78 International Organization the target state lowers its own is clearly a coercive policy,even when it is coupled to the"carrot"of preferential access to the hegemonic state's own market in exchange for the target state's tariff concessions.This strategy would seem to be quite attractive to a hegemonic state.By negotiating with other countries in a series of bilateral negotiations rather than in a multilateral setting,it reduces the possibility that nonhegemonic states will cooperate against it,and takes full advantage of the opportunities to play off the weaker states against one another.The selective awarding of access to the home market husbands the hegemonic state's "bargaining chips"and precludes spectators from taking a free ride on the target country's concessions to the hegemonic state (obtaining access to the hegemonic state's home market on the same favorable terms without having to pay any "price"in the form of tariff reductions).Such a policy is also consistent with what Hirschman terms a "power"policy in commercial relations:the deliberate fostering of trade with those states that are most vulnerable to subsequent manipulation via the exploitation of asymmetrical and unequal dependencies created by such trade.13 However,the larger and more developed the target state is,the costlier will be the short-term sacrifices in the dominant state's welfare re- quired to establish the dependency pattern.(Larger,more developed states may not be subject to entrapment in such dependency relations at any price if there is no influential domestic political interest strongly tied to continuing commercial relations with the dominant country;if there is no small group of products that alone earn foreign exchange;if geography does not constrain the choice of trading partners;and if military or other noneconomic influences can be successfully resisted.) Thus,if Krasner's assessment of the role of military force in regime change is correct,the "power"'of the hegemonic state is essentially economic power in an oligopolistic setting.Again,this is not an empty conclusion,but it is quite a departure from traditional balance-of-power arguments about the centrality of military force in the achievement of national objectives. A fourth difficulty with hegemonic stability theory lies in its treatment of regimes as collective goods.While it is true that in large-number (i.e.,com- petitive)situations it has been suggested that"coercion or some other special device"is necessary for the good to be supplied,4 it does not seem very sensible to view the international system as isomorphic with an economic system of perfect competition.Table 1 shows shares of total world trade held by various states and regions in the 19th century.If we consider just the four leaders-France,Great Britain,Germany,and the United States- we find that their total share of world trade was 48 percent in 1850;by 1913 they still accounted for 46 percent.(If we add to these totals the trade of 13.A.O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade(Berkeley:University of California Press,1945). 14.M.Olson,The Logic of Collective Action (New York:Schocken,1968),p..2.78 International Organization the target state lowers its own is clearly a coercive policy, even when it is coupled to the "carrot" of preferential access to the hegemonic state's own market in exchange for the target state's tariff concessions. This strategy would seem to be quite attractive to a hegemonic state. By negotiating with other countries in a series of bilateral negotiations rather than in a multilateral setting, it reduces the possibility that nonhegemonic states will cooperate against it, and takes full advantage of the opportunities to play off the weaker states against one another. The selective awarding of access to the home market husbands the hegemonic state's "bargaining chips" and precludes spectators from taking a free ride on the target country's concessions to the hegemonic state (obtaining access to the hegemonic state's home market on the same favorable terms without having to pay any "price" in the form of tariff reductions). Such a policy is also consistent with what Hirschman terms a "power" policy in commercial relations: the deliberate fostering of trade with those states that are most vulnerable to subsequent manipulation via the exploitation of asymmetrical and unequal dependencies created by such trade.13 However, the larger and more developed the target state is, the costlier will be the short-term sacrifices in the dominant state's welfare re￾quired to establish the dependency pattern. (Larger, more developed states may not be subject to entrapment in such dependency relations at any price if there is no influential domestic political interest strongly tied to continuing commercial relations with the dominant country; if there is no small group of products that alone earn foreign exchange; if geography does not constrain the choice of trading partners; and if military or other noneconomic influences can be successfully resisted.) Thus, if Krasner's assessment of the role of military force in regime change is correct, the "power" of the hegemonic state is essentially economic power in an oligopolistic setting. Again, this is not an empty conclusion, but it is quite a departure from traditional balance-of-power arguments about the centrality of military force in the achievement of national objectives. A fourth difficulty with hegemonic stability theory lies in its treatment of regimes as collective goods. While it is true that in large-number (i.e., com￾petitive) situations it has been suggested that "coercion or some other special device" is necessary for the good to be supplied,14 it does not seem very sensible to view the international system as isomorphic with an economic system of perfect competition. Table 1 shows shares of total world trade held by various states and regions in the 19th century. If we consider just the four leaders-France, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States￾we find that their total share of world trade was 48 percent in 1850; by 19 13 they still accounted for 46 percent. (If we add to these totals the trade of 13. A. 0.Hirschrnan, National Power and theStructureofForeign Trade(Berke1ey: University of California Press, 1945). 14. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1968), p. 2