemonic state's success in securing compliance with an open trading system.In his words,military force is not likely to play much of a role in this process since it is a "not very efficient"tool for altering the economic policies of other states and is "unlikely to be employed against medium-size states"in any event.But if military force can only be used successfully against some less developed countries,then economic "power" must be the primary lever used against the larger,more important states. The difficulty here is that if the term "economic power"is to have any meaning that is not already captured by economists'notions of ability to pay and"effective demand,"it must refer to the threatened or actual delivery of negative payoffs to the policy's target.Otherwise,the discussion ofeconomic "power"essentially becomes a discussion of economic bribery:how much is the hegemonic state willing to pay others to secure their adherence to an open regime?While this may be an interesting question and while one may choose to define"power"to include the ability to distribute positive payoffs, the fact remains that equating bribery with"power"simply renames rather than explains the phenomenon. Krasner considers two examples of the use of negative economic power, one of which,the withholding of foreign aid,he chooses with the particular recent behavior of the United States in mind.The other example,competing with the target country in third-country markets,does not seem apposite inasmuch as it is firms that decide in a capitalist state where to sell com- modities.2 Do states actually threaten other states with "competition"in foreign markets?Or do they promise to blunt the competitive activities of their country's firms in those markets in order to secure concessions on tariff policy?Such events seem extremely unlikely,and Krasner provides no reason to make us believe otherwise. There is,however,a much more potent and historically relevant weapon of economic "power"available to the hegemonic state:it can threaten to cut off one nation's access to its rich home market while allowing other nations continued access to that market.Threatening to raise tariffs unless 11.bid,p.322. 12.A partial exception to this is to be found in those cases where a decision not to sell,i.e., an embargo or some form of voluntary export restraint,has been imposed by the state.Hegemony theory and tariff levels 77 power could successfully coerce less developed countries, isolated both geo￾graphically and diplomatically from potential allies, then most students of international politics would correctly conclude that they were being offered nothing more substantial than a rather uninteresting prediction based on a standard "power" theory of international outcomes. Clearly, the critical chal￾lenge to the hegemonic state is to win the adherence of its important rivals to the open system; the challenge to hegemonic stability theory is to explain how the hegemonic state manages this victory. Krasner's argument relies primarily on "potential economic power" as the basis of the hegemonic state's success in securing compliance with an open trading system. In his words, military force is not likely to play much of a role in this process since it is a "not very efficient" tool for altering the economic policies of other states and is "unlikely to be employed against medium-size states" in any event." But if military force can only be used successfully against some less developed countries, then economic "power" must be the primary lever used against the larger, more important states. The difficulty here is that if the term "economic power" is to have any meaning that is not already captured by economists' notions of ability to pay and "effective demand," it must refer to the threatened or actual delivery of negative payoffs to the policy's target. Otherwise, the discussion of economic "power" essentially becomes a discussion of economic bribery: how much is the hegemonic state willing to pay others to secure their adherence to an open regime? While this may be an interesting question and while one may choose to define "power" to include the ability to distribute positive payoffs, the fact remains that equating bribery with "power" simply renames rather than explains the phenomenon. Krasner considers two examples of the use of negative economic power, one of which, the withholding of foreign aid, he chooses with the particular recent behavior of the United States in mind. The other example, competing with the target country in third-country markets, does not seem apposite inasmuch as it is firms that decide in a capitalist state where to sell com￾modities.12 Do states actually threaten other states with "competition" in foreign markets? Or do they promise to blunt the competitive activities of their country's firms in those markets in order to secure concessions on tariff policy? Such events seem extremely unlikely, and Krasner provides no reason to make us believe otherwise. There is, however, a much more potent and historically relevant weapon of economic "power" available to the hegemonic state: it can threaten to cut off one nation's access to its rich home market while allowing other nations continued access to that market. Threatening to raise tariffs unless 11. Ibid., p. 322. 12. A partial exception to this is to be found in those cases where a decision not to sell, i.e., an embargo or some form of voluntary export restraint, has been imposed by the state